We look at the World

BY H.V. KALTENBORN

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WE LOOK AT THE WORLD

Not for success alone;
Not to fair-sail unintermitted always;
The storm shall dash thy face—the murk of war,
and worse than war, shall cover thee all over;
(Wert capable of war—its tug and trials? Be
capable of peace, its trials;
For the tug and mortal strain of nations come
at last in peace—not war;)

WALT WHITMAN

H. V. KALTENBORN

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BY H·V·KALTENBORN

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TO MY WIFE

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FOREWORD

AMERICANS are materialists. They are also idealists. No people takes more delight in the business game, none responds more enthusiastically to an ideal appeal. This dualism is as much apparent in our foreign policy as in our business life.

One and one-half centuries of political liberty and personal freedom have made Americans free in spirit. Vast natural resources and unusual business genius have brought unprecedented material success. Our wealth in raw materials, our vast accumulation of capital, our unsurpassed industrial organization assure us a dominant rôle in world affairs. We have power, vitality and ambition. We lack knowledge and experience.

International responsibilities have come so suddenly that they find us unprepared. Our democratic traditions make it impossible for the informed few to dominate the untutored many. We have no kings,

no dictators, no elder statesmen, no aristocracy, no governing class. The people rule, not always well.

Our present task is to teach Americans to look beyond their own factories and their own frontiers. To assume consciously and courageously their destined leadership. In this book an American student of world affairs scans the stream of events from a point of view which aims to escape provocative provincialism without accepting flabby internationalism. He seeks to suggest how broad-gauged American principles can be applied to world problems.

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H. V. KALTENBORN

Brooklyn, New York, March 1, 1930.

WE LOOK AT THE WORLD

CHAPTER I

AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

IF there is in our world a single country which is the abstract and chronicle of the time in which we live, that country is America. All the world is astounded by it and feels its influence. Any one anywhere who wants to do anything on a large scale thinks of America. Whether he sells rubber, seeks credit, buys grain, delivers lectures, leads orchestras, makes movies, or paints portraits, the United States is his Mecca and his Eldorado. Whether his home is in a little Ligurian village or in some world capital, he thinks and dreams of the time when he can market products or persuasion here.

No European thinks of the United States as isolated from the rest of the world. To him it is the place where thousands of his countrymen have sought and found comfort and happiness. If his own relatives have not emigrated to the United States, his friend's relatives have. Through the letters he receives and from the lips of newly made Americans who return to the old home town in Italy or Germany or Norway he hears about the wonders of the New World

and the marvelous things that have happened to those who abandoned the modest security of an Old World livelihood for the great adventure overseas.

Whoever wanders abroad with a seeing eye soon realizes the manifold ties that bind the Old World to the New America. Everywhere peoples and governments are anxious to please us, to interest us, to make us welcome. The American who travels abroad in 1930 feels a sense of power, a sense of opportunity. The American banker, congressman, or publicist finds himself much more important abroad than he is at home. Something of the power inherent in the magic word America attaches itself to his person. He is transfigured and glorified by the strength and reputation of the country from which he comes.

We must go back two thousand years to find a parallel. Not since the ancient Roman proudly proclaimed, "Civis Romanus sum," has such deference been paid to a stranger from abroad.

Let no one suppose that this is only because the world likes us. Apart from an occasional sense of gratitude, expressed by some person who was directly concerned with administering an American post-war charity, there is no feeling that we have ever made an unselfish contribution to Europe. In those countries which were in the war on our side, Americans are still occasionally reminded that they came into the war late and that they returned home without helping to enforce the peace. In the lands of the

Central Powers, the disregarded Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson are still brought up in every conversation that deals with the larger issues of the war and the peace.

Individual Americans whose pro-British and pro-French activities were too pronounced have sometimes helped to bring their country into disrepute. In speaking with their influential foreign friends as well as in public addresses they have misinterpreted their own country, emphasizing the anti-American point of view and confirming Europeans in the natural antagonism created by our detachment from the war, our huge war profits, our refusal to underwrite the peace, and our determination to make them pay their debts.

No prominent Englishman or Frenchman who visited America has ever spoken of his country's political policy in the slighting terms that have been common to some of our blue-bloods. The traveling American leaves the clearest impression of his political immaturity when he discusses home affairs abroad. Often he falls into one of two errors: he either boasts about America, or he condemns his country's policy. In the one case he only offends good taste, but in the other he does violence to a deeper and holier sentiment. One need not hold with those who declaim, "My country—right or wrong," to realize that every traveler owes a certain loyalty to the land from which he comes. Silence concerning it is far more becoming than either boastful speech

or carping criticism. And when that criticism concerns his country's policy toward the country where he happens to be, it may be as harmful abroad as it would be salutary at home.

America is too powerful to be liked. Every one likes Switzerland because no one fears it. But no one knows what America may or may not do. The United States has already purchased or conquered an area larger than the whole of Europe, and no one feels quite certain just what the next turn in our ambition may bring. Europeans are realists and not romanticists in the realm of politics. They know what they might do if they possessed America's power, prestige, and opportunities. Looking back upon our history they observe that territorial aggrandizement has played its part in our development.

The astute European statesman sees us as children playing with the new-won toy of World Power, hardly realizing its value, uncertain whether we wish to break it, throw it aside, or try to do something with it. He would love to have us use it in a way that would be to his advantage, but not being an expert in child psychology, he does not quite know the best way to bamboozle us. He is always sure, however, that a good dose of flattery can do no harm, and he invariably tries that first.

This may help to explain why a beautiful avenue in Paris, the great railroad station in Prague, and the magnificent sea-front boulevard at Montevideo now

bear the name of America's World War president. Little more than a decade ago Woodrow Wilson seemed to the peoples of Europe a new Messiah bringing peace and victory to the stricken lands of the Old World. They lost that illusion soon after the American idealist began his ill-fated debates with the European realists. The tired millions of the Old World, who looked upon his beautiful dream of a new world order and saw that it was good, have not forgiven him the human fallibility which left him unable to translate that dream into a treaty. To-day when they see his name they smile cynically or wistfully over what might have been. Only at Geneva has the world begun to recognize the enduring value of his failure. Whatever else has so far been done in Europe to perpetuate Wilson's memory was the result of a momentary élan or of a lively expectation of future favors. The more sincere and lasting tributes are just beginning.

Whatever Europeans may say about our achievements in military science or the subtle arts of international relations, they cannot and do not deny our skill as bankers and executives.

One American who had a great opportunity to make mistakes that would reflect discredit upon his country is Seymour Parker Gilbert. He has not made them. On the contrary he has shown skill, tact, and patience. During the five years in which he served as Agent-General for Reparations, in Berlin,

administering the Dawes Plan, he never once made a serious mistake. Throughout his term of service he retained the full confidence of German and Allied leaders. The success of the Dawes Plan and the relative ease with which it has been completed and displaced by the more flexible Young Plan are due in no small part to his quiet, intelligent leadership. Qualities like his displayed in the administration of numerous tasks involving delicate international relationships added much to the reputation of British administrators and the British Empire in the last century.

Here is a young man from New Jersey, without previous foreign experience, trained only in American finance, showing his capacity in the Treasury Department during the war, suddenly thrust into the most important administrative job in Europe. Overnight, thanks to the Dawes Plan, he becomes Reparations Czar. He has supervised and administered the most delicate and complicated mass of international financial machinery ever devised by the mind of man. It made possible the accumulation in one country and the transfer to half a dozen others of sums whose very size would have appalled the financiers of a previous generation.

With typical American insouciance, he got married and entered upon his job and his honeymoon at one and the same time. Everything was new and without precedent. He nosed about a bit in Paris and

then established himself in Berlin. Without fuss, with very little publicity, he created and developed the Dawes Plan into a coördinated and integrated whole, securing the coöperation of the German government and people in meeting a terrific burden which they felt to be both absurd and unfair. The Dawes Plan was carried through its fifth and final year, the first year to carry maximum payments, without a hitch, without a serious dispute of any kind. It was an American plan financed largely with American money and administered by an American. Europe may not like us any better for having put it through, but Europe certainly has a high respect for the way in which it was thought out and worked out.

The Young Plan which has now succeeded it, carries on the tradition of American leadership. It has given the world its first truly international bank, an institution which marks the beginning of a new era in world finance. An American conceived it, two American bankers helped create it and two distinguished American bankers are among its directors.

For several years another American ambassador of business sense and good will was in Hungary. Jeremiah Smith of Boston did the same sort of League of Nations job in Budapest that the Dutch Burgomaster Zimmermann did in Vienna. And he was able to do it with very much less friction. Possibly because his task was easier than Zimmermann's, for Hungary is much more nearly self-supporting than

overpopulated Austria. Mr. Smith represented Hungary's creditors. He had to see that the government of Hungary was run efficiently and economically. Let an American imagine how he would feel about an Englishman stationed in Washington to tell us how much we ought to collect from every five-thousand-dollar income and how much we ought to spend in beautifying Washington, and he can visualize the average Hungarian's feeling about Jeremiah Smith. Yet every Hungarian in Budapest will tell you how cordially Smith is remembered. He was so careful not to abuse his authority, to suggest rather than to command, to consider himself as a mediator rather than a dictator, that he won universal esteem in the Hungarian capital. And his farewell gesture of turning over his salary to the Hungarian poor was a delightfully chivalrous reply to European criticism of Americans as Shylocks and money-grabbers.

It was the Dawes Plan more than anything else that gave Europe this confidence in American ability to handle delicate negotiations in international business and finance. They found the American peculiarly able to concentrate on business to the exclusion of politics. He was detached and objective in dealing with financial and economic problems in a way that amazed those Europeans who could only see these things in their relation to politics. American bankers and business men were not concerned with the tenure of cabinets or the policies of political parties. They

dealt with business problems in a businesslike way. At the conference of banking experts from seven nations including two Americans which met at Baden Baden in October, 1929, to frame the charter of the International Bank, there were only two offices to be filled. It is not without significance that a New York banker became chairman and a Chicago banker was chosen to be secretary.

Everywhere in Europe, Old World statesmen speak in terms of admiration about such men as Owen D. Young, General Dawes, the late Myron T. Herrick and Alanson B. Houghton. They have seen them handling negotiations in a way that amazed them. Disregarding precedents and formality, these Americans struck straight at the heart of a problem, never asking whether their intervention might be misconstrued or misunderstood. The fact that something had not been done before was all the more reason why it should be tried. They spoke to the point. It was not necessary to analyze their phrases to see what they meant or to discover hidden motives.

It soon became apparent that they were not diplomats in the old European sense—men sent to lie abroad for their country. They were shrewd, capable men of affairs used to getting things done by the shortest route with a wholesome contempt for delays or subterfuges. It is this that explains the success of Americans in getting all of Europe to accept first the Dawes Plan and then the Young Plan. Europeans

were not used to trusting each other in such vital matters. Whenever they got together by themselves their fears and jealousies threatened to make agreements impossible. At the famous London Conference in 1924, when Herriot faced Marx and their best intentions seemed unable to resolve their differences over the application of the Dawes Plan, it was Owen D. Young and Alanson B. Houghton who helped save the day.

In the morning Mr. Young wandered about the old book-shops of London hunting for first editions and rare old bindings. In the afternoon he conferred with anybody and everybody, throwing out a hint here and a suggestion there, intervening with the right people in the right places, sometimes in person and sometimes by telephone. Unlike the then American Ambassador Kellogg, he had no official standing in the conference, but he always seemed remarkably well informed about what was going on. In speaking with the writer not long afterwards both Chancellor Marx of Germany and Premier Herriot of France expressed the greatest admiration for Mr. Young's successful labors on this occasion. At the Paris Conference of 1928 it required even greater tact and patience to hold the conferees together until the Young Plan was achieved.

When Ambassador Houghton was transferred from his first diplomatic post in Berlin directly to the London embassy, it did not surprise those Americans

who knew something about his persuasive influence in European affairs. Alanson B. Houghton dared to be fair to Germany at a time when such an attitude was generally decried. His sympathetic regard for the difficulties of the German government provoked and emphasized by the Ruhr invasion won him a favored place in the affection and esteem of German leaders. Throughout a difficult period when the French point of view was naturally much more popular with most Americans than the German, he did his best to help Americans see the German as well as the French side of the case. Without being anti-French or pro-German, he pointed out the impossibility of collecting reparations with the bayonet.

When the Ruhr episode drew to its disastrous close —disastrous alike to French finance and German economy—he was in a strong position as a mediator. He used it successfully to further the acceptance and development of the Dawes Plan and to influence the German government to offer France the security pact which was finally signed at Locarno. Some day biographical history will reveal the full truth about the highly important part which official and unofficial Americans have played in most of these critical post-war negotiations.

Only then will the valuable contributions of these individual Americans toward setting Europe on the path of peace be fully known. Because of the political timidity of the American government they

were often obliged to work unofficially and behind the scenes. European statesmen recognized, of course, that they spoke for the Washington administration even though they had no credentials to that effect. When Colonel James A. Logan, America's "unofficial" representative on the Reparations Commission arranged with Premier Poincaré the conditions under which the Dawes Committee was to meet in Paris, he only acted as a go-between for the French premier and Secretary of State Hughes. But the press of those days carried no record of their negotiations.

The American public did not know this and does not know it to-day. The cablegrams exchanged between Hughes and Poincaré through Colonel Logan have never been made public. While the American Secretary of State was using all his influence to persuade the recalcitrant Poincaré to accept the Dawes Commission upon terms that would provide a fair chance for the success of its efforts, the American people were assured that "hands off" was still the corner-stone of our European policy. Some day an anti-isolationist may write a book based on State Department archives which will show what really went on behind the scenes in Washington, from 1920 to 1930, while the bitter-enders on Capitol Hill gloried in our supposedly splendid isolation.

Nor do the people of Europe know—more's the pity—what we have done and what we have tried to do. Small wonder that there is among them a feeling

of envy, of jealousy, of anxiety with regard to that great America of which they have heard so much and which seems to them to act with such unaccountable narrowness and selfishness, holding aloof from the European as though he were some untouchable who had to be kept within his pale.

Fortunately America has been able to afford mistakes. Our material strength is so great that it offsets a certain spiritual weakness. Americans traveling abroad explain our failure to be consequent and logical in foreign policy on the ground of home politics. The European does not understand altogether, but he knows enough about the game played by political leaders to realize what a mess they can make of things. Yet in Europe parties and politicians do not, as a rule, interfere too directly in foreign affairs. There is a fairly continuous line of foreign policy under a succession of ministries. The permanent under-secretaries continue the established policy and routine. When Ramsay MacDonald, the Labor leader, became Premier and Foreign Secretary of the British Empire in 1924, he was surprised to find how small a dent he was able to make in the conservative traditions of British imperial policy.

To carry on some sort of broad-gauged foreign policy and at the same time satisfy the narrow views of home politicians, Charles Evans Hughes devised the extra-legal expedient of unofficial delegates and observers. They were all things to all men. Seen from

America they represented only themselves. Seen from Europe they represented the repository of the world's most important raw materials, the only available source of credit, the greatest accumulation of political power since ancient days. For ten years hardly a month has passed in which America has not been a mighty power in some great international conference dealing with world problems. And at those few conferences where we were not officially or unofficially represented, there have always been unauthorized American spokesmen on the side-lines basking in the reflected glory of their country's prestige, answering on their own poor authority the anxious question: What would America say if she were here?

Ever since 1918 individual Americans, American influence, American credit, American machinery, and American charity have worked constructively in rebuilding the world.

In Italy, liberty-loving Italians who are fretting under the tyranny of Fascist rule recall America's democratic faith and look forward to the time when they may find freedom and opportunity if not at home then beyond the seas. When Mussolini's envoys tell them that democracy and efficiency cannot exist together they point across the Atlantic and inquire: "What of America?"

In Greece, American relief agencies coöperating with the League of Nations look back upon one of the finest achievements of organized charity in all

history. Hundreds of thousands of refugees were established in camps, cared for, transplanted to new homes, given work, and placed on the road toward renewed economic independence. Instead of continuing to be a terrible burden, the Greeks expelled from Asia Minor by the Treaty of Lausanne, who had arrived in their ancestral home penniless and helpless, are contributing to the welfare and development of the country which was all but overwhelmed by the problem they presented.

In Palestine, the intelligent use of the millions, contributed by American Jews to what many Jews still regard as a vain ideal, has transformed desert land into fertile fields. The Zionist state as a political entity will never be realized. But for the force represented by Great Britain's mandate over Palestine, the Arabs would drive out the Jews to-morrow. They outnumber the Jews six to one, and could count upon the support of all their brethren in the surrounding lands. Yet no one can talk with those who now call Palestine homeland without realizing the spiritual strength of their ideals. In Russia, Poland, Rumania, they were scarcely tolerated. Here they are the lawfully established descendants of the ancient race which called this home.

American Jews are happy in America, and few of them are willing to exchange the manifold opportunities they have for the hard manual labor and communal living that await them in a Zionist settlement.

But they are willing to provide the money needed to help their less fortunate brethren. American companies have purchased land, built houses, created settlements, established industries. Some of them are already paying interest on their investments. Of all the movements which Americans are sponsoring in foreign lands, none has a more practical and at the same time a more appealing aspect than the transformation of the arid hills of Judea into flourishing agricultural settlements to be peopled by those who look upon bleak Palestine as the promised land.

In the course of an interview with the Egyptian Minister of Agriculture in Cairo, I found his thoughts turned to quite another aspect of America. He was much concerned about two things, the elimination of the boll-weevil and the introduction of modern ploughing. The cotton crop is Egypt's chief source of wealth, and the boll-weevil is the cotton-plant's greatest enemy. He had just had word from Washington that the United States government would lend him two entomologists from the Department of Agriculture, experts in fighting the boll-weevil. They were coming to Egypt to supervise a vigorous campaign against the pest.

Egypt is America's most important rival as a source of cotton. Egypt's young government appreciates the unselfish willingness of the United States to lend its experts to help Egypt compete more effectively with the cotton farmers of our own South.

And yet the agricultural minister's greatest enthusiasm, expressed with equal readiness in French and English, was reserved for the American tractor. In his estimation the American Constitution is a small contribution compared with the production of cheap mechanical power for agricultural operations. He sees Egypt's fields enriched, her agricultural methods revolutionized, her prosperity multiplied many times by that American genius for large-scale production which delivers tractors at a price which even Egypt can pay.

And in Spain, where I had the privilege of interviewing the king, I found Alfonso XIII a great admirer of still another phase of American life, one that also has an international character. He is an enthusiast about American sportsmen and American sportsmanship. Himself a devotee of sport he admires those who love sport for sport's sake and who excel in it. He himself plays an excellent game of tennis, and in the polo game which preceded my interview, he rode his horse and handled his mallet with a skill that would have made him valuable to any team.

The king marveled at the speed with which Americans develop dexterity in any game. He knew the names and qualities of our polo players and expressed a keen desire to see them in action on Long Island. "But the task of being king keeps me rather busy here," he remarked with a suggestion of wistfulness.

Perhaps he was also thinking of the republican movement which has gained ground in Spain and which may seek to overthrow both king and dictator with a single revolution.

A few days later I was walking with Edouard Herriot, ex-premier of France, in the beautiful garden back of the Petit Bourbon, the charming miniature palace he occupied as president of the Chamber of Deputies. Our talk turned to peace, and I told him how much America appreciated the contribution which France had made under his leadership through coöperating in the Dawes Plan and in Geneva's efforts toward disarmament. He was full of reminiscences about his visit to America, the profound impression created by its lusty young strength and its eager aspiration for a better world. "We must work together," he said, "for peace, France and America. I will do everything I can."

In England there is a new note of appreciation of America and Americans. It paved the way for close coöperation in the limitation of armaments and led to the London Conference. Scepticism with regard to the United States has given way to a feeling of admiration for America's industrial and financial power in world markets and for our political contributions to World War settlements. The contrast between British unemployment and American prosperity plays its part in this revaluation. "Westward the course of empire takes its way," still seems the rule of destiny.

As it moved from Greece to Rome, from Rome to Spain, and from Spain to England, so world leadership to-day is moving across the Atlantic to the New World. It is not always easy for our British brethren to concede America's right to parity and leadership. We can afford to be patient since time and the current of events are on our side.

But world power is not yet finally established under the Stars and Stripes. Ours is an opportunity. Much still remains to be done if we are to realize it. The good old British stock that has produced generations of world leaders in an area smaller than any one of our larger States has not died out. It is doing good work at home and abroad. The fact that Great Britain now recognizes her wayward child of the New World as an equal in world power and world councils is a compliment that we have sometimes appreciated more in promise than in performance.

Fundamentally there is a marked similarity in the democratic traditions and political ideals of the English-speaking peoples. This possibility of joint power should be used for the world's good. When we protested because a British colonial government used government intervention in a vain effort to maintain an artificial price for rubber, we showed our immaturity. Certainly our government has never manifested any consideration for foreign producers or consumers in dealing with tariffs on foreign goods or with prices on our own. Objection against the high

price of rubber came with particularly poor grace from a country which has usually permitted our speculators to have their own way in boosting the price of cotton, copper, wheat and other raw materials which the rest of the world was compelled to purchase in our markets.

Americans who wander abroad with seeing eyes realize the amazing growth of our foreign interests. Politically, financially, industrially, we have become integrated with the Old World to an extent which few of us appreciate. The World War and its results have produced a change in our foreign interests and relations as profound as any development in our history. America's power and America's opportunity are world-wide. Isolation or insulation from foreign entanglements is alike impossible and inadvisable. We cannot turn back. We must go forward facing our destiny. We have already won material power. We must achieve spiritual leadership. Piling up wealth is only a beginning. It is a means, not an end. We must now go forward in true comradeship with those nations which are striving to establish peace on earth. We cannot do it through self-aggrandizement, in selfish isolation. We can do it by responding graciously to those generous instincts and traditions which are the most precious part of our American heritage.

CHAPTER II

THE WORLD'S FRIENDLY ASPECTS

AMERICANS always want things done in a hurry. Having made up our minds—since 1918—that peace and not war is the normal and proper state of the world we have become very impatient with belligerent Europeans, revolutionary Latin Americans and yoke-bearing Orientals who venture to seem to disagree.

Our present mood transforms Britain's war-time slogan "Business as usual" into "More business than usual." War impedes business so we want none of it. We don't think much of any people or government that insists on quarreling now that we have shown the world how simple it is to forswear war.

A turning point in history is reached when the strongest power in the world becomes an enthusiastic peace champion. Most small countries are naturally peaceful since they cannot well afford to be otherwise. But when the nations which are mightiest in material power join hands with those that are weakest to "renounce war as an instrument of national policy" it means the beginning of a new era.

How far have we really advanced? What are the next steps?

It would be a mistake to seek the answer to these questions only in the field of politics. Anti-war treaties, arbitration agreements, conventions for the reduction of armaments are indeed significant. But their true meaning is lost unless we see them as the result of something else that lies deeper and goes farther.

We are told that laws crystallize accepted standards of conduct. In the same way treaties which aim to prevent war express new standards of international conduct. They grow out of the conviction that war is an unnecessary, cruel and wasteful way of achieving national ends. They express a larger measure of mutual confidence among peoples. They respond to the growing demands of national business for international markets. They reflect the integration of the world through the miracles of science. They tell one part of the story of man's slow progress from barbarism to brotherhood.

If the Pact of Paris had been flashed full-panoplied upon an unprepared world it might mean as little as Communist condemnation of private property. But it is more than a theory. It expresses in treaty terms a profound aspiration of the post-war world. In his inaugural address President Hoover said twice as much about peace and disarmament as about anything else. He spoke as the leader of that nation

which could most easily develop armaments and wage war. Yet his appeal for peace was the high note, emotionally and rhetorically, of his address:

"It is impossible, my countrymen, to speak of peace without profound emotion. In thousands of homes in America, in millions of homes around the world, there are vacant chairs. It would be a shameful confession of our unworthiness if it should develop that we have abandoned the hope for which all these men died. Surely civilization is old enough, surely mankind is mature enough, so that we ought in our life to find a way to permanent Peace. . . . Peace will become a reality only through self-restraint and active effort in friendliness and helpfulness. I covet for this administration a record of having further contributed to advance the Cause of Peace."

That was a good beginning. President Hoover has made good progress in achieving for his Administration the peace record which he covets. What he said on March 4th, 1929 he has repeated in different words on various occasions. Nor have his actions belied his words.

In Herbert Hoover, we have the first American President who has the international mind. A cosmopolitan succeeded a New Englander. A world traveler succeeded a man whose two days in Cuba sum up his contact with foreign soil. The first eight weeks of the Hoover Administration marked more real progress toward American membership in the World Court,

and toward agreement with Britain on naval armaments, than all the years of the Coolidge régime. It is apparent on the basis of what has already happened that under the leadership of Herbert Hoover the United States will acknowledge more frankly and accept more courageously the international leadership forced upon us by our predominant wealth, power and position.

The problems facing world diplomacy are difficult but not insuperable. The experts who met in Paris in the spring of 1929 worked out an international cooperative solution of the financial entanglements remaining from the war. A new generation of the German people cannot be held in economic bondage on the untenable theory of an exiled Kaiser's exclusive war guilt. Common sense recognizes that and the final reparations settlement has recognized it also. Settling war debts has long since become an international job to be handled as a coöperative undertaking. The League of Nations has already completed successfully several lesser undertakings of this nature. The repatriation of refugees and the financial rehabilitation of Austria and Hungary showed how the leading powers acting jointly can easily accomplish tasks which the strongest power could not face alone.

Whether or not this country formally joins the League of Nations, Geneva's influence will constantly expand. Our membership in the World Court, our helpful official participation in the League's ef-

forts toward disarmament, our active coöperation in the work of a dozen important League Committees are direct contributions to the expanding prestige and power of the Geneva organization. When an American President again confronts the United States Senate with the formal acceptance of the League of Nations Covenant, it will be apparent that the payment of our share of League expenses is about the only additional obligation which actual membership will entail. To those who have watched the waning influence of the much-quoted Article Ten of the Covenant, this statement will not seem surprising.

Once the Senate accepts the Capper resolution, which proposes to "put teeth into the Anti-War Pact," that treaty will just about be on all fours with the League Covenant in the matter of sanctions. The League Council and Assembly by successive decisions have weakened the League's threat of force against aggressor nations. The actual text of the League Covenant was too far in advance of world opinion. The Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Treaty as limited by various reservations appears to lag behind it. "A vague pious gesture" one Senator called it, during the ratification debate. Yet a few months later the American Government used it to justify the most constructive disarmament proposals ever brought before the world. And when war threatened to break out between Russia and China in 1929 the American Secretary of State reminded both powers that they

were pledged under the Anti-War Treaty to preserve peace. Both acknowledged the obligation. A second reminder which was neither timely nor necessary brought us a deserved rebuff from Soviet Russia, but we were able to say even then that our warning proved effective.

League members, under their own interpretation of the Covenant, have the right to decide to what extent they will participate in sanctions against an aggressor state. The United States, under the Anti-War Pact fortified by the Capper Resolution, would be pledged to go at least as far as an economic boycott. There is little doubt that in a clear case of aggressive war the United States would find itself coöperating with the League powers in joint economic and financial sanctions against the aggressor.

At the London Conference on Naval Limitation in 1930 it was proposed that the United States fortify the Anti-War Treaty by signing an agreement to consult with other signatories whenever peace is threatened. We signed such a consultative clause in the Pacific Treaty of 1922 and this precedent is cited as justifying such a step.

On the American Continent, the League of Nations and the United States are working towards the same end, the consolidation of peace. That became evident in January, 1929, when the joint influence of the League Council under the chairmanship of Aristide Briand, Foreign Minister of France, and the Latin-

American Conference of Washington, under the chairmanship of Secretary of State Kellogg, prevented war between Bolivia and Paraguay.

Here was a case of League interference in American affairs. Narrow-minded American nationalists might say that it violated the Monroe Doctrine. But the purpose of the League was identical with that of our Government. Both sought to prevent war. The Bolivian Government, which, in this instance, was far more aggressive than that of Paraguay realized that in waging war it would go counter to the organized opinion of both the Old and the New Worlds. So it yielded gracefully, paying tribute to the League Council by accepting its suggestion to arbitrate the dispute, and paying tribute to the Pan-American conferees in Washington by permitting them to establish the arbitral tribunal. In January, 1930, when a second appeal for peace by the League Council became necessary Geneva's "interference in a purely American issue" did not even cause a ripple in Washington. We are becoming accustomed to coöperating with the League in Europe and to having it coöperate with us in the New World.

Comparatively little publicity has been given to the highly important arbitration and conciliation treaties adopted in January, 1929, by the Washington Conference of American states. In these agreements the United States has obligated itself very definitely to arbitrate justiciable differences with Latin-Ameri-

can Republics. We coöperate in the creation of a permanent conciliation body which will be ready to act the moment an emergency develops. In effect we have accepted something akin to the optional clause of the World Court to govern our relations with the Latin-American Republics.

Peace lovers owe a great debt of gratitude to Chief Justice Hughes and to the Coolidge Administration for the notable advance in Latin-American relations reflected by the Pan-American Conference at Havana in 1928 and the later decisions of the adjourned meetings of the Conference in Washington. Followed as they were by President-elect Hoover's admirably organized and most intelligently handled good-will journey to our southern neighbors they mark the beginning of a more auspicious era in the mutual relations of the three Americas.

How much easier it was for the Hoover Administration to deal with the problems created by the Mexican Revolution of 1929 because friendly relations with the Mexican Government had begun with the arrival of Dwight Morrow, the new American Ambassador in Mexico City! The decision to give moral and material aid to the established Federal Government was immediate. We had given it official recognition. We were interested in helping to restore order and to maintain economic stability. We did not and do not sympathize with some of the more

radical proposals concerning property and religion carried out by the Obregon-Calles groups while they controlled the Government. But we are wise enough to recognize that friendly relations make us more influential in securing modifications of such radical policies than continued hostility.

There may be occasions when armed revolution is the only way to oust a corrupt and arbitrary Government. But in most instances the régime that assumes power by force is no better than the corrupt Government which revolution destroys. Every time the selfish attempt of disgruntled military leaders to seize power fails the cause of good Government gains. Not all backward peoples are ripe for democracy and continued revolutions rarely help to make them ready for it.

The case of China is an exception. The Nationalist Revolution of China is a true revolutionary movement of the best type. Sun Yat Sen, who fathered it, was an unselfish idealist who devoted his life to the advancement of his people. He borrowed his Three Peoples Principles from various sources but they present a concrete program that responds to China's needs. China was disorganized and he preached National Union. China was the bond-slave of foreign powers and he preached National Independence. China was poverty-stricken and he preached National Well-Being.

China's economic recovery and development may

soon astonish us all. Her people are born traders. The visitor to China is impressed with the evidence of individual wealth and commercial genius. No people has a greater capacity for hard work. With a population of 450,000,000 coming into the world market as producers and consumers there are opportunities in China to which the world is only awakening.

Just such opportunities have internationalized business. Most countries now depend upon foreign trade for their prosperity. Each year exports and imports represent a larger proportion of the world's total business transactions. With the increase in foreign business comes the growth in foreign investments. Within a few years Americans have placed $28,000,000,000 of their accumulated capital abroad. Tariffs and investment restrictions impede but cannot prevent this elimination of national boundaries by the business world.

Bankers and traders have become good-will ambassadors. They often do more than accredited diplomats to develop closer relations among peoples and to remove misunderstandings. They have a material stake in peace that goes far beyond a pious aspiration. Peace means business, war means bankruptcy. Hard-headed business men and financiers have developed the international mind and have become, almost unconsciously, leaders of the peace movement.

International trusts and cartels, the great oil combinations, financial syndicates, the exchange of se-

curities on the world's stock markets evidence the material side of this movement. There are similar developments in other fields. One need only recall the internationalism of science, the progress of air transportation, the miracles of radio to realize the strength and diversity of the cultural and social ties which tend to diminish the importance of geographical and political boundaries. In 1929 Aristide Briand formally launched the idea of the United States of Europe from the rostrum of the League Assembly. In 1930 the leading powers of the world met at Geneva to discuss a tariff truce.

The anarchy of complete national liberty is developing into the democracy of international law. Every expansion of the rules that govern all nations is bound to restrict the arbitrary action of each individual nation. If we recall that the first international meeting of a scientific conference took place in Germany in 1828 and that the International Red Cross was not founded until 1863 we must realize that this world spirit is only in its infancy. Real progress has been made. But a far greater advance lies just ahead.

CHAPTER III

THE WORLD'S DANGER SPOTS

THERE is another type of danger spot unrelated to the rivalry of armaments on the map of international affairs. It grows out of the relation of less advanced peoples to those who are superior to them in physical power, if not in civilization. Many peoples classed as backward by a Western world which rules, benefits and exploits them have become restless and ambitious. Manchuria, India, Egypt, Palestine and Syria are some of the disturbed areas where bloodshed has resulted because natives have risen against foreign rule and control and have sought to establish their national identities.

A whole series of new problems confronts the empire builders of the last century because the World War taught "backward" peoples to resent a foreign yoke. Their contributions to Allied victory gave these weaker peoples a new sense of power. They were needed and exploited for war purposes. When the war was done they sought their reward in larger independence. Promises were made to them in times of stress. They ask that these promises be redeemed

and refuse to believe that they are not ready for that larger liberty to which they aspire.

Palestine

The most dramatic clash upon which the world's attention has recently been focused occurred in Palestine in the summer of 1929. The long-simmering conflict between Arab and Jew broke out in open massacres. Hundreds of Jews were killed and injured by Arabs and a somewhat smaller number of Arabs were killed and injured by Jews. Stung by a minor instance of Jewish arrogance the Arabs began the slaughter, and almost over night the conflict spread throughout Palestine. The slow and painful work of reconciliation which had made progress for some years was all undone by the events of one unhappy week.

Today the two races face one another in the Promised Land in definite deep-rooted antagonism. There is a commercial boycott which seriously handicaps the country's economic life and only the presence of British troops prevents further massacres. The British Commission of Inquiry will doubtless divide the blame for what has happened. That is what such commissions usually do. More important will be its recommendations on how to restore permanent peace between Jew and Arab.

The writer visited Palestine in 1925 and traveled

all over the country again in 1928. In the latter year he received the distinct impression that relations between Jews and Arabs had improved, and this impression was confirmed by high officials. The British Government had taken a firmer hold and its general policy had become more pro-Arab and less pro-Zionist. This was partly due to the economic difficulties which followed too rapid immigration. The Zionist organization had brought more Jews into the country than could find employment on the land. Too many had concentrated in the new Jewish city of Tel Aviv where the economic crisis was severely felt. In Jerusalem also there was much temporary unemployment. The British authorities restricted immigration and began to exercise more rigid control over the economic side of Zionist activities.

It is not fair to the Zionist movement to say that its sole purpose is to people Palestine with a large number of Jews in order to obtain political control of the country. It must be remembered that the pressure on the organization for places in Palestine is severe. Many Jews in such countries as Poland and Rumania have waited years for a chance to go. It is only natural that they should complain bitterly to their local Zionist headquarters when their hopes are frustrated.

American Zionists supply most of the funds expended in Palestine but the most passionate devotees of the Zionist cause are to be found in Europe. To visitors in Palestine the political side of the

movement seemed far less important than it had appeared when viewed from the United States. The antagonism of many prominent American Jews to the idea of a Jewish state created a false impression of the movement as a whole. As one confronted Zionism in Palestine it appeared to consist largely of an attempt to establish a Hebrew cultural centre and to provide a means of livelihood and freedom from persecution for some of the unhappy residents of Europe's ghettos. To be sure the young people of the colonies often emphasized their pride in being privileged to play a part in rebuilding what they spoke of as "our country."

In 1928, when Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews were uniting their efforts in the Jewish Agency, the political side of the movement seemed still less important. Even the Zionists admitted that they had no hope of governing the country in the near future. Many of them were eager to reëstablish the same happy relationship with the Arabs which prevailed between Jewish centres and native villages before the war.

In November, 1929, Dr. Judah L. Magnes, Chancellor of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, launched a movement to abandon political Zionism altogether. The Jewish Agency dominated by Americans, which has now replaced the Zionist organization in Palestine, might well favor this change in emphasis as helpful to a solution of the Arab problem.

Britain has been unable to be fair either to the Jews or to the Arabs because she promised too much to both. In January, 1916, Sir Henry McMahon speaking for the British Government, promised help in the formation of an independent Arab empire whose boundaries were to include Palestine. In 1917 the Balfour Declaration promised to establish in Palestine a homeland for the Jews. The two promises were and are incompatible. The Jews brought into Palestine $5,000,000 a year, intelligent leadership and modern methods. They purchased land from the Arabs, developed intensive cultivation and established for themselves a far higher standard of living than had previously prevailed among the natives.

Their presence and competition have stimulated the Arabs. The young Arabs have become more eager for education, and much larger numbers are attending universities. The Arab leaders have now organized a fairly successful campaign to prevent the further sale of land to Jewish organizations. They are determined to fight every effort of the Jews to obtain additional privileges of any kind. Since they have the sympathy of their blood brothers in Syria, Irak, Transjordania and Egypt the British Government will not find it easy to resist their demands. The Arabs still represent close to seventy per cent of the Palestine population and that proportion will not soon diminish.

As one confronts the self-sacrificing devotion of Zionists in Palestine, it is difficult not to sympathize with their aspirations. They have cherished a dream and have now begun to realize it. Many of their agricultural colonies have done well, and the young people who till the soil are imbued with the faith and zeal that moves mountains. There are only 160,000 Jews in Palestine, yet they have worked miracles in those parts of that barren country which they have occupied.

The statement that there is room in Palestine for three million Jews is an exaggeration. Yet there is no reason why intensive development of agriculture, further exploitation of the limited natural resources and the gradual development of industry to supply local and neighbor country needs should not provide a good livelihood for several times the present population.

The essential thing is the development of harmony between Arab and Jew. The British Government has failed to achieve it, but far-sighted Jewish leaders may bring it about. It will be easier to satisfy the Arab people than the Arab leaders. They are zealous fanatics who refuse to have anything to do with compromise. Still, if peace is maintained, and a reasonable amount of prosperity continues, there is no reason why the non-political aims of Zionism should not be realized without prejudice to the Arab population.

Syria

One need only cross the border from Palestine into Syria to realize that the British Government is not the only one which has encountered difficulties in the administration of a mandate. Until the 1929 riots in Palestine almost every traveler was impressed with the peaceful progress of the Arabs ruled by Britain in contrast with the constant difficulties between Arab tribes and the French in Syria.

Damascus, the Syrian capital, is still a shell-torn city. Artillery parks, tanks, armored cars and the French uniform are to be seen everywhere. External evidence suggests a military occupation, rather than the peaceful administration of a mandate. Whereas all British soldiers were withdrawn from Palestine before 1928 and the native constabulary sufficed to preserve order until the 1929 riots, French soldiers have never ceased to dominate Syria.

Until recently France considered her administration in Syria as a military problem. The first three French governors of Syria were soldiers rather than administrators, and they behaved accordingly. The failure of Generals Gouraud, Weygandt and Serrail to understand the temper of the population was very largely responsible for the bloody clashes between the desert tribes and the French Army of occupation.

Syria, like Palestine, is a poor country, but it has

far greater possibilities for development. In talking with the writer in 1928, the Minister of the Interior of the Syrian Cabinet insisted that his country has more undeveloped fertile land than Egypt. Syrians resent the separation of the fertile coastal district of Lebanon from the rest of the country. The Nationalist Syrian leaders declare that they will never be satisfied until there is a United States of Arabia which includes Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Irak, Transjordania, Djebel Druze and the Alawite state.

When the Syrians adopted their first constitution in 1928 they included an article which reads: "The Syrian territory separated from the Ottoman empire is a political integral entity that cannot be dismembered; the dismemberment of this territory effected after the great war is illegal and therefore inadmissible."

Western observers are inclined to regard Syria and Palestine as presenting two separate and distinct problems. It is true that they are administered by two different mandatory powers who are jealous and suspicious of one another in this part of the world. But it must not be forgotten that the League of Nations is the final authority with respect to all these mandates. In recent years there has been increasing pressure upon the League from organized groups who live in mandated territory which has had the promise of eventual freedom. That pressure will increase and

in time both the League and the Powers which are now exercising the mandates will have to yield to it. The Arabs will certainly never be satisfied until they have a much larger measure of independence than they now enjoy. They are working towards it in all the mandated lands of the Near East. The British Government has already promised to help Irak, a neighborland of Syria and Palestine, to become a member of the League of Nations by 1932. With Irak independent other Arab lands will insist more vigorously on the elimination of alien leadership.

French and British control is gradually giving way to native rule. It is safe to predict that before another decade has passed we will see the beginning of a united Arab state under the beneficent protection of the League of Nations. That is what the British promised the Arabs when they persuaded them to enter the war on the Allied side. There is no good reason why that promise should not be kept.

Egypt

Under the second Labor Government of Ramsay MacDonald, Great Britain is making ready to grant a larger measure of independence to both India and Egypt. In both countries there has been disorder and bloodshed as a result of the agitation for larger liberty. Egypt's nominal independence was acknowl-

edged in 1922, but not until 1930 was a British Parliament ready to face an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which grants actual independence. When that agreement is finally ratified it will make highly important changes in the status which was established in 1922.

No stranger in Cairo could think of Egypt as an independent country after having visited the citadel which dominates that city with British artillery served by red-coated Tommies. The first human beings one is likely to see upon entering the harbor of Port Said are British soldiers lounging about in front of their fine barracks building located at the strategic point of the harbor entrance. Under the proposed new Treaty this force of occupation is to be withdrawn. While British troops will be permitted to protect the Suez Canal, in the future they will be restricted to specified localities in the Canal Zone.

Thus far Egypt's foreign policy has not been independent. The British Government has interfered in various ways. Under the new treaty an alliance is established between Egypt and Britain under which the two countries coöperate in their foreign policy and agree to render mutual assistance in case of war. Practically this gives Britain a continued interest in Egypt's foreign affairs, but the obligations are mutual and Egypt's full sovereignty is recognized. Foreigners are to be subject to Egyptian law. The

jurisdiction that formerly rested with the Consular Courts will be transferred to mixed tribunals.

The new treaty even goes so far as to recognize Egypt's shadowy claim to the Soudan. When the last Egyptian troops were ordered out of that territory several years ago after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar, it was generally believed that they would never return. But the British government proposes a generous gesture. The status of the Soudan is to remain as it was under the 1899 convention. A battalion of Egyptian troops will again return to that territory as a visible sign that it is still the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan. Another important concession to Egyptian pride is that there will be no British High Commissioner resident in Cairo. Instead Britain and Egypt will exchange ambassadors and Egypt is to be received as a member of the League of Nations with Great Britain's support and approval.

From a neutral point of view this arrangement seems both generous and fair. British Conservatives will oppose it and it is more than possible that Egypt's ardent nationalists will reject it. Mustapha Nahas Pasha, ex-premier and president of the Wafd, the Nationalist Party, told the writer in 1928 that his party would never be satisfied with anything short of the complete elimination of British influence from Egypt. He impressed one as an agitator and a demagogue rather than a serious statesman, whereas

Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha who succeeded him as dictator-Premier in 1928 and who helped negotiate the new treaty with Britain seemed much more of a practical realist who recognized the necessity of approaching independence by degrees. Yet he was obliged to resign and the Nationalists once more won an overwhelming majority in the elections that followed.

Egypt's hot-heads will continue to make trouble whether or not the Egyptian parliament accepts the new treaty. But as soon as the British troops have disappeared from the cities and there is no British High Commissioner who can be charged with issuing orders to a supine Egyptian Government, the native agitators will find it less easy to stir up their people.

Much depends on Egypt's economic progress. Further irrigation works, the diversification of agriculture, an improved cotton crop and continued development of the tourist trade are enhancing Egypt's prosperity. Out of the population of fifteen million there are more than twelve million peasants, most of them illiterate. They are interested in politics only in so far as they can be made to believe that the success of this or that party will enhance their economic well-being. The Wafd leaders have been successful in stirring them up about independence. It will be an easy matter for them to denounce the new treaty on the ground that it makes but little change in existing

conditions. The peasant is in no position to judge. He will continue to vote for Nationalists as members of the Egyptian Parliament. So it will depend upon the leaders of this party whether the mutually fair arrangement embodied in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty goes into effect.

India

In India Britain's problem is much more serious. Here is an area of 1,800,000 square miles with 350,000,000 inhabitants, of which only some forty million receive any kind of education. It is difficult for an American to conceive of anything except paternalism and autocracy in such a country. He may be wrong. It is possible for a people to have political intelligence without formal education. Natives of India claim that this is the case in their country and they resent the unfavorable conclusions about India reached by observers who bring Western prejudices to the consideration of Eastern problems.

Ever since Margaret Mayo's much discussed "Mother India" appeared, Indian legislatures have set out to reform the conditions she revealed. Yet the same patriotic Indians, who are doing their best to remove the evils which her book called to the world's attention, refuse to admit that she told the truth. She certainly did not tell the whole truth, but what book is great enough and large enough to do that?

Even the traveled Indian is so used to a fatalistic acceptance of the evils which surround life in the Far East that it comes with a shock when any competent Western investigator analyzes and pillories those evils as though they could readily be removed.

One who has enjoyed college companionship with natives of India at Harvard must have the highest regard for the personal charm and high intellectual capacity of some of the diverse people who inhabit that mother-land of the world. It is not necessary to know much about Indian art or philosophy or religion to understand why such people must resent Western domination. Their way of life and their attitude towards life are so different from ours that it seems utterly unfair and unreasonable that we should try to impose our views and our methods upon them. Nor should it be forgotten that the British went to India not to help the Indians but to help themselves. India has contributed much more to the British Empire than it has received. To-day India asks for independence. In so far as the people of the country are voicing any aspiration it is a demand for freedom from alien rule. They would probably be worse off if they obtained it, but neither in India nor elsewhere does that consideration weaken the independence movement.

For some years it looked as though force would speak the final word in India's fight for freedom. Today, the chances for a peaceful solution are somewhat

better. Despite Conservative opposition in England, the British Government has moved steadily towards granting the native demands. Local native legislatures were initiated as far back as 1921, and there has been consistent progress towards a larger measure of self-government since that time. On October 31st, 1929, Lord Irwin, the British Viceroy, declared in Delhi that he had been "authorized on behalf of the Government to say clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the Declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of a dominion status."

The special British Commission headed by Sir John Simon completed in 1930 a careful study of the whole situation in India. That Commission is preparing recommendations as to how Dominion status can best be approached. The MacDonald Government has announced a round table conference between representatives of the British Government of British-India and of the native Indian states which may meet before the end of 1930. The first step will be the report of the Simon Commission which will suggest a new Indian policy to the British Parliament.

The question here, as in Egypt and elsewhere, is whether the native radicals can be persuaded to accept a slow approach towards the goal of complete independence. While it is not possible to anticipate the Simon report, it seems inconceivable that it will

recommend a reactionary policy. The bitter feelings of India's Nationalists were brought home to the members of the Commission in many ways. They must realize that extremely limited concessions would only make matters worse and would feed fuel to those who demand complete independence. To recommend almost immediate dominion status would be a bold step. It would be resented and resisted by conservative British opinion. Yet it may be Britain's last chance of preventing an outburst of unrestrained violence in India which would make a peaceful solution of the self-government problem impossible.

Manchuria

In far-off Manchuria, the world confronts a danger spot of quite another kind. Here Russia, China and Japan have long faced one another in a conflict of control over one of the world's richest undeveloped territories. Japan has now given up the idea of colonizing Manchuria—Japanese farmers were unable to compete with the poorer and more hardy Chinese—but is determined upon its economic exploitation. The Soviet Government of Russia promptly relinquished the political claim of its imperial predecessor to any part of Chinese territory, but it has made vigorous efforts to penetrate Manchuria with its political propaganda on behalf of Communism. China's new-found sense of National-

ism makes both the Government and the people resent the presence of either Russia or Japan on Chinese soil.

It must be remembered that Manchuria is an integral part of China. Until Chang Tso-lin's death in 1928 this Manchurian war lord insisted on Manchuria's independence from Nationalist China but under the leadership of his son Chang Hsueh-liang the Mukden Government has acknowledged the leadership of the Nanking Government. At various times both Russia and Japan have sought to detach Manchuria from the rest of China, and it is always possible that they may still succeed in doing so by bribing or intimidating the Manchurian provincial government. But such an alienation would probably be temporary. Both Manchuria and the rest of China need the strength which they can draw from one another to resist the encroachment of powerful neighbors.

Chinese Nationalist sentiment has spread rapidly in North China and in Manchuria since 1927. It would be easy for Nationalist agitators to intrigue successfully against any government of Manchuria that sold out to either Russia or Japan.

The Tokio government has changed its Manchurian policy. The so-called "positive policy" of Baron Tanaka's government in 1927 and 1928 probably represents Japan's last attempt to dominate any part of China by the use of force. In recent years

such attempts have not paid. They have prejudiced the Chinese people against the Japanese Government and against Japanese traders. The footless military expeditions into Shantung which culminated in a vain effort to prevent the Nationalists from reaching Peking resulted in an economic boycott against Japanese goods throughout China that proved disastrous to Japanese economy.

There is in present-day Japan a general determination to work with rather than against China. China is Japan's most promising market. The colonization of Manchuria by Chinese, which the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway is now promoting, will offer the one thousand Japanese corporations already established in that territory great opportunities for further development. It will mean the creation of much additional traffic for the excellent South Manchurian Railway system which is already highly profitable. No power can successfully compete with Japan in the economic development and exploitation of this area once the Japanese succeed in winning the friendly coöperation of the Chinese authorities. Such coöperation is far more important than the abortive Lansing-Ishii agreement which conceded Japan's special interests in all adjacent territory.

China's attempt in 1929 to oust the Russians from North Manchuria by seizing control of the Chinese Eastern Railway was bound to fail. China was too weak and Russia too strong to make that coup de

main advisable. Under a 1924 convention this important one-thousand-mile link of the Trans-Siberian which cuts 500 miles from the distance between Moscow and Vladivostok and links up with the Japanese lines running through Manchuria and Korea is jointly owned and managed by the Russians and the Chinese. The Chinese Government seized it in July, 1929, and ousted the Russian employees on the ground that they had used their position with the railroad to foment anti-Chinese propaganda. By conducting a series of punitive raids across the Manchurian border in November, 1929, the Soviet Government forced the Chinese authorities into negotiations which resulted in the reëstablishment of joint management of the railroad, on the old basis.

Ultimately China will buy out Russia's interest in this road. China would also like to purchase the South Manchurian Railway owned by Japan, but it will be some time before any Japanese Government will consider such a sale. The Chinese have not yet learned how to own and operate railroads on an efficient basis. Any one who has traveled on a Chinese railway is impressed with Chinese incompetence in railway administration. The civil war is largely responsible but even after peace is restored the Chinese will require time to learn the secrets of railroad management. Until recently they were too willing to let foreigners take all the risks and make all the profits in the transportation field.

In Manchuria, China has the great advantage of facing a conflict of interest between Russia and Japan. The obvious solution of that conflict is to permit China to be mistress in her own house. Moscow might wish to make Manchuria a Soviet state, but would certainly prefer Chinese to Japanese control in that neighbor territory.

Japan is now seeking to make China an ally. Her statesmen realize that this is impossible if they attempt to develop political control of Manchuria. Well equipped and highly competent Japanese troops are policing the lines of the South Manchurian Railway. Japan is well prepared to preserve order if there should be any threat of civil war in this region. She proved that in the early years of the Nationalist revolution. Her chief present interest is peaceful penetration. She welcomes the solution of the Sino-Russian conflict because it means larger opportunities for Japan in Manchuria and in the development of transit trade over the Trans-Siberian Railroad. She resented American and British intervention because it diminished her influence in supervising the settlement. Japan is far less imperialist and much more democratic in 1930 than it was in 1920. The second national election under a system of universal manhood suffrage in February, 1930, gave further emphasis to her liberal development.

Like most of the other danger spots of the world, Manchuria is less of a problem now than it was

a few years ago. There is to-day a more general agreement that force is a poor way in which to settle danger spot problems. The agitators for independence and for radical solutions do not like the compromises which are being made. But we are living in a business age which is dominated more and more by the common sense of commerce. When peoples grow restless and chafe under restraint the leaders of common sense policies organize conferences from which compromises develop. Such compromises may not be final solutions, but they are milestones on the straight road towards that complete independence which we have taught mankind to regard as the great goal.

CHAPTER IV

OUR FAR-FLUNG EMPIRE

THE United States is about the only country controlling a considerable area of colonial territory which could get along very well without it. Compared with the possessions of either France or Britain, our territorial dependencies are insignificant. The total population of Alaska, the Canal Zone, Porto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, the Samoan Islands and Guam is only 13,000,000. Their total area is 717,000 square miles of which Alaska accounts for 591,000. By way of comparison British Nigeria in Africa, which most of us know nothing about, has a population of 19,000,000 while the combined area of Rhodesia and Tanganyika, two of Britain's less important African colonies, equals the total area of all our non-contiguous territory.

A similar comparison can be made with French overseas possessions. French Indo-China has a population one and one-half times as large as that which lives under the American flag beyond our shores. In the matter of size, the French Soudan in

Africa has an area only a little less than that of all our non-contiguous territory. Even Portugal, which is not usually thought of as a colonial power, has a colonial population about equal to that of all our dependencies, while the area she controls is much greater.

Strictly speaking we should not refer to our overseas territories as colonies. Porto Ricans, Alaskans and Hawaiians are American citizens, while Filipinos vigorously resent an American visitor's reference to their islands as "possessions." The Samoan Islanders have an undefined and peculiar status as the inhabitants of an American Naval Station. Our Canal Zone residents also have a status peculiar to themselves.

While all these areas are comparatively small, they are most diverse in character. Take, for example, Alaska and Porto Rico. The one is 169 times as large as the other. Yet the smaller of the two is 4,205 times as thickly populated and has twenty-four times as many inhabitants as Alaska. In one we confront Arctic zone and in the other Tropic zone problems.

Practically all our outlying territory has come to us within the past thirty years. Even Alaska was a kind of No Man's Land so far as any general interest in it was concerned from 1867, when we bought it, until the Gold Rush of 1898 called it to public attention. And according to Alaskans, the Gold Rush was a "bum's rush" which left them worse off

than they were before. Compared with France which acquired Algeria a century ago and Britain, which has been in India twice that long, we are undoubtedly novices in the fine art of colonial administration.

Our acquisition of non-contiguous territory has been largely a matter of accident. Other powers have envisaged and followed out a consistent policy of imperial expansion through long periods. The United States has only indulged in haphazard empire building. It was not until we became engaged in the Spanish-American War that the eyes of American statesmen opened to colonial opportunities. The leaders in Washington then decided that what manifest destiny had thrust into our hands could not and should not be relinquished.

The Samoan Islands, Hawaii, the Philippines and Porto Rico were ours, before the mass of the American people even realized what had happened. William Jennings Bryan soon made himself the champion of anti-Imperialism. He and his adherents declared that the American ideals of liberty and democracy were out of tune with efforts to compel a foreign people to live under the American flag.

But the opportunities of Imperialism are tempting to a young and lusty people. Opposition went for naught. Aguinaldo and his brave little army fought vainly for the independence of the Philippines. Porto Rican opposition to annexation never had a chance to

develop. In the Hawaiian Islands the weak-willed native rulers had already been displaced by hardy American trader-revolutionists whose repeated appeals to the United States for annexation were finally heeded.

We have now presided over the destinies of foreign peoples for the life time of one generation. What have we accomplished in that period? To what extent have we reconciled the natives to American rule? How much have we contributed to their development and well being? What is the present status of the independence agitation in Porto Rico and the Philippines? What are the ambitions and aspirations of those who people the distant territories under the American flag?

The average American gives little thought to such questions. They do not concern him personally, and he is willing to let the authorities at Washington answer them as best they can, and in whatever way they will. When a long drawn out struggle between an American Governor-General and the native Philippine Legislature threatens the tranquillity and prosperity of these distant islands, Congress may become a little restive. When a tornado still further cripples the pauperized natives of Porto Rico, American charity responds with a generous gesture. And when the seventy-year-old aunt of Governor Roosevelt proposes to fly to Porto Rico we may even locate the island on the map. But ordinarily, no one in the

United States pays much attention to these overseas territories. They are not considered vital to our safety or well being, and for most of us the white man's burden concerns home problems only.

Yet the time is coming when all this outside territory will be of much greater importance. Before long Alaska will be our only source of native timber and Alaskan waters our chief source of sea food. Already our Island territories are sending us a large proportion of our growing imports of tropical products, and that proportion is constantly increasing. Philippine sugar imports already involve political and economic problems. If we think of these various territories in terms of naval preparedness, it is obvious that for Panama Canal defence, as protected harbors, as coaling bases, as wireless and aviation stations, as repair and supply depots, they are worth more to us than several fleets of warships.

The inhabitants of colonies, territories or possessions are never satisfied with their treatment by the home government. Dissatisfaction is more or less loudly expressed, depending on political and oratorical ability, the extent of native liberty and the degree of native irritation. Grievances there always are. It is to the credit of the United States that we have usually permitted our wards to say what they like about us. Wherever there has been dissatisfaction it has been openly expressed, and we have rarely restricted its expression.

Because discontent is voiced freely and frequently it attracts little attention. Many an American who reads and understands Spanish has been surprised and shocked to learn upon arriving in Porto Rico or in the Philippines what some of the native newspapers are saying about the United States Government and its representatives. Sometimes these newcomers cry "treason" and ask for the punishment of the offending "traitors." They are then informed that such expressions are not taken seriously and that it is considered just as well to let the native publicists exercise the American privilege of free speech. Where criticism is untrammeled, secret machinations are less likely.

We have also been wise in recognizing the inhabitants of Porto Rico and natives of the Hawaiian Islands as American citizens. They have a just pride in their status, and it has turned their struggle for privilege and power away from ideas of independence and towards larger participation in administration under the American flag. The Hawaiians are already dissatisfied with their territorial status. When asked shortly before he resigned what he believed that his people desired most, Governor Wallace M. Farrington replied in one word: "Statehood."

Porto Rico is asking for similar privileges and even in the Philippine Islands some far-seeing native leaders have substituted the demand for complete local

autonomy for the old cry of "complete and immediate independence."

Hawaiian Islands

The Hawaiian Islands are far and away the most prosperous of our overseas territories. Their enormous sugar and pineapple plantations are the chief source of wealth. These large and highly profitable estates have remained in the hands of a relatively small group of Americans. Half a dozen families originating from descendants of frugal Christian missionaries who sometimes inter-married with the aristocratic Hawaiian families constitute the financial and social arbiters of Island life. They control not only the plantations, but the steamship lines, public utilities and other outstanding enterprises.

The large Oriental population provides plantation labor and dominates trade. The Japanese, in particular, have created for themselves an enviable position. Nowhere in the world can one find a happier or more prosperous group of Orientals. The younger generation is proud of its American citizenship and so far as this territory is concerned the racial problem is non-existent. The Hawaiian Islands are one of the few places in the world where every prospect pleases, and man himself has no excuse for being vile.

Greater diversification of agriculture is needed to assure prosperity when the price of sugar is low, or

when the Philippine crop becomes more important. Hawaii's leaders are progressive and enterprising. They will be equal to any problem that may arise. When the United States frowned on the further importation of cheap labor from the Orient, they developed machines to take its place. They created the profitable pineapple industry out of nothing in a decade. They have taught the world how scientific cultivation can double a sugar crop. By applying temperate zone hustle to tropic zone opportunities they have produced a per capita prosperity which surpasses anything ever known under southern skies. Man and nature have combined to make these islands one of the world's most appealing tourist resorts.

Porto Rico

A contrasting picture is presented as one turns to Porto Rico, which might well be called Uncle Sam's stepchild. This lovely island has been unfortunate economically and politically. The American corporations which have developed it have nothing more than a money-making interest in the Island. The usual evils and conflicts of absentee ownership have resulted. The corporations have paid low wages and low taxes. Conflicts between them and the native legislature have been constant with a fair amount of blame on both sides. The governors we have sent to rule over Porto Ricans and to look after their wel-

fare have not always been of a high type. Theodore Roosevelt is the first one who had more than a local reputation before entering upon this important office.

The per capita wealth of Porto Rico is only about one-sixth that of the United States despite its nearness to our shores. Living under our tariff and our fiscal system it has a very high cost of living as compared with near-by islands under British or French rule. On the other hand nearness to the profitable American market and free entry for all Porto Rican products give the Island an important economic advantage. In 1928 President Coolidge translated this into facts and figures for the benefit of discontented Porto Ricans.

Early in our Administration we gave Porto Rico a large measure of self-government. This has resulted in numerous conflicts between American executives and the native legislature. The legislature has not always been fair in dealing with American corporations, and these corporations in turn have been less interested in developing the prosperity of the Island. The corporations insist that they are overtaxed, and the native leaders point out that the Island is always in the throes of a financial crisis. Both are right. Professor Haig of Columbia University pointed out the real difficulty when he said: "The entire revenue system is faulty; every part of it requires reform if it is to function efficiently and with precision." Perhaps we should have sent the Dawes Commission on finan-

cial reconstruction to Porto Rico as well as to Santo Domingo.

That the Porto Ricans are dissatisfied with the present state of affairs became evident in February, 1928, on the occasion of the visit of Col. Charles A. Lindbergh to the Island. The Legislative assembly passed a concurrent resolution welcoming him and voicing Porto Rico's demand for a larger measure of autonomy. The Resolution addressed to the people of the United States declared: "Grant us the freedom that you enjoy, for which you struggled, which you worship, which we deserve, and you have promised us."

There is unfortunately little evidence that the Porto Ricans would make good use of a larger measure of autonomy if it were granted. The municipal administration where the natives are in control has not been an unqualified success. Lack of money, inexperience and a propensity for graft share the blame.

The chief source of dissatisfaction is the universal poverty of the Porto Rican natives. For this, overpopulation and the parlous state of the sugar industry are largely responsible. Spanish remains the chief language of the Island despite the efforts of American school teachers. As time goes on English will come into more general use, and as autonomy develops there will be less incentive for the native politician to emphasize the study and maintenance of the Spanish language. Porto Rico's immediate

political demand is an elective governor, and there is every indication that this demand will soon be granted. That Porto Rico is far better off to-day than it was under Spanish rule was pointed out by President Coolidge in his letter of February 28th, 1928. Emigration, birth control and diversification in agriculture would reduce poverty. But it is easier to suggest such far-reaching remedies than to apply them.

Alaska

Alaska and the Philippines present the most interesting contrast in the problems that grow out of our administration of dependent territory.

Alaska's vast and unexploited areas, its harsh climate which locks it away from the world most of the year, the absence of ready means of communication throughout its vast area and the entire lack of any general interest in its progress or development combine to give it an unenviable position. Although Alaska has produced nearly one billion dollars' worth of products since this territory has been under our control, little is being done even to-day to develop its vast natural resources. It has been called America's last frontier, and still presents practically all of the frontier problems.

A few years ago the Federal Government completed a $60,000,000 railroad from Seward on the coast to Fairbanks 300 miles inland. But the result

has been disappointing. Development has not followed as rapidly as we expected. The coal which lies exposed in surface veins along the line of the railroad is of low grade, and reindeer meat, of which large quantities are now available, has not yet become a popular food.

In the administration of Alaska, a score of Government Bureaus and Departments are pulling at cross purposes. They overlap and conflict in various functions. Because of their distance from Washington, the central authorities respond slowly and inefficiently. There have been many proposals looking to the coördination and consolidation of federal activities but so far little has been accomplished. Perhaps President Hoover, who visited the territory with the late President Harding a few years ago, will effect some of these practical changes which were suggested to him in the course of that journey. He referred to them in his first message to Congress but he will have to make a vigorous effort to overcome apathy and opposition before they can be put into effect.

The Philippines

What a contrast of interest and immediate opportunity is presented by the Philippines! On every American ship proceeding to the Islands two debates occupy the eager attention of the passengers. One concerns the future political status of the Islands—the other relates to the opportunities for capital in-

vestment. On both subjects opinions differ widely, but the passionate eagerness displayed by those who debate them indicates a vital interest in current problems not usually found in tropic regions.

The absolute independence of the Philippine Islands is not now a problem of practical politics. The United States could not and would not grant independence and the native leaders do not really want it, even though they may say so for political effect. Emilio Aguinaldo, one-time leader of the forces that fought against the United States, is courageous enough to admit openly that independence would be undesirable. Other outstanding native politicians, Emanuel Quezon, Sergio Osmena and Manuel Roxas, leaders of the Filipino legislature and well known in the United States from their frequent visits to this country, do not find it expedient to broadcast their real opinions. They have gained their eminence and power by championing the cause of Philippine independence. They have become convinced that complete local autonomy under American sovereignty provides the best solution for their political and economic problems, but independence is always a popular slogan, and they want to have it available for use against an unpopular or arbitrary Governor-General or a Congress that might seek to restrict the free entry of Philippine products into the United States.

Soon after arriving in the Philippine Islands you will learn that there are 1,600 islands in the group—

that the population consists of eighty-seven different varieties of human beings, that the waters around the islands contain 1,600 different kinds of fish, that the soil produces 532 food plants, that there are more kinds of birds than in all North America, that 3,000 different trees have already been identified.

Everywhere in the archipelago nature luxuriates. It has been estimated that the 63,000,000 acres of unoccupied public domain in the Philippines could produce all the tropical food products consumed in the United States. There are Americans in Manila who say that if the Philippine legislature would withdraw the restrictions with which it surrounds the development of rubber plantations, American capital and enterprise would soon see to it that enough rubber was grown in the Islands to satisfy the entire American demand.

While the Philippine Islands are kept within the American tariff wall, there is little question about their continued well-being. The population already enjoys the highest scale of living to be found in the Orient. Every type of Asiatic is eager to obtain access to the Islands, and the smuggling of aliens has become even more of an industry than it is in the United States. There were abortive attempts to impose a tariff on Philippine sugar during the tariff discussions of 1929 and 1930. After they failed the Democratic "sugar" Senators of Utah and Louisiana sought to attach a declaration of independence for the Philip-

pines to the tariff bill. It had no place in such a measure and was easily defeated. Yet the mere fact that it was seriously proposed after the Senate rejected higher tariff rates on sugar is a reflection on the sincerity and good faith of the American people in meeting their responsibility to these Islands. We have promised ultimate independence. But we certainly do not propose to force this upon an unprepared population in order to impose a tariff against Philippine sugar.

The mass of the population is still ignorant and undeveloped. Most Americans who go to the Islands favorably disposed towards Philippine independence come away with the conviction that the time when the United States can abandon the responsibilities which were assumed so lightly and casually is not yet at hand. The native political leaders are unusually able and intelligent and exercise a great deal of power over and through local office holders. But the people are helpless and subservient and suffer from exploitation by unscrupulous minor officials.

For the first twenty years of the American occupation the Filipinos were told at regular intervals that we were going to make them independent. Then, for some six years, Governor-General Leonard Wood had the ungrateful task of telling them that they were not ready for independence and that it could not come for some time. Antagonism between him and the native leaders soon developed and matters had

reached an absolute deadlock in 1927 when he left for the United States on a journey which proved to be his last. He did a superb piece of administrative work, but lacked the ability to persuade rather than command. His successors owe him a great debt of gratitude for making their task much easier.

Acting Governor-General Eugene A. Gilmore inaugurated the era of reconciliation which was carried forward in 1928 by Governor-General Stimson. Ex-Secretary of War Davis who succeeded Colonel Stimson in June, 1929, has continued the policy of coöperation between the legislative and executive branches of the Government. But he will have to prove himself a strong executive and also something of a politician to handle the clever native leaders who dominate the Filipino masses. There are some who doubt that the amiable Davis will be equal to this task. The anti-Filipino outbreaks in California early in 1930 created further difficulties for him. They are explained by the economic competition of cheap Filipino labor which emphasizes dormant racial antipathies.

In spite of our repeated promises to make the Philippines independent, it is unlikely that we will do so before fifty years have passed. The best for which the natives can hope is local autonomy with Uncle Sam exercising a protecting and also a restraining influence in matters of finance. The Islands need our capital and we need their products. The rich

plateau lands can produce almost everything that is grown in our Southern States while the forests and lowlands can supply us with those tropic foods and raw materials of which we consume such enormous quantities.

A comparison of our administration of dependent territory with what has been done by Britain and France shows that we have been fairly successful in spite of our inexperience. In such matters as education, sanitation, road building, and commercial development we have actually done extremely well. Wherever American administration has been established, the inhabitants are much better off than they were before. They are not always satisfied. We teach them not to be. Sometimes they have just cause for complaint, yet despite our erratic policy and occasional incompetent officials we have carried our overseas burdens with fair success. We sometimes forget or neglect our wards. But on important issues we have always shown a keen sense of our responsibility for the welfare and progress of all who live under the American flag.

CHAPTER V

OUR LATIN NEIGHBORS

WITHIN a few years Latin America seems likely to rival the United States in population and in foreign trade. Immigration is rapidly augmenting its present population of 100,000,000 and the world's growing hunger for tropical products means a rapid expansion of business and buying power in most southern countries. There are interesting parallels between the speedy growth in population and economic power of the United States since 1880 and the situation faced by Latin America in 1930. We must remember that the progress of science and invention has doubled the speed of all development so it is not going to take Latin America five decades to catch up to where we are now.

It requires two tours of Latin America, made at an interval of about ten years, to appreciate the rapidity of present-day progress in these Republics. Their modernized capitals, excellent railway systems, the advance of industry, their new facilities for education and the emphasis on cultural achievement are a few of many outward signs that civilization is

marching with giant strides across these vast areas where nature does her best to hamper man.

To-day the one hundred million people of Latin America are absorbing new American capital almost as rapidly as the five hundred million people of Europe. The weight of American trade and American investment is shifting away from Europe towards the New World. Latin America already accounts for almost one-fourth of our total foreign trade, and has already received more than one-third ($5,500,000,000) of our total private foreign investments.

Our political interest in all parts of the New World is perhaps even more important than our economic interest. One need only mention the Monroe Doctrine and the Panama Canal to show why this is so. Europe may be able to drag us into war, but it is one of the chief functions of our foreign policy to keep twenty Latin American nations out of war. Our efforts to do this without wounding their national pride or trespassing upon their national independence have created problems for which we have not always found the right solution.

Almost every American President has differed from his predecessor with regard to our responsibilities and our privileges under the Monroe Doctrine. The mutability and flexibility of this Doctrine have been much to our advantage. We have freely intervened in Latin America wherever and whenever we pleased without creating too much stir in Old World

Chancelleries. Originally intended to prevent Europe from seizing any more territory in the New World, the Monroe Doctrine has developed a variety of aspects of which its founders certainly never dreamed. Within a few years we have used it to justify four different types of intervention.

When a revolution occurs we assume the right to pick the "Constitutional Party" and by our moral and material support assure its victory. We did that in Nicaragua during the Coolidge Administration and in Mexico under President Hoover. To Nicaragua we sent troops. In the 1929 Mexican revolution moral and material aid sufficed.

If there is a continuance of disorder in one of the smaller Latin Republics we do not hesitate to take control by force of arms. Then we manage the country until we have installed a régime which will do as it is told and which has sufficient power and ability to control the country. This type of intervention led us to Haiti in 1915 and has kept us there ever since. In 1930 we sent a Commission to Haiti to tell us how and when we could abandon military supervision.

We hold it to be improper for European powers to enforce debt collection against any country in the New World. Hence it follows that we must ourselves assume responsibility for the payment of some debts or for the cancellation of others. This obligation brought us to Santo Domingo in 1916. In this country we now exercise only financial control.

The Coolidge Administration justified a fourth type of intervention in Nicaragua. The State Department announced that Mexico sought to build up a "Bolshevist hegemony" throughout Central America by encouraging the revolution led by Nicaraguan Liberals. Thus one justification for sending marines to Nicaragua was to prevent the spread of economic and political ideas with which we disagreed.

Whether we approve or disapprove American action in these cases we must admit that we have expanded and broadened the original conception of the Monroe Doctrine. It must also be remembered that in all these instances the United States acted on its own initiative. We consulted no other Latin American power and coöperated with none. To say, as Secretary of State Kellogg did, that we went to Nicaragua at the invitation of the Government of the country, is not telling the whole truth. President Diaz was a usurper who held office only because he was our tool. The Liberal revolution was on the point of succeeding when we intervened. The elections which we supervised brought into power the very group against which we had intervened.

When it was suggested to President Coolidge that the United States acted somewhat arbitrarily in the matter of intervention he replied "the principle that property is not to be confiscated and the duty of our government to protect it are so well established that

it is doubtful if they should be permitted to be questioned."

He even went so far as to assert the right to send our armed forces anywhere at any time that there is a threat against the safety or the property of an American. "The person and property of a citizen are parts of the national domain even when abroad. We must be prepared for armed intervention in any portion of the globe where disorder and violence threaten the peaceful rights of our people."

Fortunately, other Presidents have emphasized a more peaceful purpose. In his famous message to Congress delivered on January 22nd, 1917, Woodrow Wilson asked that the Monroe Doctrine be applied "as the Doctrine of the World." But by his interpretation the Doctrine's true meaning is "that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."

Twelve years earlier, Theodore Roosevelt also stressed limitation of the Doctrine. In his 1905 message to Congress he said: "If a Republic of this Continent commits a tort against a foreign nation, then the Monroe Doctrine does not force us to interfere to prevent punishment of the tort save to see that the punishment does not assume the form of territorial occupation." President Roosevelt added that it is not United States policy "to use armed forces for the collection of ordinary contract debts due to

its citizens by other Governments." "To do so," he said, "is not consistent with respect for independent sovereignty."

Just before taking office President Hoover visited our Latin American neighbors and told them that our common veneration for the ideals and traditions of liberty and democracy constitute a bond of union among us. Since his inauguration he has repeatedly denounced "dollar diplomacy" and deplored intervention for the collection of private debts.

It is because our southern neighbors fought for their independence against arbitrary powers just as we did, that they cherish their freedom from foreign control and resent what they regard as an arbitrary exercise of power by the "Colossus of the North." This explains why Latin Americans do not share our impression that the Monroe Doctrine is an unselfish guaranty of independence generously offered by the United States to the peoples of the New World.

Some years ago the International Law Congress which met in Rio de Janeiro passed the following resolution on the Monroe Doctrine. "The International Law Congress declares that when the Monroe Doctrine was first announced it was in line with American interests, but later interpretations as developed and applied by the United States, because of their elastic and exclusive character, are perilous for Latin America and opposed to its interests. Whether or not they are intended to confer benefits, they rep-

resent an infringement of the vital sovereignty of these states. They constitute an imposition and they restrict the application of international law."

Dr. Lucio Moreno Quintana, a leading lawyer of Argentina, put the same sentiment somewhat less politely when he said: "The Monroe Doctrine is not a doctrine of America for the Americans, but of America for the North Americans. It has served as an admirable instrument for the United States to separate Europe from America, and to establish its hegemony over the latter. The United States has at all times been preoccupied in obtaining concessions of every kind at the cost of the sovereignty of the rest of the American states. The doctrine is dangerous because it is North American Imperialism cloaked under a principle of international law."

It is the feeling thus expressed that accounts for an attempt at the Sixth Pan-American Congress at Havana in 1928 to pull the teeth of the Doctrine by forbidding one state from occupying the territory of another, no matter what the pretext. Thanks to the diplomatic skill of Charles Evans Hughes this proposed resolution never came to a vote. The fact that we were so well treated at that Congress should not make us forget the real feelings of Latin Americans on this subject.

Perhaps some day it will be possible to expand the Monroe dictum into a multi-lateral doctrine proclaimed by all Latin American powers, large and

small. That idea was persuasively presented to me some years ago by Baltasar Brum, then President of Uruguay. "You North Americans love to talk about Pan-Americanism," he said. "But that implies the absolute equality of all powers in the New World, whether they are large or small. It means that we ought to join together to protect one another against outside aggression. If you will let Latin Americans join with you in the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine as a practical expression of American solidarity, all hostility to it will disappear."

What Dr. Brum proposes is, in effect, an adaptation of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to the American continent. It amounts to a mutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence. Our super-nationalists will scorn it, yet unless we are prepared to coöperate with the powers of the New World in the spirit of the League of Nations the time will come when they will either create a Latin League of their own, or else will look to Geneva for that unselfish coöperation which the League Covenant implies.

During the next few years we will have many opportunities to demonstrate friendliness towards Latin America. We must soon build the Nicaragua Canal. The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty grants us the right to undertake construction. Several of Nicaragua's neighbors whose rights are affected by that Treaty protested against it and appealed to the Central Ameri-

can Court of Arbitration which had been set up under our auspices. This Court decided the case against us. We refused to accept the decision and the Court collapsed. The issue will arise again. When that time comes we should accord the claims of Costa Rica, Salvador and Honduras more generous treatment than we have in the past.

We have a dispute pending with the little Republic of Panama. We claim complete sovereignty over the Canal Zone. The Republic of Panama declares that she ceded to us only such sovereign rights as are directly related to the maintenance, operation and protection of the Canal itself. The Panama legislature has refused to approve a Treaty which gives us practically complete power over Panama in case of war.

It should be possible to find a formula which would grant us all the rights we might need as a belligerent and which would also show due deference on our part for the maintenance of the complete sovereignty of this little state. Roosevelt's notorious phrase: "We took Panama" need not make us act as though we owned it. Latin Americans have a weakness for form and formality. It is a small matter for us to recognize that weakness and pay deference to it. What Panama thinks of us may be of little importance. But what nineteen other countries feel about the way we treat Panama is important.

Our tariff policy provides a more difficult issue be-

tween ourselves and the countries south of the Rio Grande. Cuba and Argentina are two of our best customers, yet our tariff appears to be directed especially against them and against those products of their soil which they seek to sell us in exchange for our manufactured goods.

Cuba's sugar has long paid a high duty and may some day have to pay a higher one. This, despite the fact that most of the important sugar plantations are owned by American capital, are operated with American machinery and agricultural implements, and are under American management. Argentina, which in 1928 replaced Cuba as our best American customer, buys almost as much from us as Brazil, Colombia and Chile taken together.

Because we seek to protect the American farmer, our tariff aims directly at Argentinian products. Our sanitary restrictions against seeds, fruits and meat products provide an additional grievance, and there is evidence that we have sometimes enforced our customs regulations in an arbitrary spirit. This has led to retaliation and bitterness. Yet despite feeling aroused in Argentina over these matters our trade with that prosperous and progressive country has increased by nearly three hundred per cent since prewar days. We sold Argentina $159,000,000 worth of goods in 1928 whereas she was able to sell us only a little more than $99,000,000 worth.

When President Hoover was in Argentina he lent

a sympathetic ear to the President of that country who explained some of these difficulties. But this did not prevent him from raising the rate on Argentina's flax seed from forty to fifty-six cents a bushel when the Coolidge-picked High-tariff Commission recommended it.

James Bryce once called Argentina the United States of South America. There are interesting parallels in the development of the two countries which suggest comparison. Buenos Aires with its subways, its beautiful avenues, its world-famous newspapers, its luxurious Jockey Club, its superb public buildings and its admirably organized municipal government is one of the outstanding cities of the world. It is the great capital of a great country. Wealth and progress are evident everywhere. Argentinians are buying 800 new American motor cars each week. It is the Argentinian demand for up-to-date American appliances which accounts for the fact that Argentina receives more than one-fourth of her total imports from this country. The six hundred million American dollars now invested there provide an additional stimulus to our trade.

There is every reason why, in dealing with tariff problems between the two countries, we should take into account the interests of the American banker and exporter and of those far-seeing Americans who believe that most profit lies in dealing with our southern neighbors in a spirit of true reciprocity.

Sooner or later we will place Latin American countries on a quota basis with respect to immigration. This implies no discrimination as all European countries are already on that basis. But care must be taken in the enforcement of such provisions. We should certainly not discourage Latin American students from coming to our universities. They have matriculated here in large numbers, some being sent at public expense.

Their whole-hearted enthusiasm about our country and its ways when one meets them at home and talks with them about their student days indicates what a great help these young men and women can be in developing mutual understanding and appreciation.

It would be unfair to give readers the impression that the United States has been altogether selfish and arrogant in relations with our southern neighbors. We have often tried hard to be friendly and many times we have succeeded. It is our brusque attack, our indifference to what Lord Chesterfield called the graces, our failure to understand Latin psychology that often ruin our well-meant efforts.

The work of the Pan-American Union under the able direction of Dr. Leo S. Rowe is a real contribution to Pan-American unity. The Washington Treaties signed in January, 1929, represent a generous and far-reaching gesture of good will on the part of the United States. The new conciliation treaty pledges the signatories to submit to the procedure of

conciliation "all controversies of any kind which may arise between them for any reason and which it may not have been possible to settle through diplomatic channels."

Two prominent regional concilation boards, one with headquarters at Washington, the other located at Montevideo, Uruguay, are to stand ready to act in any emergency that may arise.

We have also signed the new arbitration treaty which binds us to submit to arbitration all differences of an international character which diplomacy can not adjust provided they are "juridical in their nature." The only differences exempted are those within the domestic jurisdiction of any of the parties in dispute and those which concern a state not a party to the treaty.

Public opinion in the United States will not realize the importance of these treaties until some situation arises in which they are called into play. Certainly, if it were our deliberate intention to act in arbitrary fashion in pursuing our rights in this hemisphere, we would not have signed such treaties. The Anti-War Pact which most Latin-American countries have signed with us is further evidence of our desire to settle differences with major or minor powers by the peaceful processes of arbitration.

Our contribution to the settlement of the Tacna-Arica question which separated Chile and Peru for half a century was at first clumsy and inept but

our persistence brought results. Colonel Stimson mediated skillfully between the two factions in Nicaragua, and Ambassador Morrow's admirable work in settling our disputes with Mexico is further evidence of our fundamental good will. We have subsidized air lines that link the three Americas with a daily mail and passenger service. New steamship lines and cables, the better development of press services in both directions and larger knowledge and understanding have all created more intimate relations.

In an unpublished address before the assembled diplomats of Latin America in the early weeks of his administration, President Hoover gave eloquent evidence of his keen desire to divorce American policy from any suggestion of material selfishness. We don't need that kind of advantage to be prosperous. We do need frequent expression of the fact that we recognize our Latin neighbors as equal sovereign powers, who are friendly rivals with us in contributing to the material and spiritual progress of the New World.

CHAPTER VI

PROPAGANDA LAND

WE are in the Krasnaja, the huge Red Square of Moscow. Well-filled street cars, plastered with signs advertising political meetings clatter past the graves of Communist heroes under the Kremlin wall. Troops of young Communists march past behind the Red flag and the bugler, on their way to a demonstration. The inevitable crowd is gathering in front of the squat structure, half-Egyptian, half-cubistic that houses Lenin's body. With Russian patience they will stand in line for hours to await the opening of the gates. In a side street a loud-speaker is blaring forth carefully selected news items. The daily radio newspaper is being published so that he who runs may hear.

This is propaganda-land. Nowhere else does a government devote itself so religiously to the spreading of ideas. The Red Square in Moscow is the beating heart of the Communist world, and no one is permitted to forget it. In the public garden, plants and flowers have been forced into unnatural relations to outline the hammer and sickle emblem. Some devoted

gardener has even arranged thousands of small plants of diverse shades of green into a tolerable portrait of a bearded Red leader who has passed to his reward.

The moving picture house around the corner is advertising "The Little Red Devil," a propaganda film of the war between the White and the Red armies. The posters show the three young Communist heroes, a girl and two boys, white and black. There are no sex or race distinctions in Red Russia.

Groups of workmen are emerging from the former Club of the Aristocrats, across the street. It has become a Communist headquarters. From the Kremlin tower the ancient bells will soon chant the "International" not only for passers-by in the Red Square; but for the peasants in distant villages gathered about radio loud-speakers in their local reading-rooms to hear the censored news items that precede the chimes.

In Russia playing on the mass-mind is the chief business of the Government. If the Russian people were governed as well as they are propagandized, the Red régime would stand as a model. Communism considers commercial advertising as economic waste. Hence advertising experts and poster artists devote themselves to advertising Communism. Non-Communist organizations are forbidden, so the social instinct expresses itself through clubs and societies devoted to helping some department of the Govern-

ment achieve its Communist purpose. Party clubs, trade-union clubs, factory clubs abound. There is an Association of Friends of the Air Fleet with 3,000,000 members, and a Chemical Defense League of 1,000,000. Every organization must be directly related to the aims of the State. Social intercourse is a waste of time. A devout Communist resembles a devout Methodist in that he does not dance. Not for moral reasons, of course, since Communists are unmoral, but because it is a frivolous, purposeless, time-wasting bourgeois custom.

On May first as well as each October the Red Square is the scene of one of those great mass-demonstrations which provide such a dramatic expression of the Communist idea. Throughout the world, Communists celebrate the anniversary of Russia's October Revolution, "the first great triumph of the proletariat." The climax comes in Moscow's Red Square. Radio receivers in remote villages enable all Russia to share the anniversary addresses by Red leaders and the audible parts of the special programs. The manager of Russia's radio corporation expressed keen regret that television has not been developed to the point where all Russia might see as well as hear this Red Square pageantry.

Glorification of the mass in parades, pageants and processions is a Communist Government's idea of a proper celebration. The people play a part themselves. They are actors as well as spectators. Dummy

figures of foreign statesmen are paraded so as to give the crowd a chance to revile and ridicule them. At the end of the day the people will even be permitted to tear these dummies to pieces.

Demjan Bednij, the bard of the people, thus sings the conquest of the world by the masses:

Million-footed, yet with one body. The pavement groans.
Million masses; one heart, one will, one step.
Right, left! Right, left!
They march, they march.
Right, left! Right, left!

Out of the soot-covered factory district,
Out of moldy cellars, dirty alley-ways,
There steps the new master!
His fingers bend and break with strength of steel,
The thousand-year-old chains that bind him;
Like bloody splotches the Red flags fly over him,
Steeled fists reach heavenward; the Bourgeois whines;

The new Master speaks:
"This is all mine!
Streets, palaces, canals, the bourse, the bank,
Halls, granaries, gold, stuffs, food, drink,
Libraries, theatres, museums,
The poet's poem, the singer's song;
The towers, ships, domes, lands—
Are mine, all mine!"

What this poet sings is no longer a vague dream. In Russia, libraries, theatres, schools, museums, poems and songs have but a single purpose or justification: to record, teach, exemplify the achievements of the masses under their own proletarian rule. The Russian Government is strong because it is single-minded, desperately earnest, devotedly purposeful.

"The world is armed against us," a high official of the Foreign Office said to me. "We are surrounded by that same ring of enemies from which Germany sought to escape by the foolish expedient of aggressive war. The Imperialists waged war against us in 1919 and 1920 but they succeeded only in giving our young Red régime just what it needed—a new national consciousness. We became mutually dependent, we fought against the world on behalf of our new freedom, we defended the ideals in which we believe, we became strong because we stood alone."

It is the co-existence of this highly developed sense of nationalism with the true Communist devotion to internationalism that makes Russia a land of contradictions. The Communist abhors war, yet the Russian Government is as well prepared for war as any in Europe. Russia's industry is starving for credit. The mere gesture of recognizing pre-war debts would bring large loans. No one expects Russia to pay all the old debts, but there is a general purpose even, on the part of Britain's Labor Government, to

oblige Moscow to acknowledge them. Yet the same régime that offers foreign bankers and business men interest rates of twenty per cent for credit on raw materials and machinery has so far refused to render even lip-service to Czarist debts.

There are no "classes" in Russia's passenger transportation service, but there are "hard seats" and "soft seats" and the soft cost twice as much. There are no officers in the Red army but there are "commanders" whose functions coincide exactly with those of officers in bourgeois armies. There are no cabinet officers in the Government, but there are people's commissars who do the same work. Under Communism there is neither rich nor poor, yet the streets abound with beggars and the restaurants are filled with champagne-drinking profiteers. Private trade has been "abolished," yet Moscow leads the world's capitals in the number of its street-peddlers. The accumulation of capital violates Communist principles, yet the Government urges the people to save and pays them high interest rates on hundreds of millions of rubles which they have already been persuaded to exchange for Government bonds.

In Moscow, Communism has its way more completely than anywhere else in Russia. Like most religions, it is preached more than it is practised, but the authorities insist vigorously on observance of the outward forms. In Leningrad the atmosphere is much more liberal. There one may go in to the recently

restored State Library on the old Nevsky Prospect and almost forget revolution, until the veiled portrait of a czar recalls recent events. Only rulers after 1800 are believed to exercise a contaminating influence; busts and portraits of their predecessors are left uncovered. Asked why the portrait of such a substantial bourgeois as George Washington was given a place of honor, the Communist attendant replied with a reproving smile: "But he was a Revolutionist."

Some 4,000,000 books, pamphlets, maps and manuscripts make up the Leningrad collection which includes much priceless material. Yet the Communist Government almost rivals the Boston censorship in seeing to it that books exercise no contaminating influence on the people. All foreign books are separately classified and housed in a special room to which access is accorded only to those equipped with a permit. No book reaches the Leningrad library except by way of Moscow. There a special institute passes on all manuscripts and only those that are approved are printed. The old system of printing books first and censoring them afterwards, involved too much waste.

"It is one of my regrets," an assistant librarian confided, "that we cannot get the interesting books which are printed illegally in Moscow."

Now that it has enlarged its quarters and added a few more rooms that are reasonably well lighted—artificial light is barred from most rooms—the Lenin-

grad library proposes to arrange more frequent exhibitions. Items from Voltaire's library, from the rich Duma library, from the thousand volumes printed before 1500, or from the rich manuscript collection, are occasionally placed on view. Most of the exhibitions centre about such a figure as Lenin or concern the history of revolution. Just as our traditional histories deal largely with dynasties and administrations, the Communist historian deals mainly with revolutions, their causes and consequences.

With the increasing population of Leningrad, the library's circulation of books has more than quadrupled since 1913. The striking feature of the attendance figures shown on the diagrams and graphs which abound here as in every government office, is the rapid increase in the number of women readers. One must remember the semi-Oriental character of Russian life to realize the full significance of this change. Already in 1927 the new Russia claimed 27,219 libraries with 5,667,000 subscribers and a total of 556 newspapers with a circulation of 7,577,-104. This is one bit of evidence to show that the Government's claim to have reduced illiteracy from eighty-five to fifty per cent, is not exaggerated.

The chief function of museums as of libraries is to serve a Communist purpose. Moscow and Leningrad have well-organized museums of the revolution. To visit one of them is to realize that revolution has its history, its traditions, its heroes, and its code of

conduct. The revolutionary leader, especially if he died on the scaffold, is revered as we revere the victorious general. Enormous paintings of mobs in action replace battlefield pictures, and fragments of bombs thrown by revolutionists are displayed as reverently as battle flags in the traditional war museums of Europe and America.

There is a special touch of irony in locating Leningrad's museum of the revolution, in some of the 1057 rooms of the old Winter Palace which once housed the glory of the czars. The shell-scarred façade has not been repaired, and even the window panes through which bullets passed during the street-fighting, have not been replaced. Pieces of glass have been carefully glued over the holes from both sides to exclude the air and yet show the holes to good advantage as a permanent memorial of the Russian revolution. On a chair in each room, generally idle and indifferent, is a woman comrade—the red bandana over her head proclaims her adherence to the party. One longs to ask why she doesn't use her leisure hours to wash the windows. Perhaps she would reply that objection to dirt is only another bourgeois prejudice.

Nowhere is guide-service more intelligently organized than in Russian museums, nowhere are museums more popular. Palaces such as the great Winter Palace in Leningrad, are divided into various sections, open at different times. The woman who showed

visitors the apartments of Nicholas I was specially trained for museum work at Jena University and is devoted to her mission as a popular educator. "While the proletariat of the city is with us," she said, "much remains to be done with the peasants. I love to show them the vulgar luxury of these rooms, and picture the corruption and extravagance of their former rulers. I point out the room where Alexander II received his mistress, and the private staircase she used. They see the gorgeous ball-rooms and the banquet halls and I tell them about the czar's twenty personal cooks and the czarina's million-ruble gown. You should see them drink these tales in! Then I take them to the miserable boxes where the 2,000 servants were quartered and I explain how 7,000 men slaved for seven years just to build the walls of this palace."

What this woman is doing in one section of the Winter Palace is being done in every palace and museum throughout Russia. Museum visits are a regular part of school work. Life in Russia under the last czar is spoken of as though it belonged to some far-off historic period in an earlier stage of man's evolution into a civilized human being. The emphasis is always on the oppressions, the human weaknesses, the extravagance and the corruption of the old régime. To visit Tsarsko Selo in the outskirts of Leningrad where countless family photographs, gorgeous uniforms and Rasputin scrawls tell their story

of the superstitions and futilities of the last Czar is to see and feel why the revolution had to come.

In the famous Tejakoff Gallery of Moscow, a teacher escorting a troupe of young children has stopped in front of Repin's graphic portrayal of the emaciated Dostoievsky's unexpected return home from Siberia.

"Children what does this man's face show?"

"Suffering"—"hunger"—"misery"—"pain," the replies come in an eager chorus.

"It is Dostoievsky the great Russian writer. Who can tell me where he suffered?"

No one is sure, but one ventures a safe guess: "In Siberia."

"Who sent him there?"

This is easier and several are able to gratify the teacher by replying that it was the wicked czar.

The writer asked Acting Minister of Education, Hodorovsky, "What is the dominant aim of Russian schooling?" and received the reply: "To teach Communism." The longer you remain in Russia the more you realize how intelligently every social institution, hospital or factory, palace or cathedral is used to serve this aim.

In America, we are sure that the moving pictures are not doing all they should for education. Yet the Russian film "Potemkin" and a score of later productions were so good as films that they had to be shown in the United States. They were also such good revo-

lutionary propaganda, that they had to be censored before they could be shown.

Few events outside of Russia are included in the "News of the Week" reels that precede the feature picture in every Russian moving picture theatre. Three types of events in Russia are always included. Invariably the Red army or the Red navy makes some kind of a display. Always some prominent figure of the Government is shown in oratorical action, and always too, Russian boys and girls are shown engaged in athletic sport or parading and demonstrating as Communist pioneers. National power and national patriotism mean as much in Russia as in Fascist Italy. For some time the Communist Government employed a physical expert from the Young Men's Christian Association to train teachers of physical education. Through the appeal of moving pictures Russian youth is being urged to participate in every kind of inexpensive sport.

Every department of the Government has propaganda films that make the rounds of the moving picture theatres in the smaller towns and villages. Thus the Department of Agriculture teaches modern farming methods, the Department of Health has films dealing with such subjects as abortion, alcoholism, and the experimental work of the Pavloff Institute in Leningrad. Feature films deal with episodes in the history of Russian revolutions. If one of these strikes the public fancy, an attempt is made to build up a

series of photo-plays, all exploiting the same characters.

Here is a paragraph from the advertisement of such a revolutionary film published as a reading notice in a Moscow daily: "In the American moving pictures you laugh a physiological laugh because of the sheer empty stupidity of a situation. Here the laugh is different. It is a vital laugh. It grows out of the fact that the problem of creating a joyous revolutionary detective has been solved most successfully."

Adverse comment on American films is common and for a good reason. Despite the best efforts of Russian producers, the technical excellence of American films and their display of luxury and well-being make them more popular than native films which are often more artistic and always less "capitalistic" in atmosphere and treatment.

Life in Russia is drab. The American film feasts the eye and stirs the imagination with sights and experiences that poverty and a Communist régime have banned from Russia. Leon Trotzky, the exiled Communist leader, was a great believer in having the Government provide the "right" kind of amusement for the people in order that the hours given over to recreation might also serve to emphasize Communist ideas. In the early days of Red rule, shortly after universal prohibition had been introduced, he suggested turning the thousands of Government liquor stores into moving picture houses. Unfortunately for

his good intentions, prohibition could not be made effective so the realistic Soviet leaders substituted a successful system of government control, and many of the former liquor stores are again serving their original purpose.

It was inevitable that the protagonists of world-revolution should also utilize the dramatic stage. "Art does not interpret life," a modern Russian dramatist declares. "It creates a new life. It is not a mirror in the hands of the idle bourgeois, but a hammer wielded by the proletarian's strong right arm."

Stanislavsky's famous pupil, Mayerhold, founded a militant theatre whose development provides one of the most interesting chapters in the history of modern drama. He proposed to divide the entire Soviet Union into theatre districts, corresponding geographically to the army districts, and build up a "theatre army." The first duty of this army was to be the total extinction of the traditional theatre and all its forms. This was to be succeeded by a Communist forum finding expression in a new type of drama.

The stage was to supplement the work of press and poster in organizing the masses. Revolutionary drama was to interpret the psychology, the tragedy and the triumph of the mass. The emphasis of the traditional drama on individuals was to disappear. Mechanical design replaced artistic decoration, physical rather than psychological expression was sought

in training and rehearsing actors. In the absence of a dramatic literature that responded to the new demands of the new day, classic plays were dissected and reshaped to suit the taste of Communist producers. Mayerhold justified his procedure by pointing out that Sophocles, Shakespeare and Schiller reshaped the work of their predecessors. "Every recreation justifies itself," he declared, "provided it is born out of a real need."

The Moscow Art Theatre took no part in the new movement. Stanislavsky continued to train his artists with the same careful attention to psychological detail that made his work universal. Some of his pupils turned to the new movement, but for several years he refused to curry favor with the Government by accepting or producing revolutionary dramas. The new plays which he was willing to rehearse, the censor was unwilling to see produced. It was not until 1926 that a new play called "The White Guard" by Bulgakov, a young writer of undoubted talent, treating an episode of the 1918 revolution in the Ukraine, succeeded in meeting both the high artistic standards of the Moscow Art Theatre and the revolutionary standards of the Government.

There is no denying the Communist genius for producing dramatic mass-effects on the stage and in outdoor pageantry. Not even Reinhardt has handled mob scenes and crowd emotions more effectively than some Russian producers. By recreating an emotional

crisis that belongs to the personal experience of the audience, they establish that unity of thought and feeling between spectators and performers which creates the supreme dramatic effect. Most of their radical experiments in stage-craft failed. They had theoretical merit only, like the notion that a good orchestra should be able to play without a leader. They made no appeal to the public and were soon abandoned.

It is in the realm of art that government by propaganda has failed most completely. There is something at once sublime and ridiculous about the earnest enthusiasm with which the Communists sought to manufacture poetry, music, painting, drama, fiction, sculpture, in the same way in which they built up the Red army or the State trusts. Laboratory methods were applied to creative work and the results are amazing if not edifying. The cultural experiments of these first ten years of Soviet Government provide a record of human temerity that is unlikely to be rivaled for many generations. It deserves intensive study. Some of its failures were due to the material handicaps which are crippling most Russian efforts.

The artists who have found it impossible to create a pure revolutionary art, are already following the example of the Soviet Government by compromising with reality. Contrasting the new Russian art of 1929 with that of 1926 one could see that Russia's genius for artistic expression was again com-

ing into its own. There was less glorification of the revolution and its heroes and much more of art for art's sake.

Every one has heard about the Russian Government's effective use of propaganda railroad cars fitted out by different departments and carried to every town and village on a railroad line. The universal use of striking posters to visualize doctrines and slogans, is likewise familiar. But one needs to visit Russia to realize how this passion for transmitting ideas dominates the organization and routine of every existing social institution.

Thus the function of prosecutors, courts and jails is not to punish criminals, but, as Comrade Segal, who was in charge of criminal prosecution in the provincial court of Moscow expressed it: "To establish the participation of the mass in the administration of justice."

The prosecutor does not wait to have cases brought to him. He scans the newspapers, particularly the columns carrying letters of complaint, to discover a cause for action. The judge is not only interested in getting at the facts in a particular case, but it is a large part of his duty to reveal existing defects in the working of any state institution. If inadequate supervision has permitted embezzlement, the judge makes a report to the authorities on the particular weakness revealed by his examination. It must be remembered that in Russia the motive of private inter-

est which would remedy such defects in other countries, is absent.

In all the lower courts every professional judge has two "people's adjuncts." These are judges drawn from the ranks of the workers who share in the responsibility of the Court since there is no jury. In Moscow there is a selected panel of 30,000 "people's judges" and most of them are proud to serve. They receive a little elementary legal training through lectures and conferences, but rely largely on their "revolutionary conscience" which teaches them that the first duty of the Court is to defend the toiler against "exploiters."

The Russian Court is frankly a class-court in which a private trader could not expect to be treated as fairly as the member of a trade union. The Court fixes the fee which may be charged by the working-man's lawyer, but the nepman—private trader—who is haled to court, must make his own arrangements. In return for being permitted to charge the nepman a good fee, the professional lawyer must give several hours of free consultation each week to proletarians. Early in 1930 the practice of the law for personal profit was forbidden and public defenders took charge of all cases.

Carrying the court to the working-man is another unusual way of promoting Communist ideas. "We believe strongly in the social value of court procedure," Comrade Segal explained. "I tried a prison

warden who was charged with cruel treatment of the prisoners in his care. The case was tried in a large factory even though no factory workers were involved. It was a wonderful opportunity to show these working-men what prison conditions were like under the czarist régime. My sentence in this case was handed down in the presence of 3,500 workers."

Cases of hooliganism which are more common in Russian courts than almost any others, are frequently tried in the evening or on holidays in workmen's clubs. It is court-scene drama with the added thrill of reality.

Obviously a system that believes so thoroughly in popular education relies upon the public schools to reach the younger generation. Training citizens to approve and serve a Communist régime is the dominant purpose of Russia's school system.

Every course of instruction is judged, not on the basis of its value to the child, but for its value to the Communist state. That may explain why some of the courses seem to us rather advanced even for highly intelligent children. The eight-year-olds in Moscow schools are confronted with such subjects as "The Causes and Atrocities of the Imperialist War" and "The History of the Third International."

Nor is the school the only place where formal education thrives. Classes are carried on in connection with every factory. Workers are required to attend for a certain number of hours each week. If they are

illiterate, half the working day is supposed to be given over to schooling. Every village has special classes for adult peasants. Half the time of army and navy recruits is devoted to general education. No soldier leaves the Red Army without being able to read and write. There is supposed to be no illiteracy in the Leningrad or Moscow districts after 1930.

On every industrial undertaking there are long daily conferences in which workers and foremen participate to their hearts' content. Every problem that arises is discussed ad infinitum. An enormous amount of working time is lost in this way, but the worker acquires skill in dialectics and develops a sense of his own importance. These interminable pow-wows in the assembly halls attached to every factory are helping to train the new generation of leaders. But it is a method more likely to develop orators and politicians than artisans and engineers.

Acting Commissar of Education, Hodorovsky, listed the four great problems confronting his Department, in the following order:

First: Compulsory education for all children between the ages of eight and twelve. (Lack of funds has made it impossible to attempt this except in big cities.)

Second: The elimination of illiteracy. (Intensive work among adults has reduced this from 85 per cent in 1914 to 50 per cent in 1929.)

Third: The preparation of qualified workers for

agriculture. (This is being furthered by demonstration farms, the rapid development of coöperative farming, radio lectures, propaganda trains and a peasants' newspaper with a circulation of well over 1,000,000 copies.)

Fourth: Preparation of highly qualified scientists, engineers and agricultural experts. Until now most of these have been brought in from Germany and the United States. It will be years before professional scientific education can meet the demand for trained personnel. But there is an intensive effort to develop engineers and technicians who can build and repair agricultural machinery.

Except in mathematics none of the pre-war school text-books is retained. "Too much church and czar" was the curt explanation. The new books turn away altogether from the past and glorify the age of mechanical appliances. Even the primers elaborate in word and picture the advantages of electric light, running water, typewriters and other articles of daily use to which we have long been accustomed but which are the last word in modernity to Russian children. Until recently less than two per cent of the public school teachers were Communists, but every teacher must pass an examination in "political literacy" which means that they must be completely reconciled to Communist rule and all that this implies. They know that any departure from the prescribed curric-

ulum will be promptly reported and punished by dismissal.

In foreign languages English is now emphasized as against French and German. "English is the language of those who wield the most power," the Communist Commissar explained. "French is primarily a cultural language. Germany lost the war and her language is less important now."

In Russia nothing just happens; it develops according to a very definite theory and purpose. The Soviet authorities believe in a mechanistic universe. Their art, their poetry, their oratory exalt the machine. In Soviet terminology the old phrase deus ex machina, acquires a new meaning; for the Soviet god is the god of the machine. He alone is supreme and superb. His staccato rhythms govern the universe; his is the siren's song with which the Bolsheviki would call Russia's millions to new achievements, electrically energized and organized. "We worship American efficiency," I was told at the Foreign Office in Moscow. "America exemplifies our ideal in productive organization. That is why we want your engineers, your power plants, your mechanized agriculture, your labor-saving appliances, your large-scale production."

Ours is the only important Government which refuses to grant Russia political recognition, and yet it is our country that Russia emulates and admires.

Radio represents the newest application of electric energy. America has developed it beyond any other

nation; therefore Russian government officials draw up plans and prepare diagrams linking up all the Soviet republics with a series of American superpower broadcasting stations, equipping every village with the best American receiving sets and loud-speaker installations that will make it possible for Red leaders speaking in Moscow to be heard wherever the Red flag flies. Like most Russian plans, these are still on paper; every Russian government bureau is choked with graphs, blue prints, diagrams, and tables picturing the future. Realization does not always catch up to prediction, but as yet there is no diminution in enthusiastic prophecy. The millennium may have to be postponed, but those in authority continue to assert with apparent sincerity that it is surely on the way.

Yet there are real progress and real achievement in radio as in most other fields. He who judges the Soviet régime only for what it has tried and failed to do misjudges the world's most interesting political and economic experiment. In view of Russian character, Russian tradition, and recent Russian history, it is much more astounding that the past has, in some degree, been vanquished than that the predicted future has not been turned into a realized present.

At the Moscow office of Russia's only radio corporation a white-bloused workman, risen from the ranks, was in charge as general manager. A loud

speaker, braying into the ears of passers-by a baritone solo from "Le Coq d'Or," pointed the way to the company's office. In a window on the ground floor were small receiving sets of an antiquated type. A few ragged strollers surveyed them curiously, looking first at the window and then at the braying horn overhead. The manager had been informed by the Foreign Office that an inquiring American would visit him and he was cordial and frankly communicative. Most Russians not occupying key positions in the Government are loquacious and not afraid to speak their minds. He explained that his company had conducted Russia's only broadcasting station until this was taken over by the Comintern, the Communist International, which now controls it. This Moscow station which began with a 250-watt transmitter has steadily raised its power and is now using superpower equipment. It is the best station in Russia and transmits the great public events in Red Square, which rank as the outstanding features. For the Red Square is to Moscow what the Place de la Concorde is to Paris or the Schloss Platz to Berlin.

Selling receiving sets to the general public was not permitted in Russia for several years after radio became popular in the United States. As late as 1926 the average Russian purchaser was still buying crystal sets. That is all most Russians can afford; and since the most worth-while Russian programs are broadcast in Leningrad and Moscow, a crystal set

answers the purpose for residents of those cities. Like everything else in Russia, radios are expensive. A crystal set of the simplest type sells for $2.50, a one-tube set for $25, and a four-tube set—the most elaborate in stock—for $83. In accordance with sound Communist principles, Russian retail prices are most reasonable for necessities and most unreasonable for luxuries.

There are enough high-powered broadcasting stations in operation to cover the entire Soviet Union. Powerful new stations in the Ural Mountains, on the Black Sea, in Leningrad, in mid-Siberia, and on the Pacific Coast at Vladivostok which carry well over 600 miles in summer and 1,600 miles in winter make simultaneous broadcasting throughout the Soviet Union possible.

American broadcasting stations are supposed to transmit what the people want. In Russia they transmit what the Government thinks the people ought to have. When asked what type of entertainment the listeners-in preferred, the manager of Russia's Radio Corporation answered without hesitation: "They like to hear the Red leaders speak." When told that almost every census taken of an American radio audience indicated a preference for popular music, he smiled and said: "Well, I suppose that the majority of our listeners prefer cheerful music, but we don't give them much of it."

About one thousand letters a month are coming in

from the radio audience of the Comintern—Moscow's super-power station. That is a large number considering the generally backward state of things in Russia. Many letters come from Communists in charge of village reading rooms where there are receiving sets. They report the reactions of the peasants and help keep the Government informed upon what they are thinking and saying. The Moscow authorities spare no pains to keep in touch with public opinion. There is a special department to scan and analyze radio letters, newspaper complaints and the universal wall newspaper.

Every Russian muzhik has heard of the Kremlin in Moscow, and when told that the Kremlin chimes are broadcast each midnight, he is not content until he has heard them. From all over Russia came the request to have the Kremlin chimes broadcast on Sunday afternoons as well as at midnight in order that they might be enjoyed by the peasant and his family. The street noises from the heart of Moscow, which were transmitted for several minutes just before the sounding of the midnight chimes, also thrilled the Russian farmer. He had never heard anything beyond the familiar sounds of his native village. To him the clang of street cars, motor-car sirens, street cries, and the hum of traffic carried the vision of a new and magic world.

It is because radio affords such a wonderful opportunity to reach the minds of the illiterate peasantry

that its development has an important place on the government program. A public loan aided in the purchase of receiving sets for village reading rooms. Every village of any size now participates in the chief Moscow ceremonies by way of the loud-speaker. It was on the occasion of the Djershinsky funeral in 1926 that the chain-station system was first tried on a large scale. The enthusiastic response to that experiment convinced the Soviet leaders that in radio they have a wonderful new weapon for fostering loyalty to the Communist party and they have made effective use of it.

The Red Army and the trades unions have their own broadcasting stations in Moscow, but they do not use them for entertainment purposes. Commercial advertising over the air is not permitted. Russia's leaders consider that advertising is economic waste unless it is directed to the spread of Communist ideas. Radio stations are run as cultural enterprises. Their programs are published in the newspapers. The Comintern Station in Moscow is usually on the air from 4 P. M. until 11:30 P. M. The evening hours are generally devoted to a program picked up at some remote control point. Opera performances, plays, concerts, and public meetings alternate. Here is a typical program:

Midnight to 12:30 A. M.: Tass.
8:00 to 9:00: Tass.
10:30 to 11:55: Tass.

1:00 P. M.: Weather Reports.
4:00 to 4:30: Boy Scouts.
4:30 to 5:20: Tass.
5:20 to 6:20: Lectures and reports.
6:20 to 7:05: The Radio Newspaper.
7:05 to 7:55: Tass.
8:00 to 11:30: Opera.
11:55: Kremlin Chimes play the "International."

Like most modern Russian words describing an organization, "Tass" is an abbreviation. The full name might be something like "United and Associated Press of the Union of Soviet Republics." It is the official governmental agency which has a monopoly of the news going out of the Soviet Union. Whatever news comes into the Union from abroad, whatever news is developed in the Union, and most of the news sent out is written, edited, and handled by representatives of this agency. Its customers include village publications as well as the Moscow *Isvestia,* with its 500,000 daily circulation, and the Moscow *Pravda,* with a circulation of 400,000. Among the many newspapers served by the Tass agency are few which have no wire connection with the outside world.

To us telegraph service and the newspaper are synonymous terms. In Russia, where Twentieth-Century civilization is being borne full-panoplied into a mediæval world, one hundred fairly important communities have neither railroad, telegraphs, nor telephones; they have only radios to receive and trans-

mit news. Five times each day the central office of Tass, located in a remodeled Moscow palace, issues news reports to its 168 radio customers publishing newspapers in an area which radiates 1,800 miles in all directions. A bored-looking, bearded youth sitting in front of a microphone holds a printed sheet in one hand and a cigarette in the other—all Russians, male and female, smoke while they work—and reads news dispatches sent to him from the copy editor's desk. His voice is musical and well-modulated—only graduates of the Moscow School of Dramatic Expression are employed for this task. In the three hours and a half of daily transmission from four to five thousand words are put on the air through the new high-powered Tass broadcasting station which was opened in 1929.

In the offices of 168 Russian newspapers trained receivers write out what they hear. Stenographic reproduction is not permitted. "We tried speeding up transmission and recording stenographically," said M. Doletzky, the capable organizer of the Tass service. "It made for error and we gave it up. Our present method has reduced errors to one-fifth of what they are in transmission by telegraph."

He laughed upon being asked whether he was not afraid of reducing circulation or giving away his merchandise by broadcasting news. "Since we have an absolute monopoly of all news, there is no one to steal it. We have the legal author's right to every-

thing that we transmit so that we could prevent any newspaper from publishing it. But we want every one to hear it. Only fifty per cent of our adults can read, and we find that the illiterates who hear things over the radio are stimulated to learn. Those who can read are eager to see in print what they have heard over the air. We consider that radio helps newspaper circulation."

One room of the Tass building is almost entirely filled by a huge indoor aerial. At a little table on one side is seated a Russian operator who is familiar with the Continental code. It is his business to catch all the news messages transmitted by radio anywhere in Europe. Hour after hour he types messages in half a dozen European languages, none of which he understands, which tell the Tass editors what is going on in the world. When two American visitors happened into this room in August, 1929, he was just transcribing an American wireless message announcing Secretary Stimson's intervention in the Sino-Russian dispute. In this way Tass editors supplement and check up the wire services which they exchange with European and American news agencies. Many times the radio apprises them of important events hours before the wires flash a report into Moscow. Tass now catches the New York news service sent out each night to ships crossing the Atlantic, thanks to its new installation.

A summarized version of the day's news dispatches

is broadcast between six and seven each evening. At the beginning of 1926 there were 225,000 receiving sets in the Soviet Union, most of them serving large groups. About one million sets were in operation in 1929.

In their use of radio, as in so much else, the Communist leaders are stark realists. Their chief illusion, to which they clung as firmly in 1929 as in 1926, is that world revolution is bound to come. Yet even the chief Communist executive, Stalin, admitted not long ago that there would be an interim of ten or twenty years during which period "Russians must be careful not to forget that they are internationalists." At home they are not permitted to forget it and abroad the agents of the Third International do their best to help non-Russians to keep it in mind. Throughout Russia, the attempt to persuade is universal and untiring. In many efforts, as in seeking to make Russians abandon all religion, the régime has failed at least for the present, but this has only resulted in a change of direction or of emphasis. The purpose remains.

CHAPTER VII

SOVIET RUSSIA FUNCTIONS

IT is unfortunate that the remarkable Russian experiment in consciously directing the lives and purposes of 150,000,000 people, has not received more dispassionate and scientific study. From many matters of human concern the dead hand of tradition has been removed for the first time in history. Except where its own blind belief is involved, Communism renounces prejudice and preconceived opinion. Nowhere has there been a more complete break with the past or a more eager thrust towards the future.

The Russian church which was to be propagandized out of existence continues to attract worshipers. Private property is sought just as eagerly in Communist Russia as in capitalist America, although the search is more difficult and less frequently rewarded. The Communists teach that "Alcohol, like religion, is used by the bourgeois to enslave the proletariat," yet the Communist Government was unable to enforce prohibition and restored the liquor trade.

Communism was to bring a new heaven and a

new earth. For more than a decade it has controlled the destinies of a great people and sought to bend this people to its will. If the world had been more patient and sympathetic in the experiment's early stages, perhaps the Communist leaders might now be ready to steer a different course. They already acknowledge that pure Communism failed and that they are now trying a modified form of State-Socialism. Perhaps after a few more years the ruling group in Russia will admit with William James: "Only that is truth which works."

Yet present-day Russia continues to be the world's most interesting country. The experiment now under way in that tremendous area holds much for the weal or woe of humanity. Its success or failure may prove the most important single fact in the history of our times. For the student of economics, politics or social science no country offers such fascinating opportunities for study and inquiry.

Karl Marx, a German dreamer who lived a century ago, conceived an ideal government of, by and for workers. Class distinctions were to be removed, all wealth was to belong to the state, the profit motive was to be eliminated, the individual was to exist only as a unit in the mass he was to serve. Society was to consist of a single class of proletarian workers contributing their skill and their labor to the common cause and receiving in return society's ministrations for body and mind.

Since 1917 a small group of Russian Communists has sought to impose this ideal state on post-war Russia. They seized the reins of power from the less purposeful middle-of-the-road revolutionists who overthrew the Czarist Government early in that year, thus repeating the opening phases of the French Revolution. Led by the masterful, big-brained, shrewdly practical Nicolai Lenin they established and consolidated their authority by proclaiming peace and dividing the Russian land among the peasant population.

There followed an unprecedented reign of terror whose bloody cruelty is explained though not justified by Czarist persecutions and the successive counter-revolutions promoted by Yudenitch, Denikin, Kolchak and Wrangel, whose misguided abortive military enterprises were backed by a terrified Europe seeking to establish a "cordon sanitaire" against the "Red Plague." When this phase of the revolution was over that five per cent of the Russian population which, under the old dispensation ruled the country and owned all the property, had been submerged. Thousands were executed or died in the civil wars. Tens of thousands emigrated into border countries or to other parts of the world. Hundreds of thousands stolidly accepted the new order, contributing enough of their skill, their knowledge and their experience to be tolerated by the masters of the new government machine. One finds them still serving as teachers,

engineers, executives, closely watched by Communist associates, expressing in their faces and in their lives that unending patience and capacity for suffering which are peculiar to the Russian people.

To-day the 1,500,000 members of the Russian Communist party are absolute masters of the country. No other political parties are tolerated. Party members must be fervent Communists and wholly subservient to the ruling oligarchy to escape expulsion. Every few years there is a thorough party housecleaning to eliminate those who have joined as a matter of expediency or whose way of life or of thinking departs from the rigid prescriptions of the Moscow code. In 1929 the leaders of the party were endeavoring to reduce the membership from 1,500,000 to 1,250,000, but they admitted difficulty because of the growing pressure for admission from the youthful Comnosols, the workers' children trained to be Communists. Nor can a party member be expelled by a simple fiat. He has the right of appeal and often fights back when his place in the ruling organization is threatened.

The Communist is the aristocrat of Red Russia. He is looked up to, admired and served. He is exempt from arrest by the ordinary police. Only the almighty Gay Pay Oo, the secret political police, has authority over him. After traveling about Russia in the summer of 1929 in close daily contact with several fairly prominent members of the party this

writer would say that the Communist of to-day receives much of the same deference and consideration that aristocrats receive in a country like England. The attitude of other Russians towards him is not subservient or menial but it is highly respectful. Every provincial Communist or would-be Communist wants to be well thought of in Moscow, the seat of all power, and is eagerly responsive to the suggestions of those party members who have a place near the throne.

It is no simple matter to secure admission to the Russian Communist party. One must be a worker and the son of a worker. One must be vouched for by two party members from the same cell. One must fill out an application blank that reveals every important biographical fact. After that one may or may not be accepted as a candidate. For those admitted to the waiting list there follows a period of probation during which the applicant's way of life is subject to the closest scrutiny. Communists must not drink in public, their moral life must be satisfactory, they must observe no religious rite or festival, they must associate only with workers and fellow Communists. Contact with foreigners, nepmen (private traders) or members of the former bourgeoisie at once makes them suspect. After living for one or two years under the closest observation the candidate may be admitted to the final examination. This is a test involving his knowledge of the Marxian ideology

and testing his ability to defend it against all comers. Foreign visitors in Russia who have marveled at the dialectic ability of the guides and leaders with whom they come into contact may not be aware of the special preparation they receive or the process of selection that led to their appointment.

What have these carefully selected masters of the New Russia accomplished? Just what kind of a state have they created? How does it differ in its practical operation from capitalist countries? What progress have they made in their far-reaching plans to revolutionize industry and agriculture? Towards what are they heading? How is the great Communist experiment likely to develop and how can Communist Russia be reconciled with and related to a world which refuses to accept the Red way to salvation?

For a decade these questions have been asked and answered by a host of trained and untrained writers and observers. No two answers agree in all particulars. That is why interest persists and the questions are repeated. Two summer visits made in 1926 and 1929 supplemented by much reading, conference and reflection justify the present writer in another attempt to answer some of them.

As a first conclusion let it be affirmed that the present Government of Russia will endure. It will not be overthrown by a counter-revolution. There are no forces within or without Russia strong enough

or sufficiently well organized to undertake such an effort. The Communist Government by a superbly organized omnipresent system of secret espionage takes good care that no subversive elements are developed either within or without the ruling party. As for the unhappy Russian emigrés, they and their children have already been absorbed into the life of those countries where they found refuge after the Revolution. Moscow, according to a Government leader, is rather pleased to see them organize in Paris and elsewhere, since this justifies more aggressive tactics by pro-Communist organizations in foreign countries. But there is now general agreement among the emigrés that they have no further hope of attacking the Red régime from the outside.

Yet it is easily possible that the present policies and leaders of Red Russia will be gradually displaced by the subtle processes of counter-evolution. The very compromises with reality that keep the present régime in power must, in the end, change its Communist character. Divergence from Communist principle and acceptance of capitalist practice through permitting private enterprise, recognizing profit motives, granting special rewards for special performance and legalizing private property are to be found everywhere. On every hand one notes reluctant acceptance of the truth that human nature cannot be changed by a Communist fiat. Theory yields to expediency, precept gives way to practice.

For how long will Russia's leaders find it advisable to render lip service to a system that has not met and cannot meet the test of experience?

What most astonishes the unprejudiced visitor to Russia is the degree of practical material success which a Communist Government has achieved. Progress has been constant along the entire line. Contrasting conditions in 1926 and 1929 one notes such externals as the better clothing worn by the people, the improved appearance of the cities, the finer quality and greater variety of goods displayed in shop windows, and the much more confident air of the leaders. The official statistics—with due allowance for purposeful optimism—agree with personal observation of farm and industry in town and country in confirming the impression of definite progress towards general solvency and even prosperity.

Present-day visitors to Russia, who see the country for the first time, find it difficult to make due allowance first for what Russia was before the War and second for the devastating influence of war, revolution, counter-revolution, civil war and famine. Whether or not one accepts the oft-repeated half-truth that Russia belongs to the Orient rather than to the Occident, it is necessary to remember that the Czar's Empire was the most backward in all Europe. Agriculture was primitive, industry was either undeveloped or dominated by foreigners, corruption was universal, serfdom, though abolished, remained in

practice. The ruling class which governed the country was recruited from an aristocracy notorious for its profligacy and incompetence. For one unfamiliar with Russia before 1914 who visits it to-day the fundamental difficulty is to distinguish defects inherently Russian from those defects which may properly be charged to the Red régime. Nor could any people pass through the terrifying experiences which have come to all Russians since 1914 without experiencing a profound modification of what one might call the normal point of view. The soul of Russia has been seared. The wounds of the spirit have struck as deep as the wounds of the body and are healing much more slowly.

When I asked J. E. Rudzutak, first Vice-Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, People's Commissar for Transport, one of the three outstanding leaders of the New Russia, why his Government made such a to-do about acknowledging the paltry $75,000,000 Czarist debt due to the United States his face clouded and his eyes flashed. "You do not understand," he replied. "It is not a question of the amount. Be it $75 or $75,000,000 our people will never consent to pay one penny. The money lent to the Czar by other countries was used by him to pay the police and the gendarmes with which he oppressed the people. These same people are now sovereign. They do not propose to acknowledge such loans as a proper debt. I myself was kept in the

Czar's prison for ten years at hard labor. How could I be expected to vote to pay back the loan that helped to keep me there?"

The case of Comrade Rudzutak is no exception. Most of the Communist leaders served prison sentences. They have a deep and abiding hatred for everything related to the old régime. That hatred is one of their most appreciated qualifications for high office in Red Russia. It helps to explain the persecutions and cruelties, the fears and suspicions, the rigid restrictions of the Soviet Government.

While one cannot understand or correctly appraise the Russia of 1929 without having some sense of what Russia was in 1909 and in 1919, it is equally important not to be misled by the exaggerated claims of Communist enthusiasts. The Reds are all such confirmed and zealous propagandists, convinced of the righteousness of their cause, that they are more than willing to distort the truth. One wonders why they do not get tired of trying to impress upon foreigners the extent of their achievements. But one might feel the same way about our own Western boosters.

Leaders of the League of Nations have long since abandoned their efforts to persuade America to join the League. They decided that what the League did would be much more persuasive than what they said. The Russians have not learned the same lesson. They propagandized as eagerly in 1929 as in 1926. In one breath they proclaimed their ability to get on with-

out American help and in the next offered the most persuasive arguments to obtain it. Realistic to the core they have no false pride and are not concerned about questions of prestige. They want results and care little by what means they obtain them.

Even the trained observer wanders about in Russia with a certain feeling of helplessness. He is permitted to go where he will and to see what he likes but the language bar is an insurmountable handicap. Nowhere is it so difficult to distinguish between isolated phenomena and significant facts which justify general conclusions. Contrary to belief there is little restriction on a foreigner's movements once he is in Russia. The legend that he sees only "what the Government wants him to see" is so foolish as to be scarcely worth denial. Naturally the foreigner who asks to see a school whether in Moscow or New York is not shown the worst. As an intelligent observer he is much more interested in seeing the best and then drawing his own conclusions. What a Government tries to accomplish may be more significant than what it has already achieved. No visitor to Russia who stays less than a year could possibly exhaust his opportunities to receive fresh and vivid impressions of this great social and political adventure.

Every aspect of public and private life under Communist rule is an excursion into new realms of experience. One observes with interest the vain battle of the Red régime against man's delight in

ceremonial, against his love of luxury, against expressions of the eternal feminine. The unending struggle to extirpate religious instincts provides fascinating examples of the great truth that a man's a man even when he is a Communist.

The Russian peasant refused to consider himself married when he had merely made his cross in a book. Soviet officials were obliged to devise a special Red ceremony to satisfy the bride and the bridegroom. In the cities clerical workers and Soviet officials have quite generally substituted shirt, collar, necktie and coat for the comfortable Russian blouse. One must assume that they did so to differentiate themselves from laborers and to show their ability to pay for more expensive if less comfortable clothes.

In 1926 Russian customs officials reported that face powder and perfumes, barred from Russia by Communist decree, were smuggled in more frequently than any other articles. In 1929 a Government factory was turning out the scents and sachets that Russian women refused to do without. In 1926 throngs of worshipers were paying their devotions before the famous Iberian shrine at the entrance to the Red Square in Moscow and none looked up at the Soviet sign which told them that "Religion is the opium of the people." In 1929 workmen razed the shrine because it enabled every foreign visitor living in the Grand Hotel across the way to see for

himself the failure of the Communist crusade against all religion.

Yet the sacrifice of Communist principles in the face of practical obstacles is only one phase of the general situation. Let us not forget that professing Christians have compromised with the principles of Christianity for 1,900 years and yet Christianity endures. The Church of Rome has made numerous concessions on dogma and practice yet it stands today stronger than it has been since the Reformation. Russian Communists who tell you that because of inherent difficulties it has so far been impossible to establish Communism in Russia, that they are working towards it as an ideal, that they hope to achieve it some time in the future, might cite such analogies and ask the world to be patient.

Practical-minded Americans are chiefly concerned with what the Red Government has done and is doing in the development of agriculture and industry. Here, after all, is the real test of the success or failure of any Russian Government. Ninety per cent of Russia's population belongs to the farm. Any Government that satisfies the Russian farmer is a success. But a Government that fails to satisfy him is not necessarily a failure. All over the world the farmer is in difficulties. Over-production, drought, pest, tariffs, transportation, the increasing poverty of much-exploited land create problems which many Governments have vainly tried to solve.

By dividing the Russian land into innumerable small holdings the Communist régime satisfied the Russian peasant but reduced efficiency and diminished production. To-day the Government is making every effort to undo what it did ten years ago. The entire resources of its vast propaganda machine have been set in motion to persuade the peasants to pool individual holdings into coöperative farms or to aid the Government in the creation and management of enormous state farms.

Progress is slow. The official Soviet Year Book for 1929 declares that 98 per cent of the total production is the output of individual farmers. Yet twenty per cent of all the new agricultural machinery produced in Russia or imported from abroad is put on the collective and coöperative farms which produce the remaining two per cent. Their share of the total production is bound to increase rapidly now that the Soviet Government is manufacturing $150,000,000 worth of agricultural machinery in its own factories each year.

One of the most impressive sights in all Russia is the vast complex of buildings in the outskirts of Stalingrad on the Volga which, in August, 1929, was almost ready to begin producing thirty-horsepower tractors at the rate of 40,000 a year. Here is a plant designed by Henry Ford's architect, built under the direction of able American engineers, producing agricultural machinery of American design on

a scale which rivals our own mass production. Much that one sees in Russia is still in the blueprint stage but here is a vast area of buildings connected by fifteen miles of railroads, including two sawmills, a large brick factory, seven miles of sewers, fifty-two barracks and eighteen four-story modern apartment houses, each of which can accommodate thirty-two families. The American engineer in charge tells you that the Russian worker is only one-fourth as efficient as the skilled American worker but he will add that the Russian is willing, eager and responsive to direction. He will explain how he has speeded up work by eliminating subcontractors and by assigning one foreman to every twenty men instead of one to 150 men as was the Russian practice. He is convinced that the plant will be producing its 40,000 tractors per year before the end of 1930.

The heart of the agricultural struggle in Russia lies between the coöperative farm and the kulak, the rich peasant. The Government does its best to encourage coöperation while the Darwinian law of the survival of the fittest is constantly developing new kulaks in spite of all efforts to hamper and suppress them. At the Commissariat of Agriculture in Moscow Russian peasants are divided into three classes: the bidyak or poor peasant, the serednyak or middle peasant and the rich kulaks. One-third of all the farms in Russia are classed as poor men's farms and only

three per cent as kulak properties. But the latter are important in size rather than in number.

Assistant Commissar of Agriculture Muralov indicated to the writer that the Government is finding elimination of the kulak impossible and is concentrating its efforts on the development of collective farms. "The financial condition of all Soviet farms is rising," he said. "Peasants are passing from the lower to the higher categories. We are witnessing the development of a new class of well-to-do peasants not quite rich enough to be classed as kulaks.

"The Government's agricultural policy is based on the poor and the middle farmers. They pay the least taxes and receive loans on the most favorable terms. When a poor peasant buys a plough he may take three years to pay for it. The middleman receives credit for a year whereas a rich peasant must pay his obligations as soon as his crop is harvested. Taxes rise from practically nothing for the poor farmer to the fifteen per cent of total income paid by the rich.

"We are fighting the kulak by the development of collective farms. With his farm of some fifteen hectares he cannot compete against the collective farms with their 15,000 to 20,000 hectares. Our collective farms are of two types, elemental and advanced. The elemental farm involves joint ownership of farm machinery. The peasants continue to live in their own homes but till the soil and harvest the crops collectively. In the advanced form of coöperation the peas-

ants own the farms and machinery collectively and consume collectively. Present Soviet policy is to make land ownership and production collective and leave the peasants to suit themselves with regard to collective or individual consumption. We are seeking to industrialize agriculture. By mechanization, crop diversification, the development of truck gardening, dairying, animal breeding and such special crops as tobacco we are seeking to enhance production and to provide employment for poor workers."

This is the Government program. How it will work out only the future can tell. Thus far the results have been meagre. During the summer of 1929 such primary foodstuffs as butter, bread and sugar were being rationed and sold only on cards in various parts of Russia. Long lines of buyers waited hours for the shops to open so as to reach the counter before the day's supplies were exhausted. At the same time agricultural exports had sunk to a record low point since 1923. While the 1927-8 figures showed a slight increase in the export of eggs and butter the total grain exports dropped from 3,086,000 tons in 1926-7 to only 520 tons in 1927-8. The gross grain crop of 1928 was 74,292,103 metric tons as compared with an average production of 75,000,000 metric tons in the same territory before the War. Until there is a very much better showing Russia's predominant problem has not been solved.

In industry the general situation is much more

favorable. The pre-war production level was passed in 1926-7 and progress since has been rapid. The writer was a member of an American delegation of engineers, financiers, industrialists and promoters which spent a good part of July and August, 1929, in an intensive study of Russian industry and noted the rapid development since his 1926 visit.

With regard to the future of industry, the Russian Communist displays fanatic zeal, boundless enthusiasm and an almost childlike optimism. One of the prominent officials in the Moscow office of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, the Government organization which handles trade between Russia and the United States, seriously predicted that Russian industry would have caught up with that of the United States by 1944 and would have far surpassed it by 1949. This may happen but only a Russian fanatic would hazard such a prediction in 1929.

From one end of Russia to the other banners, posters, bulletins, wall newspapers are calling the nation to the aid of the Five-Year Plan. By every propaganda device which has been developed in Propaganda-Land the Soviet Government is enlisting the aid of man, woman and child for the 1928-32 industrialization program as mapped out by the Supreme Economic Council. It was said during the World War that the dominant word in the German war lexicon was "planmaessig"—according to plan. To-day all Russia is organizing, working and produc-

ing in accordance with a detailed plan mapped out and prescribed by the economic general staff.

Every factory in the land knows just how much it must produce every day for the next four years. Every office and every workers' assembly hall has its production chart on the wall where every one may see. The blue line shows what the Government prescribes and expects in the way of production week by week and month by month. The red line shows the running record of actual production. The famous wall newspapers to be found in every factory and office are featuring comment on the plan. In these poster papers, which he who runs may read, managers and foremen are criticized, suggestions are offered, enthusiasm is fomented. At the new tractor plant in Stalingrad, the wall newspaper bears the appropriate name "Give me speed," and in every second item it suggests a way in which more speed might be obtained.

Every device known to our Liberty Loan drives and building campaigns is being used to advance the Government program. Newspapers and magazines are giving it large space. The omnipresent Russian poster deals with it in every form. The red bunting and banners which are carried in the innumerable processions and which provide the only decoration of the bare assembly rooms of every industrial plant feature slogans dealing with the plan. "Fight Russia's enemies with the Five-Year Plan." "We are doing

our best for the Five-Year Plan," "Fight against imperialism—work for the Five-Year Plan."

Several American industrial experts who visited Russia in 1929 estimated that not over fifty per cent of the plan would be realized by 1932. Yet even this represents an enormous expansion of capital investment and production. In round figures the total output of Soviet industries is to be increased under the plan from a value of $5,000,000,000 in 1927-8 to $15,000,000,000 in 1932-3. The basic capital in operating industries is to grow from $4,000,000,000 in 1927-8 to $10,705,000,000 in 1932-3. The increase in production varies widely. Coal output is to grow from thirty-five to seventy-five million tons, pig iron from three to ten million tons, oil production from 80,000,000 to 160,000,000 barrels, electrical energy from five billion to seventeen billion kilowatt hours and chemical fertilizer production from 180,000 tons to 7,000,000 tons.

Experience with two earlier tentative five-year plans that have been abandoned indicates that in many branches of industry the fixed quotas may be reached. Many of Russia's leading men are sincerely convinced that the plan will be carried through one hundred per cent. They admit that if no capital is forthcoming from abroad the rate of progress will be slowed down but insist that the only difference will be a slight delay in carrying through some parts of the program.

Competent American observers are certain that Russia cannot carry through any substantial part of this plan without considerable outside aid. No undeveloped country has ever built up its industry without foreign capital and capitalists do not believe that it can be done in Russia. They point out that the plan requires total capital investments amounting to $7,500,000,000 and that this sum cannot be supplied by Russia herself. The Russian experts answer that the Soviet state presents unusually favorable conditions. They declare confidently that the advantages of unified management, the prohibition of all capital export, the re-investment of all profits, and the aid of the Government through taxation of agriculture —to be applied to the benefit of industry—assure success.

In any case the Russian Government is moving forward with its plan under full sail. In Moscow and Leningrad, throughout the Donetz Basin, in the important towns along the Volga, in the oil district of the Caucasus, enormous new plants are rapidly nearing completion. Almost half of the total new investment in industry is allotted to new construction. Many competent American construction engineers have already obtained favorable Russian contracts. Communism steps to one side that they may enjoy the luxuries to which they are accustomed and the special privileges which they demand. They get screens for their windows, ice machines for their

homes, tennis courts for their families and they can park their motor cars in violation of all traffic rules. To-day in Russia the engineer is king.

A good place to study the conditions under which American engineers are doing their work in Russia is at the Dnieprostroy Hydroelectric development on the Dnieper River in the Ukraine, two days' railroad journey south of Moscow. This is the largest hydroelectric project in Europe and, according to Colonel Hugh L. Cooper of New York who is directing it, "the largest water power project ever undertaken by man." It is the most important of the three outstanding projects of the Soviet Government, the other two being the 950-mile Siberian-Turkestan Railway which is to bring Siberia's grain, timber and minerals to the rapidly developing Soviet cotton belt in Central Asia, and the Volga-Don Canal, surveyed but not yet begun, which will give the chief water transport route of the Soviet Union an outlet to the Black Sea.

In the Donetz Basin of the Ukraine, adjoining the Dnieprostroy project, are produced seventy-five per cent of Russia's coal, seventy per cent of the iron and a large proportion of the manganese. There are also chemical and dye industries and salt mines. The dam and power stations now under construction on the Dnieper River are to cost $114,000,000 and will have an ultimate capacity of 800,000 horsepower. In 1929 the work was being carried forward by 13,000 Rus-

sians with every prospect of finishing the job by the end of 1934.

The experience of the American engineers in dealing with the Russians on this project is typical. The Russian engineer has little false pride, but it takes time to convince him that the old ways are impractical and that for the solution of certain problems graduates of the P. and S. (Pick and Shovel) University are more competent than men with the fine theoretical training supplied in Russia's pre-war schools for engineers. About 4,000 Americans could do the work being done at Dnieprostroy by 13,000 Russians because they are experienced in handling machinery. In operating derricks and construction trains the Russians move at one-half the American speed. But they are dealing with a type of construction machinery which was unknown in Russia until it was used on this project and each month they are doing a little better.

Some of the workers' gangs are bossed by women. Russians obey women foremen without difficulty. Here, as everywhere, women are treated on an absolute equality with men, except that women with child and mothers receive time off with full pay. They have special vacations before and after a child is born and mothers are given time to feed their babies.

Common laborers at Dnieprostroy earn from $1.25 to $1.60 a day and derrick men receive $2.25 a day. Some have free housing, others pay a small rental.

The civil engineers receive from $150 to $500 a month, the latter being the salary of the Russian chief engineer. Communists may not receive more than $110 a month which is the party scale for the district. In a few important industries the Communist Party permits engineers actually engaged in production to receive more than the party maximum "to stimulate other workers to increase their production." This is done to help the Five-Year Plan and shows that even the most cherished precepts of Communism are sometimes violated when it is necessary to get results.

There has been no conflict between the six American engineers who are serving the Dnieprostroy project as consulting experts and the Russians who are doing the work. Colonel Cooper admits that his task requires infinite patience and that the temperament of some Americans has proved unequal to the strain. It is their task to persuade the Russians to do the work in the right way. They must intervene whenever they feel that it is being done in the wrong way. On minor matters the Russians are permitted to go wrong if persuasion is unavailing. On major matters which would affect the character of the work the Supreme Economic Council in Moscow is the ultimate court of appeal. Since the Moscow Government is paying the American engineers a great deal of money because of their superior knowledge, the Russian engineers do not often invite such an appeal.

Three eight-hour shifts working seven days a week are pushing the work at high speed. Already 11,000 people have been housed better than they were ever housed before. A thoroughly modern mechanical kitchen supplies food for 6,000 people a day. Colonel Cooper says that his Administration Building is "the best administration office I've ever sat in."

The wives of the American engineers find their Russian experience most interesting and fairly comfortable. Their homes are American bungalows designed in the States with all conveniences. They obtain good servants from a neighboring German colony for $12.50 a month plus $2.50 insurance fees. When there is a shortage of tea, butter or sugar, as happens frequently, they receive larger rations than the Russians. American specialties cannot be imported. A home brand of coffee came to $8.00 a pound. There is little companionship with the natives. The language, Communism, different moral standards cause difficulties. Radio is a great comfort since it keeps them in constant touch with all the capitals of Europe. When important American events, such as the election bulletins or the Zeppelin landing, are re-broadcast by a European station there is direct contact with the United States.

Most of the machinery used on the Dnieprostroy project is American. Several 80,000-horsepower generating units were nearing completion in the United States in 1929. Various large American corporations

are coöperating in the completion of this and other projects through a system of revolving credits.

The entire Russian nation is proud of this undertaking. The people look on it much as we looked upon the construction of the Panama Canal, although it does not, of course, have the international character of that undertaking. The elaborate ceremony which attended the cornerstone laying was broadcast throughout the land. Every Saturday and Sunday trains and motor trucks bring thousands of children and adults from neighboring districts to marvel at the huge machines and to report back home the transformation of a peaceful district of river meadows into a humming industrial centre. Such visits to industrial undertakings are part of Russia's elaborate system of social education.

The new Russia worships machinery. Her sons and daughters come here on a pious pilgrimage to a new shrine of devotion. What they see with their own eyes is tangible evidence of progress and prosperity. Before they come they have attended lectures illustrated by charts, maps and diagrams telling them how the electric power from this centre will serve a territory as large as all New England, supplying all the power needs of an intensively-developed area with a population of 8,000,000. Then they see for themselves with what giant strides the work is progressing.

If Russia were unrelated to the Third Communist

International the world would rejoice with Russia's people over all evidence of her advance. But, because there is the closest sympathetic relation and to some extent personal identity between the Russian Government and the organization that is seeking to foment world revolution, there is continued suspicion and hostility.

The explanations by members of the Russian Government of their entire dissociation from the propaganda work for Communism which the Third International carries on all over the world are not convincing. Granting that Russian embassies, legations and consulates are no longer used as propaganda centres, it still remains true that money and literature sent out from Moscow with the consent and connivance of the Russian Government are used to advocate the overthrow of existing Governments. Within a few weeks after recognizing Russia, Ramsay MacDonald's Labor Government felt constrained to warn the new Soviet Ambassador in London about propaganda issued by the Third International.

Russian leaders themselves admit frankly that they want no friendly relations with a capitalist world. In an interview with the writer in August, 1929, one of the outsanding leaders of the Soviet régime, People's Commissar for Education Lunacharsky, declared that force must and will be used to substitute Communism for Capitalism. Here are some of his phrases uttered for publication in the United States

at the moment when the Government of which he was a prominent member was making every effort to secure American recognition:

"Society is suffering from a serious disease. The only way to save it is by a surgical operation which will involve some blood-letting. . . . The very existence of Capitalist society constitutes a war against humanity. . . . The bourgeoisie will never give up willingly. . . . It controls the instruments of force. . . . Humanity must take its fate into its own hands. We oppose wars between peoples but we are for a war of the peoples against their oppressors. . . . The suggestion of evolution is nothing but a trick of the possessing classes. . . . There must be further suffering before our ideas can be put into effect. . . . Our task is to explain to the people and to organize them for the struggle."

Is it to this end that Americans are being asked to aid Russia's development? "To help them cut our throats?" as one American capitalist put it when he heard of Lunacharsky's statement. Or are such statements to be regarded as the vain mouthings of misguided theorists without practical importance to the rest of the world?

Russia must answer that question for herself. While her leaders continue to preach the class war she will be suspect throughout the world. Communism is a negative and destructive force while the class war remains one of its dominant principles.

Even countries like the United States where Communists are scarce are determined to do nothing which will encourage them. In Germany, where there are more Communist Party members than in Russia; in France, where radicalism can set the emotional Latin temperament on fire; in Italy, Hungary, Poland, Turkey where apprehensive dictators sit upon uneasy thrones; in Britain where empire has begun to totter, there is grim determination to check Communism's illicit activities.

Russia is a wonderful country with one of the most patient and lovable peoples in all the world. Here is a vast reservoir of human and material power, a potential source of even more in art, literature and music than Russia has already contributed. If her leaders will consent to teach by example rather than precept, if they will assume a more tolerant attitude toward religion, if they will become a little more national and a little less international, if they will concentrate their efforts on revolutionizing Russia and leave the rest of the world to take care of itself the great and valuable experiment which they are directing, may, in the end, bring untold benefits, not only to Russia, but to humanity at large.

CHAPTER VIII

CHINA'S CHANGING CITIES

THE Far East is so different because it is so far and because it is the East. One would have to go to Mars or to the moon to find a way of life in more complete contrast with our own. It is because the East is so old that it is so new to us. We are civilization's last word, while the Orient represents the first. And yet today the real fascination of the East lies in its efforts to step with the seven-league boots of time from mediævalism to modernity.

Let us begin our visit to China's changing cities with a journey up the Pearl River to Canton, the heart of Revolutionary China and the birthplace of that Nationalist movement which has given China its first semblance of unity since the fall of the Manchus.

River life is an essential part of the Chinese picture. The great rivers are the chief arteries of travel to and from the interior. A country that is practically without railroads or roads depends largely upon river transportation. Ducks arrive at the Canton market after transporting themselves hundreds of miles

down the Pearl River. Day by day baby ducks float down stream and day by day they grow. When the poultry man who rows his boat along behind them reaches his destination, after several months of river travel, the self-fed, self-transported ducks are ready for market.

China's unspeakable poverty is evident from the banks of her great rivers. Naked coolies slave away for months on little rice patches along the shore. Then, when their small crop is almost ready, the wash from a passing steamer that has been run too close to the bank may tear away the soft soil and with it a large part of the precious crop. If it happens to be a British steamer this does not help to make the "foreign devils" popular in that part of China.

On the Pearl River en route to Canton one can still see the "rice-power" boats of ancient times. They are flat-bottomed junks with stern wheels like those on the old Mississippi steamships, propelled by a tread-mill arrangement on the after deck. Like Roman galley slaves eight brown-skinned Chinamen press their feet against the wheel boards and force their craft against the river current. It costs the average Canton coolie $2.50 a month to live, and his income is in proportion. That is why "rice-power" is the cheapest thing in China.

The Whampoa Forts which are passed not far from the city of Canton are placed here to keep hostile

craft at bay. They are not formidable. Generally speaking Chinese military equipment is hopelessly old-fashioned and ineffective.

Log rafts are sighted occasionally. One notices them because China is supposed to have no timber. But while the coast provinces have been stripped bare there are lumber lands along the upper reaches of the Pearl River although the trees are small. The Chinese have been using up their forests for thousands of years and have done no replanting. The logs which float down to Canton and beyond would hardly be worth cutting in our own Northwest. They are precious property in China, where wood is a luxury. Whole familes live for weeks on these Chinese log rafts and guide them down stream with bamboo poles and huge oars lashed to the side, which they manipulate with the greatest skill.

As the steamer nears Canton, the junks become more numerous. Fishermen are everywhere. One marvels at the vitality of fish that can survive in such muddy waters. A strange nine-story pagoda that looks from the distance like the leaning tower of Pisa looms up across the low fields. It is one of the series that marks the approach of Canton. In the city itself most of the pagodas have been destroyed.

The steamer must constantly manœuvre from side to side to keep from sinking some of the innumerable craft sculled and rowed by black-trousered Chinese women whose male companions are often stretched

out full length on the shaded decks. Women seem to provide most of the muscle power that keeps Canton's teeming river life on the move.

Canton

Soon we are opposite the little island of Shameen in the heart of the great city. Shameen is the foreign settlement. Until 1928 it was still surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. It has shade trees and turf tennis courts and plumbing to make it habitable for the luxurious sons and daughters of the West. This island also has a point of view—a distinct, separate, definite point of view. The Shameen mind like Shameen Island was surrounded too long by barbed wire entanglements. During the early part of the Nationalist Revolution, Canton was often cut off from the island. Chinese servants went on strike, food supplies ran short, the foreign women had to be sent away, and there was something like a siege. There was shooting across the narrow canal that separates the shady walks of Shameen from the turbulent streets of Canton. Blood was spilled unnecessarily. Both sides became frightened and bullets flew. Perhaps no one was to blame, but the bitter feeling remained for a long time afterwards.

For several years foreigners rarely left the restricted area of Shameen. They could walk all around the island in twenty minutes, but many preferred

that confinement to the smells and sounds of the Chinese city. They are still cynical about China and the Chinese. Have they not seen from their island fastness how Chinese soldiers loot from their countrymen? Have they not had enough experience to know that the element of "squeeze"—graft—enters into every transaction? Have they not watched the new leaders come and go? Have they not seen revolution and counter-revolution? Corruption flourishes—the people suffer—there is crime and disease. Isn't it all hopeless? How can China ever have a stable well-ordered government?

One can understand this Shameen point of view without sharing it. It requires faith and optimism to overcome the disillusionment of daily experiences in the Canton area. Particularly in summer when the moisture-laden superheated air blankets ambition and makes even sleep difficult.

Foreign missionaries do not live on Shameen Island. They would not feel comfortable in the Shameen atmosphere. Their point of view is apt to differ too radically from that of the members of the Shameen Club. Most of their friends are Chinese, and they go to their houses. Many of them went back to interior China while the Revolution was still at its height, in spite of the official warning issued by the Consuls. Many others have gone home since 1927 because they realized that the Revolution has brought about a great change in missionary work. Proselyting

is resented and converts are not numerous. There is much social service work to be done, but not every missionary board is willing to spend its funds for that alone.

Even in the midst of revolutionary disturbances the streets of Canton continued to show their accustomed life. Despite Communist upheavals, strikes and disorders, banditry and piracy, life here has a way of going on. Chinese children are flying kites, rickshaws carry silk-trousered sing-song girls to banquets given by rich merchants; sweating coolies pass with a thousand mysterious burdens. A noisy funeral procession pauses at a corner to permit the passage of a gorgeously decorated sedan chair setting forth to fetch a bride. So busy are the Canton people with their own concerns that the staring foreigner is almost ignored by the passing throng.

The guide books list Canton's population at "from two to three millions." The first official census of the Nationalist Government completed in 1927 gives 850,000 as the official figure. But it is the river life of the 100,000 whose permanent homes are on junks which makes this city unique among the great cities of the world. To be sculled at night through Canton's mysterious river streets, lit by flickering oil lamps on the solid rows of junks, some selling food and drink, others with sing-song girls and Chinese music is to enter a world unutterably strange to the Western sense.

Hongkong

What a different aspect is presented by the city of Hongkong. For Hongkong is not in China. It is not even a part of that solid area of the Asiatic continent which goes by the indiscriminate name of China. Hongkong is a British island in the China Sea. The steamship lane leading to it is one of the loveliest in all the world. The harbor of Rio de Janeiro, which is about the only one with which Hongkong can properly be compared, bursts upon you suddenly in all the glory of its sugar-loaf islands with their background of green-clad mountains, the brilliant blue bay beneath and multi-colored houses straggling up the slopes. Hongkong is almost equally imposing but much more solid and sober. It also develops more gradually and the approaching vessel passes many islands before the eye finds the particular one which the wise British traders selected in the middle of the last century as most appropriate to house their enterprising merchants.

It is impossible to contemplate the work of the British in their overseas possessions without a certain feeling of admiration. Everywhere they are so sure that they are right, and that they are established permanently. The solid Victorian architecture of Hongkong suggests that it was built not for an age, but for all time. The Britisher's self-righteousness, his innate confidence that no matter where the English

flag may be raised it will never be lowered is reflected in the general appearance of this city.

Fortunate are those who catch their first glimpse of Hongkong at the sunset hour. Nearly always several of Hongkong's mountain peaks are cloud-capped. These floating guardians of the city catch beautiful colors as the burning oriental sun drops out of sight. Soon after comes the glory of the night's myriad lights. Down below near the water they glow in solid lines and patches. Farther up the slope they thin out into separated constellations and near the top they are scattered so that it is impossible to see just where the dark mass of the mountain gives way to the starlit heavens.

Yet not all things in Hongkong are beautiful. They could not be in a city peopled by 600,000 Chinese and 10,000 Westerners. To drive through the streets of the Chinese section in a rickshaw on one of those hot sticky nights in July, from which Europeans escape by residing on the slope of the hill, is to realize anew the gulf which separates East and West. Practically all males are naked to the waist. Exhausted sleeping coolies are stretched full length in every dark spot where a man can lie without being stepped upon. Every shop and workshop is open to the street. As in America, Chinamen here seem to work at all hours. Some one is always darting out of a dark corner to murmur "What you want?—curios, ivory, sing-song girl? You get cheap." They persist in wearisome

reiteration till the rickshaw man barks them away. Here is a food vender selling roast duck at a fraction of a cent per piece and watermelon slices grimy with the dirt of the street are displayed everywhere. One wonders how rapidly this population of 450,000,000 would multiply if sanitary laws were enforced throughout China.

The din called Chinese music resounds from gaudy well-lit restaurants, but if the truth be told, it is the smells of Hongkong's narrower streets that discourage intimate exploration. They are weirdly and wonderfully compounded. There is nothing like them outside of China. The out-door food shops, filth-strewn gutters, naked perspiring bodies mingle their odors with an occasional whiff of fragrance from some bale or bundle of oriental merchandise. All these are component parts of a variety of smell sensations that provide Westerners with some of their most vivid Chinese memories.

Shanghai

Shanghai is another Chinese city which all visitors approach by the water route. A bit of black rock rising out of a yellow sea near the mouth of the Yangtze River is the first sight of China to greet most foreign eyes. For some hours before that bit of rock is sighted, the discoloration of the water tells us that China's rivers are still doing their best to wash away her remaining fruitful soil. Soon a long

low mud flat rises above the horizon at the mouth of the river, and mysterious China is in sight.

The first junks with their strange black sails and high sterns, looking like Spanish galleons, create much excitement. They have weirdly painted eyes at the prow. "To enable them to see," the old China hands explain to the neophytes as they launch into the story of China's eternal superstitions.

A few scattered stunted trees begin to rise behind the mud flats, several good-sized steamships lie at anchor just ahead. Many ocean liners do not undertake the twenty-mile journey up the shallow river to Shanghai. They anchor near the mouth and are served by tenders from the city. It soon becomes apparent that Shanghai is an industrial centre of great importance. Warehouses, Standard Oil tanks and factory chimneys appear in the distance. But right up to the outskirts of the city itself dirty water buffaloes wallow in muddy shallows, phlegmatic Chinese fishermen perch on platforms along the shore dip and raise huge square nets by means of balanced poles. All along the shore there are huge pyramids of hay well dried and well stacked. The steamer runs from one side to the other of the narrow river to escape shallows and miss the passing junks. Each native craft reveals something fantastic in the way of torn sails, human cargo or weirdly painted stern. Huge cargo boats loaded with Western merchandise are being sculled across the river by

that strange Chinese device—the double-jointed oar, with a rope running from the handle to the deck. It looks so awkward and yet operates so efficiently.

Rickshaws jog along roads which parallel the banks. An occasional motor car honks past and everywhere there are groups of Chinese wearing long white garments that flutter in the wind. Lumber yards with American cargo boats from Seattle and Portland alongside remind us that de-forested eastern China must import timber from the far-off American Continent. Small wonder that concrete is the favorite building material.

The lower anchorage where most of the large boats stop is still three miles distant from Shanghai proper. The steam tender that meets our ship discharges the wildest, weirdest lot of scarred, pock-marked black-brown coolies before it takes us on board. We wonder why Chinamen were ever called yellow. In Shanghai they are all brown—the only yellow-looking human beings are some of the Caucasians.

The first impression which Shanghai makes upon the visitor is one of solid substantial wealth. Coming out from the Custom House to the Bund—the great water-front street of the city—one faces a row of huge stone buildings with massive imposing fronts. One of the first and finest is the Taiwan Bank of Japan which failed, proving that even in the easily impressed Orient the ability to "put on face" does

not always mean the ability to succeed. There are insurance companies, banks, commercial houses, each rivaling its neighbor in substantial magnificence.

Every one will tell you that you must make a show in the East. In Shanghai the British show the Chinese a lot, the French show them a little less, the Americans show them least. Here is a monument in memory of the Allied soldiers who died in the World War. It should remind us that thanks to the skillful diplomacy of the late Dr. Reinsch, American Minister in Peking, China entered the World War on the side of the Allies. They say here that Reinsch died of a broken heart because the treaty makers in Paris refused to redeem the promises to China which he had been authorized to make.

The newcomer never knows in which part of Shanghai's separately governed districts he finds himself. The French Concession and the International Concession are indistinguishable where they join each other or the native city. But every rickshaw man seems to head you straight for the native city no matter where you tell him to take you.

The British Consulate with its huge frontage occupies one of the choicest parts of the Bund. A broad stretch of well-kept lawn with a score of tennis courts is backed by the imposing Consulate buildings. Nowhere can one find tennis courts on more expensive ground. Even when Uncle Sam completes his proposed million-dollar building to house

all official American activities, his quarters will not approach those which the wise Britons set aside for themselves many years ago. Foreign service is not made less attractive to the right type of young men by the kind of accommodations and facilities which John Bull provides in most of his foreign establishments. We may have the money now. but John Bull had the foresight many years ago.

A few squares farther on is the Hotel Astor. It is not without significance that the main entrance leads to a sumptuous brass-railed well-stocked American bar which is to the foreigners in Shanghai what the Rialto was to the merchants of Venice.

Night is the best time for a first walk along the famous Nanking Road of the International Settlement into the section of the brilliantly-lighted Chinese shops with their chattering hordes of Orientals. The Settlement shelters one million Chinese and only thirty thousand foreigners. Streets, sidewalks and stores are all jammed. What with motor cars, horse-drawn and hand-drawn vehicles, rickshaws and trolley cars to compete for the right of way with crowds of scurrying pedestrians it requires Oriental equanimity to solve the traffic problem. But the huge bearded Sikh policemen are equal to the task.

Here is the place where British police shot into a crowd of coolies in 1925 and gave Chinese Nationalism the martyrs it needed to advance the cause. A little farther on lies Bubbling Well Road, open coun-

try a few years ago, now built up on both sides with sumptuous villas, some of them in horrible taste, most of them owned by rich Chinese who have finally won their long fight against taxation without representation and secured limited membership in the Municipal Council. It is here in Shanghai where the Western traders have waxed rich and where they have ventured to invest their millions under the protection of their own flags that they will fight long and hard against surrendering the special privileges to which they have become accustomed and on which they depend.

Tsing-Tao

In Shanghai and the other cities of the South you will be told that in North China things are going much better because there the people have not been so upset by ideas of revolution, and the longing for a new order. A two- or three-day steamer journey separates Shanghai from Tsing-Tao, the newest and in some respects the finest port in North China. Here is the sea outlet for the over-populated province of Shantung, long coveted by Japan's imperialists, occupied during the World War, divorced from China by the Treaty of Versailles and finally turned back to China by a voluntary act on the part of a Japan grown wiser and more democratic.

Tsing-Tao was seized by Germany in 1899 as compensation for the murder of two missionaries. The

Kaiser had a good eye. The place has much natural beauty, it is an excellent harbor for large ocean steamers, and it is the only practical port for a hinterland richer in natural resources than almost any other Chinese area. Now that China has it back what is she doing with it? Ask that question in Shanghai and there are varied answers depending on the political prejudices of the informant. The separatism which slows China's progress is evidenced by the difficulty of securing accurate information in any city of China about what is going on in any other.

The Japanese took good care of Tsing-Tao during the eight years they were in control and the returning Chinese have been wise enough to bring back some of the German administrators who first developed the port. Here, as elsewhere in China, the former German residents have rapidly reëstablished themselves in favor with the natives. They were forced to surrender all their special privileges under the post-war treaty, but the very fact that Germans are "equals" makes them popular with the Chinese. Moreover the Chinese are trying to show the world that foreigners can get on very well in their country without the special protection afforded by the unequal treaties.

Tsing-Tao's harbor can still accommodate large vessels. The harbor entrance has silted up some three feet since the Germans opened it, but it still has twenty-seven feet of water at low tide. A few of the fine shade trees planted by the Germans were cut

down by soldiers during the revolutionary disturbances. They needed the wood for their fires in the winter. But Tsing-Tao still has the finest trees to be seen anywhere along the Chinese coast, and how the Western eye delights in them! One remembers the city pleasantly just because of the trees. The well laid-out streets and avenues of the port and the lovely hills that rise behind it are alive with shade trees, some of which have been planted by the Chinese Administration. The dock facilities have been much neglected but the Germans have built them solidly and they are outlasting the universal Chinese indifference to maintenance.

The streets of Tsing-Tao are clean, well kept and well lighted. The city's water supply has been well maintained. Iron is corroding the house mains, and the difficult question of renewals will soon arise. For an Oriental port, health conditions are excellent, the harbor water is the cleanest in all China, and the sea bathing is the finest on the Chinese coast.

It is easy to understand why various missionary groups have established summer cottages in Tsing-Tao, and why the units of our Far Eastern fleet enjoy an assignment to this port. There are excellent motor roads throughout the city and to nearby places, while a rapidly expanding motor bus service links up various points in Shantung province with this port. The further development of interior roads will be an important factor in Tsing-Tao's prosperity.

As a result of the Japanese occupation, Japanese business men dominate local commerce. The Japanese aid in policing the city and they still control the excellent railroad line which runs from Tsing-Tao to Tsinan-fu, the capital of Shantung Province. By declaring this railroad and a strip on either side of it a neutral zone, the Japanese prevented the Nationalist Army under Chiang Kai-shek from completing its victorious march to Peking as early as 1927. The clash between China's Nationalist forces and the Japanese at Tsinan-fu brought the dispatch of further forces by Japan and delayed Chinese-Japanese reconciliation until 1929.

Tientsin

The land route from Tsing-Tao to Peking goes via Tsinan-fu and Tientsin. This is the route covered by the famous Blue Express of pre-war days which linked Shanghai with Peking. It continued to run between Peking and Tsinan-fu during the greater part of the revolutionary period, but the roadbed deteriorated and the rolling stock shows many signs of wear. Both sleepers and diners are still available and the service, at least, is excellent.

At Tientsin, three hours' rail journey south of Peking, we find a city whose population may be Nationalist in sympathy, but whose Chinese administrative leaders have little confidence in the competence or the good intentions of the Nanking Government.

The river channel that connects Tientsin with the sea has been much neglected and only small ships can now come up to the city. Business has been difficult during the Revolution. No one dared to make commitments and taxes were so varied and uncertain as to occasion constant irritation and controversy.

For the better part of two years the city of Tientsin housed the American marines under General Smedley D. Butler. They were sent to China in 1927 when the Nanking episode threatened to develop into a general conflagration. They were not obliged to fire a single shot throughout their stay, but their presence, together with that of British and Japanese soldiers may have prevented the looting of Tientsin when control of the city was transferred from the Northern to the Southern armies.

The four thousand stalwart American defenders liked Tientsin. After the first few weeks of summer discomfort under canvas they found good quarters. Their money went twice as far in China as at home. Beverages, meals, entertainment and those other delights of life which a marine appreciates could be found in Tientsin in the greatest variety at a small price. The Americans were paid from two to ten times as much as any of their foreign comrades and were able to put on more than a bit of swagger. General Butler rented the mansion of a Chinese millionaire for himself and his staff. As an experienced campaigner in the Orient he knew how to make him-

self comfortable. He has no particular liking for the Chinese but managed to get along with them. It is a happy thing for Chinese-American relations that our forces escaped a clash which might have had an adverse effect on the traditional Chinese-American friendship.

Peking

Peking, or Peiping as the Nationalist Government now insists on calling it, is, in many ways, the Orient's most fascinating city. Round-the-world cruise trippers are almost unanimous in declaring that their Peking days stand out above all others. This is because Peking combines the romance of mediæval China with the comforts of modern Western civilization. The walled Legation Quarter with its parks and pools, its parade grounds and its tennis courts, its numerous handsome palaces and gardens, provides a blessed retreat from Oriental squalor. The walls and gates of the ancient city, the pagodas and towers that dot the skyline, the colorful native quarters with their booths and bazaars, teeming with life; the temples and palaces of the western hills beyond the city gates combine to delight visitors and residents.

Here is a great, richly endowed American University, its beautiful buildings blending Oriental architecture with Occidental convenience. Here is a remarkably fine hospital which the Rockefeller millions have equipped with every modern device. No

wonder that the diplomats assigned to China are reluctant to quit this city for undeveloped Nanking!

Peking holds the past—Nanking holds the future. Some of China's finest traditions find their centre in the walled-in gardens and palaces of the Forbidden City where lotus flowers, marble lions, beautifully-carved stone balustrades, strange pagodas and magnificent collections of Chinese art tell their story of an opulent yesterday. Physically, the Chinese of the North make a much better impression than those of the South, and they are much more sober and conservative in their point of view. They admit the advantages of Western civilization, but they are not so sure about all our political institutions. Where some of the young hot-heads of the South want immediate and complete democracy on the American model, the more conservative leaders of the North would build the new only on the foundations of the old.

But the young hot-heads will grow up and calm down. As the Revolution succeeds it will become less of a revolution. Canton will forego the luxury of unseating governments for the sake of the more enduring luxuries inherent in an ordered life. She will seek to rival the sober solid prosperity of Hongkong. Shanghai will become more completely Chinafied but not in the sneering sense in which Roosevelt once used that phrase. Shantung's Chinese Government will prove to the world that it can administer and maintain the improvements which Germany and

Japan established at Tsing-Tao. Even Tientsin will reëstablish its commercial importance, although that importance can no longer be derived from the fact that it is the port city for the nation's capital. As for Peking, the unexploited wealth of Mongolia may pass through its gates or it may find some relation to Manchuria that will recapture a little of its prestige. Its past, at least, is secure and the time may come when China's eastern cities have all been so changed and modernized that forgotten and neglected Peking will be the museum city of the Orient.

CHAPTER IX

YOUNG CHINA MARCHES ON

THE world's oldest country has the youngest ruler. China is governed by youth. Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Nationalist Government, is the world's youngest president. He is young in years, but younger still in spirit. He radiates modernism in dress, manners and ideas.

Determined to meet and interview this Nationalist leader, the writer followed him to his native hills in Ning-Po Province. There, in an ancient Buddhist monastery remote from the world, the generalissimo of young China was gathering strength for fresh efforts. China's past and present seemed to meet with his visit to this seat of tradition. The old monks went about their devotions with apparent indifference to their distinguished guest and his foreign visitors. The bells summoned them to worship with clanging insistence and they hurried across the open court without even a glance at the trim khaki-clad figure on the veranda.

Young China's leader was expounding China's hopes to an American visitor who was to tell the

story to the people of the West. The old priests had more important business. They could not take time or thought for China's tomorrow. Theirs was the task of transmitting the heritage of a million yesterdays.

Chiang Kai-shek is slight in figure, of medium height, with a boyish face and a manner almost diffident. He is the very antithesis of a military dictator. His tan silk fatigue uniform was of Western cut. The impression of modernity was confirmed by the large red fountain pen and pencil clipped against the outside pocket of his blouse. He spoke his quick precise answers with the eagerness of an enthusiast.

Asked about his plans, he replied that the first essential for the complete success of the Nationalist movement is the organization of a more vigorous propaganda to bring Sun Yat Senism home to all of China. That, in his mind, is the necessary foundation for coördinating the entire country under the Nationalist régime. "Political unification is only the beginning," he said. "Our chief task is to teach the principles of Sun Yat Sen to all our people."

Sun Yat Sen's principles are a mixture of American democracy and European Socialism. This idealist and dreamer, who led the Revolution that overthrew the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and became China's president, drank from the same fountain of ideas as the Russian Communists. He modified Marxism and made it more practical. His famous three principles

—national unity, national independence and national well-being—have no international flavor. All three can be summed up in the phrase China for the Chinese. To achieve Sun Yat Senism, President Chiang Kai-shek and his associates are calling for new methods, new ideas, and new men. Against vigorous opposition and with practically no outside aid they are winning their way in a world that, for many years, was bitterly hostile to their ideas.

For a time they sought help from Soviet Russia, and the Communist propagandists headed by Borodin were of great service in teaching Chinese leaders the fine art of mass persuasion. But those who headed the Nationalist movement soon realized that Communism could not be adapted to serve China's needs. They had the courage to oust Russia's envoys and strike out for themselves, continuing to use against Communism the very same propaganda methods by which they had introduced it. Throughout 1927 and 1928 travelers in China, who had also visited Russia, could recognize Communist posters which had been adapted to anti-Communist purposes by simply changing the captions.

Fortunately for Young China, the great powers of the world no longer have a common policy in any part of the Far East. Germany was compelled to forego her special privileges in China by the Post-War Treaty. Russia relinquished hers voluntarily in the hope of making China another Soviet state. The

United States has always been reluctant to play the old imperial game in China and has preceded France and England in admitting China's right to complete autonomy. Our note of November 1st, 1929, on extra-territoriality repeated our willingness to enter at once into negotiations to devise a method "for the gradual relinquishment of extra-territorial rights, either as to designated territorial areas or as to particular kinds of jurisdiction, or as to both, provided that such gradual relinquishment proceeds at the same time as steps are taken and improvements are achieved by the Chinese Government in the enactment and effective enforcement of laws based on modern jurisprudence."

Our reward has come in trade advantage. To one who travels in the Far East for the first time the achievements of our business men in this region are surprising. In both Japan and China we are already on better than even terms with Europe's bankers and business men despite the long start which Britons, Germans, Dutchmen, Portuguese and Frenchmen have had in these regions. Europe depended on foreign markets long before we felt the need of them, and European governments have devoted many years of effort to their development. Nevertheless, there is a steadily growing interest and participation by Americans in the business and financial operations of the Far East. Despite the Revolution in China, the economic crisis in Japan, and stagnation in the Philip-

pines, American enterprises and investments are reaching out more largely to all these regions. Our capital surplus and our foreign experience are both increasing. American agents in the Orient are fighting for business with more determination and with more success.

The British development of Hongkong in Southern China shows how an aggressive imperially-minded government can assist its bankers and traders in a foreign field. The British seizure of this admirably-located island at the mouth of the Pearl River was epoch-making in the development of Britain's Chinese trade. Here is a beautiful natural harbor with all modern facilities under exclusive British control. Pious profession and practical purpose were combined to achieve British ends. New land has been seized or purchased as it was needed. Extending control to the mainland made it possible to build a British railroad to Canton, further developing British prestige and British commercial opportunities.

The United States cannot seize a Chinese port and develop it. The day of aggressive imperialism has passed—the people of the Far East have developed a degree of race consciousness and nationalist feeling which not only makes them resent outside interference but which makes them determined to throw off the burdens and handicaps imposed by foreign governments in the past. For some time to come,

foreign powers will lose rather than gain prestige and authority in the Orient. Western business men will accomplish more than Western diplomats in the struggle for advantage, and this change will be helpful to America. Our business sense is greater than our diplomatic acumen.

We do well in the Far East, wherever competition is without fear or favor. The Standard Oil Company, the National City Bank and other American corporations have built up highly efficient and successful Far Eastern organizations. In some places they have already outdistanced British competitors, and almost everywhere their prospects are excellent.

The expulsion of Russian Communism from China, the anti-British and the anti-Japanese feeling growing out of the historic relations between China and these two strong-willed Empires have helped to make us popular in China by contrast. The fact that we refused to back "strong action" after the Nanking outrages and our traditional friendly attitude towards Chinese Nationalism has made Chinese officials and Chinese merchants hospitable to American business enterprises.

In Shanghai, the International Settlement had an American Mayor through the most difficult period of the Nationalist Revolution. At the same time the American Consul General in Shanghai was Dean of the Consular Corps. The American clubs are the finest clubs in that city. The American Chamber of

Commerce represents an outstanding group of business men. Fortunately for the prospects of our business in China, this powerful group realized before it was too late that it is better to work with the Chinese Nationalists than against them. After a preliminary period of hostility which lasted until 1928, these Americans recognized that the Chinese could no longer be bullied or ignored. They broke away from British leadership and launched upon a more conciliatory policy. Chinese leaders responded with the most friendly enthusiasm.

Nelson Johnson, our new Minister to China, is the ideal man to advance this friendly understanding. He is far less concerned than his able but too legalistic predecessor John Van A. MacMurray, with the letter of outworn treaties, and far more sympathetic with Nationalist China. For many years he lived in China. He speaks the language, admires the Chinese people and should prove a true interpreter of America's sympathetic interest in China's faltering steps towards a more modern way of life.

Several American banks have established Chinese branches. Their buildings are imposing and their managers are young, aggressive Americans acquainted with the modern way of building business. China's civil wars have handicapped these branches. Books show a loss instead of a profit, but by holding on through the transition period they will be in a strong position to take advantage of the prosperity which

will follow the first year in which there is no fighting in China.

It is easy to point out the mistakes of the Nationalist régime. Many of the young men associated with the Government are hot-headed and inexperienced. They are in too much of a hurry to introduce democratic ideas in a country unfitted to receive them. Sometimes they remind one of college debaters in the cocksureness with which they propound theories of government as though theory and practice always ran on all fours. They rightly resent foreign domination and interference, but they do not make enough allowance for what might be called squatter's rights. As one passes through the International Settlement of Shanghai and notes the solid magnificence of the many square miles of business structures that line its streets, one understands the apprehension of the Old China Hands at what might happen to the vast amount of wealth which Westerners have piled up in this area if it should suddenly be turned over to Chinese rule and administration.

Yet the unequal treaties must go. Foreigners must learn to trust the Chinese even before they are quite ready to be trusted. Foreign courts in China and complete foreign control of concession areas belong to a past era. China has already had her way in the establishment of a new Chinese tariff exempt from those unfair restrictions which were imposed three-quarters of a century ago. On November 15th, 1928,

the British Government formally surrendered the British Concession at Chinkiang in the province of Kiangsu, not far from Nanking. In 1868 China had surrendered this area to Great Britain "forever."

The new tariff has supplied the Chinese Government with funds—and the possession of funds means power. This explains why the Nationalist forces have triumphed again and again over those generals and provincial leaders who have fomented revolution in various provinces of the West and South. The prospect of defeating the well-organized and well-paid Nationalist army is so poor that it is no longer an easy matter for the trouble-makers to find outside financial help. In China, even more than elsewhere in the world, victory is likely to go to the best paid and the best fed battalions.

Yet one finds many competent observers who have little faith in the power of the Nationalist régime to maintain its authority over the entire country. Many experienced foreign residents are reluctant to admit that the Chinese are capable of creating or governing a unified China.

Sir Cecil Clementi, a veteran resident of China, who ruled Hongkong for the British Government with even-handed justice for some years cannot envisage Nationalist success. Here is a well-trained public servant, generous and fair-minded, representing that fine type of British official often encountered who serve their government with true loyalty and

unselfish devotion in remote corners of the earth. "There is no such thing as China," he said with a quiet smile, fixing his American visitor with a clear and steady gaze. His bronze face grew more serious as he continued. "There is no such thing as a Chinese language. Your English would be as readily understood by the citizens of Canton as Li Hung Chang's Chinese when he came down here to govern. China has no united history. It is absolutely impossible in our time to create a united China. The people who seek it are less than one per cent of the population.

"Our neighbor province of Kwantung has always had its own government, with but one brief interlude. It is as large as Italy and has a population of 42,000,000, so why not? To me it is nothing short of amazing to see the continued recurrence of the idea of a united China in the documents that go forth from our Foreign Office and from your State Department. This is a complete misconception of the situation. The truth is that we are still in the Tuchun period with a lot of independent provincial war lords fighting one another."

The man who says this is no ordinary commentator, but one of the ablest and best-qualified students of Chinese affairs.

We must also admit that what he says is still true. Even today most of the provinces of China are practically independent of the central government. They have always been so in the past and the idea of a

strongly centralized national authority is completely at variance with China's historic tradition.

Manchuria has accepted Nanking's authority only with respect to foreign affairs. Even in this field it is limited and there are endless intrigues at Mukden between the provincial leaders and foreign envoys. It was the provincial authorities at Mukden, the Manchurian capital, and not the government leaders at Nanking, the Nationalist capital, who carried on the Sino-Russian negotiations which ended the quarrel about the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929.

Half a dozen provinces in the North, South and West are just as ready to follow an independent leader as they are to accept continued domination from Nanking. Nor does the Nationalist Government function as well established governments do. It is often unable to enforce its decrees or to collect its taxes. Despite its decrees against opium, it is possible to purchase opium almost everywhere. In certain districts near Canton the sale of opium is legal. In the city of Canton it can usually be obtained on certificates. Special permits to smoke opium for a night are issued for a few cents, and the anti-Opium Bureau functions largely for purposes of tax collection.

It is such omnipresent abuses that cause established foreign residents of China to inveigh against the Nationalist régime. They knew how to deal with the Imperial Government, and in the old days they

were fairly certain to get what they paid for. To-day it is even difficult to know whom to bribe and when. That is why they find it easy to laud the old leaders and the old ways.

Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord, was the perfect embodiment of the old order. While his rule was at its height, and until he was driven from Peking by the advance of the Nationalist forces in 1928, he lived in the Imperial palace in the centre of Peking's weed-grown Forbidden City, carefully guarded by an army of well-trained mercenaries.

What a contrast between the trim young Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek and the shrewd decrepit ex-bandit who ruled North China with an iron hand! But this Northern war lord was even more eager to be interviewed than the leaders of the South. He had been told of the effectiveness of their foreign propaganda and was anxious to launch a little favorable publicity in his own behalf.

Yet the picture he presented was not one to win Western approval. Here was a small, sallow, cotton-clad Chinaman, whose blinking eyes and shaking hands showed signs of dissipation. It was evident that he did not like being interviewed and only submitted because he had been told that this was the way to win the favor of the Western powers. After each question his straggly down-turned mustachios seemed to droop a little further. His eyelids would close down slowly as if he were about to go to sleep.

The tapering yellowed fingers seemed to find it too much of a task to hold up a beautifully-browned meerschaum cigarette holder. There was about him something of the feline in repose. A slightly sweetish fragrance which he had brought into the room with him suggested opium.

He charged the leaders of the South with violence and radicalism. He was sure that Western ways and Western political institutions would not do for China. "This room has been furnished in European fashion," he said, gazing about with contempt at the mid-Victorian pieces which surrounded him, "but that does not make it occidental. Some Chinese put on United States clothes but that does not make them American. China can use western methods and western ways, but only if they are developed on the foundation of her own tradition. Nor can China be changed by violence. Everything must be done regularly and in proper order."

"There is too much talk about democracy. The only true meaning of democracy is welfare of the people. Democratic government is that government which does things for the people. My rule benefits the people of China because I look after their welfare. In South China they profess to do many things, but their performance lags. The United States misunderstands the beneficent effect of my rule in North China because of Southern propaganda."

Then, shrewdly he continued: "The people of

your country ought to realize that China and the United States have a common enemy in Russia. You are a rich nation, and they would like nothing better than to wreck the greatest capitalist country in the world."

A few months later the railroad car which was carrying the ousted Northern leader from Peking back to his Manchurian capital was blown up as it entered Mukden. With Chang Tso-lin's death the strongest anti-Nationalist leader disappeared. Some semblance of unity became possible, and the first stage of the revolution against absolutism came to an end.

What will the new phase be? Can the Nationalist Government in Nanking hold China together despite the efforts of the selfish militarists to overthrow its rule?

The answer is yes. China has at last become conscious of herself. Despite lack of experience, mistaken efforts and excessive zeal the Nationalist leaders will succeed. They represent the best of young China. They have absorbed the traditions and purposes of the West and will force them upon a reluctant China, making many mistakes as they proceed.

The Japanese Empire imposed Western civilization upon itself by a slow process of evolution. China has initiated the process by the speedier, but harsher method of revolution. This method is more waste-

ful, but results are achieved more quickly. China is on the way to the new order, and will not be denied. It is of good omen that the powers of the world no longer oppose the new movement and are even ready to surrender those special privileges which belong to the past.

CHAPTER X

JAPAN FROM MT. FUJI

WHO has not heard of Mount Fuji and longed for a glimpse of its snow-crowned summit? This majestic heaven-kissing peak is everything a mountain should be. It is shaped even as little children expect a mountain to be shaped, it is beautiful to look upon from near and far, it is surrounded by the halo of legend and tradition as Japan's highest and most sacred mountain. Best of all it is accessible.

So when I learned that the climb could be made between the time the *Siberia Maru* arrived at Yokohama and sailed from Kobe I resolved that Fuji's summit would be my first destination after presenting some letters of introduction at Tokyo. Within twenty-four hours of landing I would be on my way to get a bird's-eye view of Japan from its very top.

"Americans are certainly energetic," remarked the Foreign Office official in Tokyo upon whom I called that afternoon. "I have been planning to climb Fuji myself for the past twenty years. Somehow I have never got around to doing it. Yet here you come along from America and within a few hours are on your

way. Well, I hope you enjoy the climb and get a clear view. Our rainy season has been lasting a little longer than usual."

The Japan Tourist Bureau is an excellent institution. It is a Government institution, as so many things in Japan are, and it is well run. The Tourist Bureau is well staffed and most responsive to the needs of travelers visiting Japan.

It would be several days before the regular Mount Fuji climbing season opened, the manager of the Bureau informed me, but under favorable weather conditions it would be possible to make the top. Having had constant contact with intrepid tourists he was less surprised than the Foreign Office that any one should wish to climb Japan's highest mountain on his first day in the country. He was asked about an interpreter-guide.

"That is a bit difficult," he replied with a smile. "I can easily get you a good mountain climber or an excellent interpreter. But you ask for some one who is strong both in the head and in the legs. Yet we will see what we can do."

He did see with the result that a youthful member of a Tokyo hiking club who spoke some English and better German was soon on his way with the American editor to Gotemba, the little town lying at the foot of Fuji. As the train wound its way through the foothills, sheets of rain dashed against the windows while clouds and mist obscured all view of the

snow-clad peak towering 12,387 feet above the plain.

At Gotemba the weather reports from the mountain were unfavorable. It was doubtful whether it would be worth while to go on. But one soon learns in traveling never to be discouraged by poor prospects. Difficulties have a way of disappearing when they are faced.

For the small sum of $1.25 the driver of the omnipresent Ford taxi was persuaded to carry two eager would-be Fuji pilgrims—my young Japanese companion was making his first ascent of the mountain—seven miles farther on to Subashiri where the footwork was to begin.

There, at a modest Japanese inn, we were properly equipped with a pilgrim's staff, which was afterwards branded at the different stations, a grass mat to be slung over the shoulder as a protection against rain or sun, and a picturesque conical straw hat. The hardy village guide who was to pace our faltering steps looked doubtfully at my low-cut kid leather shoes and silk socks—his doubts were fully justified by events—and pointed to his own stout cloth shoes and leggings. But I decided that even though unsuitable my own shoes would probably be more comfortable than anything that I could obtain in the village shops.

For the small sum of $2.65 our guide contracted to spend the better part of two days in our service, feeding himself en route and carrying anything we

might wish to turn over to him. Human service is cheap in Japan despite the general rise in living standards.

A few minutes later with the rain still pouring down we were passing through the shrine at the end of the village. For the first time I saw the fluttering paper streamers, the white-painted sacred wooden horse and the graceful gateways that mark Japan's places of worship. Just beyond the shrine a great stone block commemorated the visit of the Crown Prince, now Emperor. The Japanese revere their rulers more than any of the great peoples of the world, their traditional reverence for authority finding in the sovereign's person a convenient and valuable symbol.

The ascent began. It was very gradual, recalling in its early stages the journey up Mount Rainier in the State of Washington, or the slowly mounting slope of Mauna Loa on the Island of Hawaii. As in the Hawaiian Island, there was semi-tropical vegetation and red volcanic soil. After a little distance had been traversed wind flowers and anemones abounded on the mosses under the fragrant fir trees. In the open spaces we heard the distant song of larks and in the woods nightingales chanted melodiously and even responded when my young companion whistled the notes of their song.

A white-clad bearded Fuji pilgrim on horseback, too old to journey to the mountain's top but still

eager to pay his personal tribute to the sacred mountain by spending a night upon its slope, passed by. Two police officials rode behind him at a respectful distance, indicating that the pilgrim was a person of rank. He lurched back and forth on his horse and was obviously tired. But with true Japanese pride he stiffened in his seat as he saw us coming, and passed us head erect and with straightened back.

Soon we had occasion to shout with joy, for the rain stopped and the sun made repeated efforts to peep out from behind the cloud banks. Fuji persisted in remaining hidden, but we did not care so long as we were able to continue on our way. As we reached Rest House Number Two—there are ten in all on the Gotemba route to the top—the sun was still fighting the clouds with occasional success. We had climbed for two hours and were dripping with perspiration despite the gradual nature of the ascent. The pot of hot tea which greeted our arrival here, as at every stopping place, was grateful to the taste and pleasing to the stomach. If Westerners would learn to take hot drinks instead of cold after exercise in warm climates they would do much for the enduring comfort of their bodies. After profuse perspiration hot tea, no matter how weak, seems to satisfy the thirst more completely than a cold drink.

After leaving Station Number Two, the volcanic dirt and gravel became looser and deeper, making walking a little more difficult. The loam produced

from the vegetable matter which has decayed for many centuries gradually disappears and the bare volcanic soil affords less firm footing. But the slope is so gradual that the veriest tyro in mountain climbing is able to keep going. The rain had stopped, and since the sun was now definitely scoring a triumph over the clouds the prospects for a successful ascent were much improved.

Yet the occasional natives whom we met on their return from one of the high stations were not encouraging. They had transported food and merchandise for the throngs of pilgrims soon to come to points nearer the top. All declared that the peak was cloud covered, that a few hundred feet higher up a cold clammy mist made it hard to see and that a piercing cold wind added to discomfort.

A few minutes later a party of young American missionary folk confirmed the bad news. "We found it impossible to reach the top," they reported. "We struck a snow field beyond the Sixth Station and it was so cold and such hard going that we turned back. Unless you have heavy clothes you had better not try it. One member of our party kept on climbing with the guide. He probably did not reach the top either, and you are likely to meet him at the Third Station."

At five o'clock in the afternoon, after having encountered an occasional cold wind and some whirling clouds of mist, we sighted Station Number Three. Our guide suggested that we stop there for the night,

since we might not find accommodations higher up. He explained that it would be easy to complete the rest of the climb in four or five hours the next morning. Perhaps, too, he expected better weather the next day.

Just before reaching the station a tall, wiry, well-bronzed Yankee passed us on the way down. "Did you pass a group of Americans?" he asked. "Are you Missionary Johnson?" we asked in turn. He nodded identification and explained that he had reached the summit after a strenuous battle with the wind and cold. "It took it out of me," he admitted. "But the others stopped going at the very worst place. Conditions were much better nearer the top."

He had reached the summit in a total climbing time of nine hours, spread over two days, and was determined to catch his less hardy companions before they reached the bottom. He was in too much of a hurry to say anything about the Chinese situation. As a missionary he looked like a good mountain climber.

For the first time we could see Fuji's summit, a perfect black cone with occasional streaks of white down the side. It seemed blacker than any other mountain peak in the world, the wet volcanic soil shining like polished ebony whenever the floating clouds gave the sun an opportunity to light up the slopes.

When our eyes turned in the direction from which

we had come they beheld one of the world's loveliest mountain views. Fog and mists were fleeing in every direction before the piercing rays of the late afternoon sun. As their gray curtains swept away, one low mountain range after another came into the line of vision. Between the slopes were beautiful lakes surrounded by sloping green fields. With the glass, most of these could be identified as the omnipresent rice fields, cut into tiny holdings, each one of a different shape, suggesting the studied variation of a picture puzzle.

What a waste of human effort! Each little patch cultivated by a different family with painful hand labor, involving all the waste that is inseparable from small-scale agriculture. The whole problem of Japan as related to population and production of food can be visualized from the slopes of Mount Fuji. One is quite ready to believe that more than half the farms of Japan are less than two acres in extent. As far as the eye could reach in every direction, nothing but hills and mountains. No sweep of broad acres on which tractors and other modern machines could be employed to advantage, only slopes and narrow valleys.

To visualize for the first time from the side of this high mountain that vague mental concept which the Westerner identifies with the word Japan is to experience a profound shock. We are looking upon the heart of a great empire which is nothing more than

a small group of volcanic islands, smaller in total area than many of our States, incredibly mountainous. Yet here is a land teeming with a proud, hardy, war-steeled island people, increasing now at the rate of one million a year. Such a people is bound to knock upon the gates of the world. It must do that, or accept the alternative of race suicide.

As one looks upon the lovely lakes that lie at different levels near Fuji's base the thought of water power suggests itself as a possible solution of Japan's basic problem. If the water that flows down the sides of these many mountains could be turned into white coal to run local industries perhaps the small-scale farmers who now wrest a scanty living from the soil could work in industrial plants part of the year, thus increasing their own income and Japan's export surplus.

But the wind is cold and the call to hot tea cuts off further speculation about the future of a country which has thus far managed to solve all her problems with excellent success. Soon there will be a wonderful sunset and perhaps the wind will have swept away the clouds that still hide the expanse of the Pacific. In the rest house there is a small open fire. The fumes from the burning wood make the eyes smart, but the heat will dry the city man's clothes dripping without and within from rain and perspiration.

There are no beds in native Japan. The Imperial Hotel in Tokyo provides them, of course, but the rest

houses on Mount Fuji are not equipped to cater to the degenerate taste of the Occident. In these wayside huts you are fortunate to be able to rent mat space, which means the opportunity to stretch out and sleep upon one of the beautifully clean and fragrant grass mats which are the only floor covering of the true Japanese home. Shoes must be left at the door. Ill-bred Westerners who track their muddy soles over the mats are soon taught that this is akin to walking on beds and dining-room tables.

Those who are wise take their own food with them on a Fuji climb. Only boiled rice and Japanese vegetables are available at the rest houses and there may not be enough of these to supply over-night guests. At Rest House Number Three there actually were eggs. The Japanese ordered them raw and the American wanted them boiled. They were to supplement the canned ham and white Japanese bread which had been purchased on the Ginza in Tokyo the previous evening. The boiled eggs were cold when served, the friendly host having taken great pains to keep them in cold water for some minutes after they were done. It was with a look of pained surprise that he responded to the request to put them back into the hot water.

Soon a stiff cold wind announced the disappearance of the sun's rays. The golden afterglow was all too brief. The well-carpentered door—in Japan door really means one side of a house—was pulled over on

its groove, shutting out the cold and darkened skies. A kerosene lamp and the fitful glow of the wood fire provided more than enough light to write the inevitable post cards.

My genial young interpreter took advantage of my Harvard German to write all his cards in that language. In response to a question as to how it happened that he knew German so much better than English after having studied both languages in the same Japanese schools for the same number of years he gave an apt reply: "I learned English because I had to and German later because I wanted to." It is the old story: "Most profit grows where is most pleasure ta'en."

Mountain climbing induces sleep. Four o'clock in the morning came with a rush. Already the East was aglow. Absence of razor or toothbrush simplified toilet obligations. Radio exercises removed stiffness from muscles softened by non-use and melted snow provided a fresh sense of cleanliness that may have been more imagined than real.

Soon a golden crescent, that became a slowly rising fountain of molten gold, rose up out of the ocean behind the lowest range of hills and bathed the still darkened world in a ruddy glow. It was a glorious Fuji sunrise, worshiped by the Japanese pilgrims. To experience it upon the slopes of their holy mountain means to them much the same thing as the journey to Mecca means to the pious Moslem.

After a breakfast of strangely scrambled eggs, rice and the ever-welcome hot tea the bitter part of the climb was essayed. The sunlit peak still seemed a great distance away. The road at once became more steep, the path more narrow, while the loose rocks and gravel crumbled away more easily underfoot. Every 100 feet of rise made the breath come a little harder. Frequent rests were necessary. Occasional fields of mushy snow had to be crossed. The American silk socks and half shoes were showing signs of wear. Every step of the way was sown with abandoned straw sandals worn out and kicked off by travelers who had equipped themselves with many pairs for the journey to the top.

The Sixth Station seemed only a little distance away from the Third but the Seventh and Eighth and the summit climb beyond, that was another story! Twelve lazy days at sea are no preparation for mountaineering. But all things yield to persistent effort and Fuji's summit was reached after four hours of unremitting toil. As is often the case, the view from the summit was less extensive than that from Station Number Three because of great banks of intervening clouds that only broke occasionally to allow a fleeting vision of the distant countryside.

But the sight of the huge crater at the top was alone worth the effort of the climb. Few extinct volcanoes show a mightier pit. As one struggles for more than an hour to walk round one side of the

giant crater one realizes the deceptions of distance which make Fuji's peak appear as the narrow apex of a perfect pyramid. Skirting the rim one passes over beds of lava still warm to the touch, although centuries have elapsed since Fuji's last eruption. And they are growing warmer. In the summer of 1929 the soil temperature averaged five degrees warmer than in previous decades. Steam rose where the sun was drying the moisture left from melting snows and night mists. And regular jets of steam issued from the constant changing fissures in the bottom of the old crater.

No one stays for long at the top of a high mountain. It was the one place where there was no green tea. But the rest house host announced that he was prepared to supply white tea. There was an eager call for three good-sized portions. It proved to be plain hot water, but it took away the internal chill, and satisfied the ever-present thirst.

Then came the descent by a different route. Three hundred feet below the rim we encountered the first great bed of snow. And here America introduced Japan to a new trick in mountaineering. In making climbs upon our snow-clad mountains we wear "tin pants"—canvas trousers with waxed seats—that take the place of bobsleds in whizzing down the snow slopes. The grass mat was made to serve the same purpose in Japan. Slipping the neck cord over one leg, squatting down on the mat, feet to the front, and using

his mountain staff as a rudder the Fuji pilgrim from America whizzed down upon his improvised sled to the great delight of his companions. A little farther down another snow field obliged, adding speed and interest to the toilsome descent.

Then came a long, grueling tramp through volcanic ash and gravel, across what is known as the lava desert. At each step the leg was buried halfway between ankle and knee. The loose stones forced their way into the low shoes, bruising the skin and tearing what was left of a much abused pair of silk socks. The little towel, which every Japanese carries as we do a handkerchief, supplied necessary bandages. Three hours of painful limping, running and jumping with no stops en route brought us to the bottom. For miles there was not a plant nor a tree to break the desert waste of lava, although centuries have passed since it spouted out of Fuji's crater. The eternal operation of the force of gravity keeps rolling the lava rock down the side of the mountain, choking out whatever seeds the wind and birds have brought during the previous year.

That evening a hot bath provided by the admirably run Fujiya Hotel near the shores of Lake Hakone transported one mountain climber into a heaven of delight. "You newspaper men certainly know how to hit the high spots in a hurry," was the comment of another American as he accompanied a hungry and limping editor in to dinner.

CHAPTER XI

THE LEAGUE'S FIRST DECADE

A GROUP of Americans in Geneva sitting on the Hotel Bergues balcony overlooking the lovely lake in September, 1929, were debating the probable date when the United States would become a member of the League of Nations. No one was inclined to name the exact year yet, this being an American occasion, a wager was offered and so discussion centered about dates. It was finally agreed that 1935 was the year in which the party would meet again to celebrate America's entry at the expense of the only member of the group who was willing to wager that it would take more than six years.

Among those League enthusiasts who have followed with eager interest the developments at Geneva during the first decade of the League's existence there is little doubt that the United States will ultimately become a member. Each year the League has grown stronger, more firmly rooted, more popular, more useful. Each year also the United States has coöperated in League work more willingly, more largely and more effectively.

Russia and the United States are the only important non-member powers and they have both been glad to join in every League activity which affected their interests. Russia has found the Geneva meetings of the Disarmament Commission a most convenient means of proclaiming to the world the peaceful intentions of a Communist Government. The United States has sent powerful delegations to Geneva not only to advance American views but to prevent the opposing views of other governments from dominating international meetings.

To understand the present power and prestige of the Geneva organization it is necessary to realize the great change it has undergone since 1919. It was conceived as a means of preventing war. It has developed into a vast complex of international machinery for the promotion of peace. While it has functioned successfully to prevent minor international conflicts, intervention of this kind has been rare and incidental. The League's dominant and all-absorbing task is to remove the causes of war and to further all coöperative action that promotes peace.

The League has proceeded on the assumption that whatever makes for the well-being of humanity—promotes health, reduces poverty, eases communications, facilitates contacts, furthers understanding, eliminates friction, contributes directly to the peace of the world. To prevent war is, in a sense, the negative side of the League's work. Nor is there any certainty

that the League can, in any particular instance, prevent war any more than the Anti-War Pact could prevent it. But day in and day out, year in and year out the League can and does promote peace.

If the United States had rightly understood the relative importance of these two League undertakings, if we had appreciated the utter absence of any super-state authority to issue an anti-war fiat backed by the threat of force, our relations with the Geneva organization might have developed differently.

Politically the League is still weak and will remain so for a good many years to come. Strong nations are still unwilling to yield to it any considerable fraction of their national power. They believe in the League, they applaud it, they coöperate in its many undertakings, but they do not rely on it to promote their national interests.

With smaller countries the case is different. They see in the League an instrument of power with which to offset their own weakness. They want to rely upon the League because they are unable to rely upon themselves. In controversies with a larger power they need League help. Their enthusiasm and their support have given the League much of its vitality. Thanks largely to their constant pressure, the League long ago ceased to be an organization to consolidate the Allied victory and crystallize the map of the world on the basis of the 1919 treaties. Already in 1929 the League Assembly was reminded by the

Chinese delegate that it is one of the functions of the League under the Covenant to inquire into any treaties which create ill-feeling between nations and thus endanger peace. He referred to Article Nineteen which reads as follows: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

There was little reference to this article during the first decade of the League's existence. Now that the League is gradually acquiring power there will be constant efforts on the part of weaker countries to use League strength to their own advantage. Each year sees the smaller powers enlarging their authority and influence within the bosom of the League. From the first they have played the most prominent part in the work of the Assembly and, thanks to the enlargement of the Council, they have become much more important in the work of that body. The great powers still exercise the preponderant influence. A hint of opposition from the delegate of France will carry great weight with the delegates of a dozen small countries. Yet each passing year sees delegates in both Council and Assembly speaking out more boldly when it is a question of defending League policy against national interest.

When the League began its work it had 42 mem-

bers. To-day there are 54. In returning to the League in 1929 both Peru and Bolivia expressed through their delegates high appreciation of the League's contribution to the settlement of international difficulties in which they were involved. Peru returned "because she had become convinced of the moral authority of the League Assembly" and because the happy outcome of her long-standing dispute with Chile was due "to the generous intervention of the American Government and more especially to the atmosphere of peace and coöperation fostered by the League of Nations." The Bolivian delegate, recalling the League's intervention in the frontier dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay in January, 1929, assured the Assembly that his country felt "a warm feeling of confidence in the League on that occasion."

The United States remained out of the League because it feared an alliance with war-making Europe. Americans did not propose to sign a Covenant which seemed to perpetuate war-time obligations. America's decisive vote against the League in 1922 expressed our determination to avoid any obligation to enforce peace in other parts of the world. The "war against war" having proved an illusion we did not propose "to be fooled again" by being drawn into a visionary "League against war." It was America's disgust with the secret treaties, with war lies, with the vindictive character of the peace that

made us shun a League which grew out of these events and which was born as an integral part of a peace whose terms denied our most important war aims.

As the League has grown in prestige and authority, hostility to it has diminished. Germany's admission to the Council and Assembly in 1926 eliminated the argument that it was a League of victor nations formed to conserve and guarantee the spoils of war. The influence of France and Britain became less pervasive. The smaller powers began to find in Geneva a valuable forum for the exposition of their views and a powerful agency for the protection of their interests.

The first three Assemblies were devoted exclusively to organization and to aiding post-war reconstruction. Most of the League work of this period, repatriation of war prisoners, refugee settlement, the financial reconstruction of Austria and Hungary, was accomplished by the Council and various Commissions. Members of the Assembly were extremely timid about expressing any views which might not meet the approval of the Big Four (Britain, France, Italy, Japan) whose representatives dominated the Council.

Because of the large importance attributed to Council membership the struggle for seats on that body became intense. When Germany joined the League in 1926 it became necessary to enlarge Council membership to satisfy the demands of lesser

powers. The original nine seats were increased to fourteen. "Semi-permanent" seats were added to the "permanent" and "temporary" seats in a vain effort to prevent Spain and Brazil from resigning.

The original aim of the great powers was to keep constant control of the Council by allotting the five permanent seats to themselves and granting four non-permanent seats to the rest of the world. America's absence and the necessity of assigning Germany a permanent seat upset this arrangement. Once the doors were open to change, Poland, Brazil, Spain and China presented weighty claims to a preferred position. The League experienced the bitterest struggle of its history in the rivalry of these national claims. It was finally agreed to make room for every one by adding six new members to the original nine but this unsatisfactory solution came too late to prevent Spain and Brazil from leaving in a huff. Both have since repented and returned to the fold but an unwieldy Council and an unedifying annual struggle among Assembly members for Council seats is the unhappy result of their intransigeance.

The problem of Council membership has not reached its final solution. Both the United States and Russia are entitled to permanent seats. China, representing more people than any three other powers, excepting India, will soon insist on recognition equal to Japan's. The creation of "semi-permanent" seats raised more difficulties than it solved. A

truly democratic League would eliminate all distinctions among Council seats but it will be many years before the great powers acknowledge the doctrine of equal sovereignty to any such extent. The League of sovereign nations is still far from becoming a league of equal nations.

Meanwhile there is a disposition among the smaller powers to seek more authority for the Assembly in which they have equal and permanent representation. In 1929 Premier Stauning of Denmark said to his Assembly colleagues: "The struggles to obtain seats on the Council have become one of the least satisfactory features of the League. Could not these difficulties be overcome by endowing the Assembly with a more active share in the work?"

He went on to complain that the states which are members of the Council dominate the membership of all important Commissions. To remedy this he proposed that Commissions be appointed jointly by Council and Assembly rather than by the Council acting alone.

Until recently the Assembly was not even scheduled to meet regularly each year. No one knew what the delegates of fifty nations would or could do when they met together. But the opportunity to make their voices heard made such an appeal to the small nations that the annual September meeting of the Assembly was soon taken for granted. Minor powers began sending their Premiers and Foreign Ministers

to the Assembly as delegates with the result that major powers felt obliged to do likewise. To-day, all over the world, statesmen are planning the year round what they are going to say and do on that important annual occasion in Geneva when they are sure of a world-wide audience.

No nation has had more to do with the creation of the League than the United States and few have had more to do with its development. The memorial stone fronting the Lake of Geneva which uses large letters to describe Woodrow Wilson as the founder of the League of Nations and small ones to recall that he was also President of the United States probably anticipates the verdict of history on his outstanding achievements. Many Americans before Woodrow Wilson dreamed of a League, but dreamers rarely occupy positions of power. In Woodrow Wilson a dreamer became head of the world's most powerful national unit. By sacrificing many possible practical achievements at Paris in 1919 he made a dream come true. He lived to convoke the first sessions of the League's Council and Assembly, but failed to persuade the United States Senate to accept membership on his conditions.

A decade of League experience shows us that his dispute with the Senate concerned issues which were and are largely academic. The Lodge reservations, if accepted, would not have prevented our full co-operation in any League activity. Subsequent inter-

pretations of Article Ten show that this guaranty of the political independence and territorial integrity of all League members is not "the heart of the Covenant." Other countries have also reserved the right to decide for themselves when and how and whether they will participate in the enforcement of this Article.

Because of this political quarrel and its consequences, succeeding Republican Administrations have felt bound to show a certain hostility to the League and all its works. In 1921 the State Department still ignored League communications, and it was not until 1923 that our Government consented to have American officials participate in League meetings in an unofficial capacity. By 1925 we became bold enough to participate officially in two League conferences, one dealing with the Traffic in Arms, the other on the Opium Traffic. In the first we participated because our own interests were seriously involved. We joined the second under pressure from socially-minded Americans.

By 1927 our hostility and apprehensions abated sufficiently for us to participate with fully accredited official representatives in four important international conferences summoned by the Council of the League. At the Economic Conference, the Transit and Communications Conference, the Import and Export Conference and on the Preparatory Disarmament Commission the United States had unusually strong

delegations. The State Department was wise enough to recognize that when issues vital to the business and political life of the United States are being discussed by the leading nations of the world our interests require that we be represented by competent delegates concerning whose prestige and authority there can be no question.

It is unfortunate that President Coolidge's first attempt to make even more direct use of League facilities ended in failure. The poorly prepared three-power naval conference of 1927 was held in the Secretariat of the League in Geneva. It is safe to say that if the League Secretariat rather than our State Department had prepared that meeting the groundwork would have been laid with more care and a larger measure of success might have been achieved.

Several times each year the United States is now officially represented at League conferences. The official American delegates "with power only to observe" have given way to delegates who have the same powers as those from other countries. The experts appointed by the State Department "without authority to speak for the Government" now speak for the Government to excellent effect. Nor is it possible nowadays to draw that clear-cut line between political and non-political subjects which Secretary of State Hughes had in mind during his term of office.

In justifying our coöperation with the League before the Republican State Convention of 1924, Mr.

Hughes declared that such coöperation was safe and proper because "we do not take up subjects which involve political entanglements."

But if economic conferences on tariff walls, discussions on arms traffic and arms limitation, conferences on import and export restrictions and on double taxation and tax evasion do not involve political issues, what does? And how is a League member more "entangled" by official participation in these conferences than a non-League member? Only the astute legal mind can discover and define such distinctions. On the basis of plain fact and common sense they do not exist.

The Republican platform of 1928 states the case somewhat differently. "We have most usefully assisted," this platform declares, "in the humanitarian and technical work undertaken by the League, without involving ourselves in European politics by accepting membership." Yet such matters as disarmament cannot by any stretch of terminology be considered as exclusively "humanitarian and technical." The reduction of a country's army and navy is a matter of vital political importance. Governments are made and unmade on this one issue. It involves vital questions of home policy and foreign relations. Present and prospective political relations (entanglements) are fundamental in all discussions of disarmament.

It will be remembered that President Harding

and the vast majority of voters who supported him were willing to have us join an "Association of Nations." Just how this was to differ from the League has never been explained. In a sense we have now joined such an "Association" through promoting and signing the Anti-War Pact. At the Inter-Parliamentary Conference held at Geneva in September, 1929, the American delegates quoted both President Hoover and Senator Borah, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to the general effect that the United States would not be indifferent to a violation of this Pact.

Many qualified students of international relations see little difference between "involving ourselves in European politics by accepting membership" in the League of Nations and involving ourselves in European politics by joining with the nations of the world in an Anti-War Pact to the violation of which we cannot be indifferent.

In his inaugural message President Hoover based our continued absence from the council board of the League on thoroughly unselfish grounds. He said: "Our people has determined that we should make no political engagement such as membership in the League of Nations. . . . They adhere to the belief that the independence of America from such obligations increases its ability and availability for service in all fields of human progress."

Let us note in the first place that Herbert Hoover

does not say that *he* has "determined" or that *he* "adheres to the belief." There is good ground for believing on the basis of his record and remembering some of his earlier statements about the League that he would be willing now as then to have the United States accept membership under appropriate conditions. But he believes that public opinion still opposes our signing the Covenant and he evidently has no desire to combat public opinion on this issue.

But when did the American people "determine" that we should make no "political engagement" with the League? The only election in which they may fairly be said to "have determined" anything on this particular issue was in 1920 and that, in the history of political campaign issues, is a long time ago. Yet they spoke then by a decided majority and they have kept in power the party which then opposed and which still opposes American membership in the League.

Since 1920 Republican opposition to the League has abated and Democratic enthusiasm for the League has waned. Prominent Republicans no longer decry the League as a "super-state" or speak of it as "dead." Many noted Republican leaders have friendly words for the League's achievements. The 1928 Republican platform repeated the 1924 declaration about our refusal to accept membership or to assume any obligations under the Covenant but commented with satisfaction on the coöperation of the

Coolidge Administration in League work: "In accordance with the long established American practice of giving aid and assistance to other peoples we have most usefully assisted by coöperation in the humanitarian and technical work undertaken by the League."

Coming from a Republican Party platform the League may regard this as high praise. It is particularly significant in view of the fact that the Democratic platform of 1928 makes no mention whatever of the League or of American membership therein. One might fairly conclude that, for the time being, League membership has ceased to be an issue on which there is a sharp division between our two leading political parties.

Since Germany's admission in 1926 gave the League a much broader and more truly international basis, there has been much less concern in Geneva about American adherence. During the early meetings of the Assembly there were frequent expressions of the hope that the United States which had contributed so much to the establishment of the League and the World Court would see its way clear to accepting membership. League leaders at banquets attended by pro-League Americans who gather at Geneva in large numbers each summer would elicit long-continued applause by referring to the time "not far distant" when the vacant seat at the Council table would be filled.

To-day there are no vacant seats at the Council table. The chairs press closely against one another to accommodate recent newcomers. Every one is more concerned about satisfying the fifty-odd League members than about the half-dozen non-members who still linger in outer darkness. League leaders are politely sarcastic rather than warmly eloquent when they refer to the United States. They know that we join League undertakings whenever it is to our interest to do so.

Occasionally, when we are not sure about getting an invitation to join a particular League conference in which we "have or claim to have" an interest, we throw out a discreet hint. We did that in 1928 when a League Committee was working out a uniform system of measuring the tonnage of ships. The dispute as to whether the Leviathan or the Majestic was the biggest ship afloat arose because the various national measuring systems do not agree. If the League Powers agreed on a uniform system the United States would find it impossible to impose our own system on the rest of the world. When an American ship wished to enter a foreign port or pass through a foreign canal it would have to pay dues on the basis of the universal measurements. So the League Secretariat received a hint from Washington that if an invitation were forthcoming we would be glad to send representatives to meet with the League Committee.

Naturally the League responded. The Secretariat at Geneva has always been more than polite to the United States, even in that period when we were so discourteous as not even to acknowledge its frequent communications. One of the fine things about the League is that it has no sense of diplomatic prestige or *amour propre*. It stands on no dignity, insists on no forms, resents no slights, cherishes no resentments. In so far as it is possible for any human institution to divest itself of personality, color or emotional influence, the League Secretariat has achieved that purpose. It is an efficient, noiseless, self-starting, smooth-running non-personal machine.

Americans ought to realize that when the Republican campaign platform of 1928 declares that our coöperation with the League is "in accordance with the long established American practice of giving aid and assistance to other peoples" it is telling less than half the truth. Let us admit frankly that when we join international conferences on the white slave traffic, on the trade in narcotics, on communications, taxation, tariffs, health matters, the traffic in arms, disarmament, we are seeking to help ourselves more than we are seeking to help others. Our pious pretense of disinterestedness may befuddle a few ignorant voters at home but it evokes sarcastic smiles in every foreign capital.

A little of the underlying feeling in Geneva with respect to the way in which we use or ignore the

facilities of the League without accepting the financial or political obligations of membership cropped out in the report which Albert Thomas, Director of the International Labor Office, submitted to the twelfth session of the International Labor Conference at Geneva in 1929. He notes with satisfaction that Washington is becoming more polite and comments on "the increasing cordiality of the replies to requests for information both from the public administrative departments and from the employers' organizations. A spirit of friendly interest in the work of the office has spread."

Yet there is disappointment at Washington's continued refusal to admit this interest officially. Robe Carl White, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor, was in Geneva to attend the meetings of the Eleventh Session of the International Labor Conference. He was the first important official of the United States to visit the International Labor Office but the joy over his advent was dampened by his announcement that he "had come only in the course of a trip to Europe, and would not be taking part even as an observer in the work of the organization." A prominent official of the State Department was on duty in Geneva to study the work of the League for a considerable period in 1929, yet newspaper men who met him were requested to keep his presence in Geneva a dark secret.

Director Thomas goes on to say: "It must be

recognized that the work of the Washington Office and the visits of innumerable Americans every year have contributed little to improve the position of the organization in public opinion, and more particularly in the general opinion of workers and employers in the United States."

After referring to the expanding international interests of the United States in trade and investment he concludes with a comment which may shock Americans who see their country as the moral leader of the world: "All the energy and tenacity of the Organization will be required to pave the way for closer relations with the most highly industrialized, but at the same time perhaps, despite appearances, morally the most isolated country in the world."

Yet the League welcomes our increasing practical coöperation in a hundred fields of international endeavor. One must examine a complete record of all American contacts with the League over a given period to realize at once the universality of League interests and the extent of our participation in League activities. The Geneva office of the League of Nations Association prepared such a record for the first six months of 1929. During that period there were six important international conferences held under the auspices of the League in which the United States Government was represented. They included sessions of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, of the Experts on the Manufacture of War Materials,

a conference on Counterfeiting Currency, a meeting of the Committee on the Unification of Transport Statistics, a meeting of the special jurists' committee to discuss amendments to the World Court Statute to facilitate American adherence and a meeting of the Health Committee.

In the same six months the United States Legation at Berne transmitted communications from the American Government on the organization of veterinary services, on the importation, transit and exportation of animals, on a report relating to bills of exchange and checks, on the protection of stage artists in the United States, accepting American membership in the League's aerial organization and on the codification of international law. The State Department also forwarded five international treaties for publication in the League's Treaty series, and Secretary Kellogg's note proposing resumption of the negotiations for American membership in the World Court. The formal declaration of the adherence of the United States to the League's Slavery Convention was deposited with the Treaty Registration Section of the Secretariat.

When it comes to unofficial American coöperation during this period the record is even more voluminous. Former Under-Secretary of State Robert B. Olds, Roland Boyden and two other prominent Americans participated in the meetings of the Economic Consultative Committee in May. Lucius East-

man, Chairman of the Merchants' Association of New York, took part in two meetings of the Economic Committee. Jeremiah Smith, the Boston banker who supervised the financial rehabilitation of Hungary, met with the Financial Committee in June. Charles B. Eddy reported as chairman of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Professor Adams, Treasury Department expert, was appointed to the fiscal committee. Charles Evans Hughes, former Secretary of State of the United States, took his seat as one of the eleven judges of the World Court. The American Group of the Hague Court of Arbitration nominated Sir Cecil Hurst of Britain and Henri Fromageot of France to succeed deceased members of the World Court. They have since been elected. Miss Julia Lathrop attended the April meeting of the Child Welfare Committee and the Foreign Policy Association of New York was represented at two sessions of the Permanent Opium Control Board. Officials of the United States Health Service coöperated as experts in the Sanitary Organization of Greece and on the Advisory Board of the Singapore Bureau.

In connection with the League's work in Intellectual Coöperation, prominent Americans attended the meeting of Library Experts, the Conference of Institutes for scientific study of International Relations, a meeting of philologists on Latin languages, meetings of the directors of the International Institute of Intellectual Coöperation, a meeting of

directors of University Offices, of the International Educational Cinematographic Institute and four other international conferences.

Despite this general use of League facilities we have made no move to pay our proper share of the League's constantly increasing expenses. The total amounts involved are, to be sure, comparatively small, but there is some feeling among our impoverished European cousins that the richest country in the world should assume its proper share of the cost of an institution from which it is deriving just as much benefit as any League member.

It may be answered that we do pay our proportionate share of the cost of all conferences which we attend. Yet this is true only if we exempt the entire cost of preparing the conference, of supervising it and of handling all the detail work that grows out of it. The principal item of cost in the unbroken series of international conferences fathered by the League is the overhead of the League Secretariat. The League's budget totals some $5,500,000 a year and a good part of this money is spent for the secretarial work involved in conferences. Perhaps the best comparison in the matter of League contributions is between Britain and the United States. Professor Manley O. Hudson of Harvard University estimates that from 1920 to 1929 Britain (exclusive of the British Dominions, the Irish Free State and India) has contributed $3,500,000 to League expenses. Her annual

contribution is now about $500,000. During the same period the United States has contributed about $22,000.

Fortunately for American self-respect the Rockefeller Foundation and other organizations have made generous contributions to further important social and intellectual activities of the League. Consciously or unconsciously these American contributors have rendered their country a great service by mitigating the perfectly natural resentment at our failure to deal with this phase of our League relations in a more generous spirit.

What of the future? Are we going to drift into League membership? Are we going to keep on using League facilities without assuming League obligations? Both these courses are repugnant to the American character. We are a positive, purposeful people which prefers a definite policy of action to lazy opportunism. Nor is it consonant with American traditions that we should accept the advantages which our country is deriving from the work and influence of the League without in return giving the League the advantage of our support.

It needs that support far less than it did ten years ago. At that time our hostility nearly dealt it a mortal blow. The international spirit was crippled and its development was much delayed by American isolation. But it soon became apparent that our opposition to the League was a matter of politics and not

of principle. The United States began doing on its own account what the League was trying to do as the principal organ of international opinion. The inevitable logic of events has led us to a community of effort. From the reduction of naval armament under American leadership we will move on to the general reduction of armaments under League leadership. From the formal outlawry of war under the Kellogg Pact we are proceeding to the elaboration of sanctions against war-makers under the auspices of the League.

The time has come for Americans who believe in the League to speak out vigorously for American membership. We owe it to our pride and to our interest to have full official representation at the great forum of international opinion in Geneva. Our voice should be heard at the meetings of the Council and the Assembly. The League was created by a great American. The time has come when a great America should be proud to play its proper part in the further development of the greatest political institution of our time.

CHAPTER XII

ARMS AND ARMAMENTS

ARMAMENTS are an economic waste and something of an anomaly in a business age that abhors waste much as nature abhors a vacuum. Because the piling up of armaments represents such a vast amount of wasted expenditure, the business sense of our time objects. It is one of the wastes of competition. Just as industry has learned to eliminate wastes by consolidation, nations must learn to eliminate the waste of armaments by coöperative action.

The business man holds that just as it has been found possible to organize international trusts to fix prices and divide markets, so it should be possible to organize something like an international trust among governments to control and limit armaments. It is a straight business proposition. Armaments are intended to protect nations against one another. Therefore, argues the business man, fifty per cent armament for all countries is just as efficient for its purpose as one hundred per cent armament for all. Relativity applies to armies and navies even more than it does to astronomical calculations.

Many effective arguments against armaments can be derived from the World War. Germany, the country which was best prepared to fight a war, was defeated largely because of excessive preparation. Fear of German armaments turned neighbors into a circle of enemies with a combined strength, which even Germany's superlative war preparedness could not overcome.

Germany's experience proves that armaments create militarism, that militarism creates arrogance, that arrogance creates enemies, and that a sufficient number of enemies insures defeat. It was the very efficiency of Germany's military machine which helped bring about anti-German alliances before the war, and drew one country after another into the alliance against the Central Powers.

The World War also made it apparent that the mechanized wars of to-day are too destructive to advantage even the victors. Modern wars are fought not alone by armed forces, but by whole peoples throwing their entire industrial, financial and moral strength into the conflict. The professional armies and navies meet the first shock of battle, but after a few months they become insignificant compared with the vast national forces which are mobilized for action.

Yet so strong is the force of habit and so quickly do men forget, that in present day discussions of "preparedness" we continue to attribute exaggerated

importance to the professional army and navy. We still think of war in the simple terms of battleships and battalions which two powers can marshal against one another. We forget that modern wars are much more likely to be fought by groups of nations openly or secretly allied. We underestimate the part that food supplies, raw materials, credit resources, transportation systems, industrial organization, scientific advancement, topography and climate play in determining national strength or weakness in time of war.

While the average individual has not yet learned to consider a nation's fighting strength on such a broad basis, those organizations which make a business of studying the armament question are beginning to appreciate what diverse elements must be considered to arrive at a nation's "equivalent" fighting power.

It is interesting to note, in this connection, the steady expansion in scope and size of the Armaments Year Book of the League of Nations. When it first appeared this publication included little more than a summarized statement regarding the various armies and navies. The 1929 volume includes 1084 pages of the most varied statistical information. It now contains detailed monographs on sixty different countries.

Instead of confining itself to home forces it gives elaborated information on the organization and com-

position of colonial forces. It takes account of military legislation and analyzes such matters as police forces, equipment, recruiting systems, army budgets, military schools and preparatory military instruction. Navies are carefully divided into categories, and there are special figures on such matters as "depreciated tonnage."

The far-sighted League authorities have also considered that the information provided by a Government as to the size of its army and navy may not be nearly so important as the amount of money which is spent in developing defensive services. For this reason the Armaments Year Book includes a special section devoted to budget expenditures. It was soon found that these figures are also deceptive, since each nation has a different accounting system and includes a different set of items under the head of military expenditures. That is why the authors of the volume are careful to say: "The figures for defence expenditure entered in these monographs cannot be used for comparison between the different countries." Yet the only point in presenting such figures in a League of Nations volume is to make such comparison possible.

Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides that member states are to exchange information on "the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes." So the authors of the Year Book have added 190 pages

of facts and figures concerning the principal products and raw materials that are considered important for national defence. There are special sections for fuel, oils, metals, chemical products, agricultural products, live stock and various special articles such as—cotton, flax, wool and rubber. As one examines this material it becomes apparent that practically everything a country produces is used in waging war.

It is in contrasting the advantageous position of the United States in geographic isolation, independence of foreign food supplies, control of essential raw materials, national wealth, industrial equipment and scientific technique with the handicaps of other countries in these respects that we realize our strength in national defence. It is relative inferiority in these defensive assets that makes other countries concentrate so much attention on their armies and navies.

Many of them fear the United States. That seems strange to us because we are so sure of our beneficent intentions. They remember just as we forget, that the United States always declares war first and that while we have sent soldiers to a dozen different countries to fight our wars no armed enemy has set foot on our soil since we finally wrested it from the British. Nor must any foreign soldier ever be permitted to do so according to President Hoover's Armistice Day speech in 1929. Yet if any French Premier called for enough armed forces to

challenge any possible invasion he would be decried as a wicked militarist.

Our record is not exactly pacific even from our own point of view, and foreign historians sometimes characterize us as aggressive. Foreign strategists are always pointing out that we are better prepared to fight a long and successful war than any other country. It would take a more powerful alliance than is now in prospect to defeat a people which controls from one-half to two-thirds of the world's supply of those fuel products, minerals, grains and plants that are most essential for fighting purposes.

It is this predominant position that imposes our obligation and our opportunity to lead the world towards disarmament. Almost in spite of ourselves, leadership had been forced upon us. Even the League of Nations, which is pledged under its Covenant to persuade its members to reduce armaments, saw the United States secure practical results in 1922 while its members continued their long-drawn-out debate on ways and means.

The two great achievements for the cause of peace, resulting from our initiative, are the conference for the limitation of naval armament which was held in Washington in the winter of 1921-22 and the successful promotion of the Anti-War Pact in 1927 and 1928. Both are highly important contributions to that moral disarmament which makes nations willing to trust one another and thus create what President

Hoover has called the greatest guaranty of peace. For "in that atmosphere all controversies become but passing incidents of the day."

The Washington Conference, under the able leadership of Charles Evans Hughes, showed the world for the first time that nations could actually agree to reduce armament. Some sixty steel and paper battleships representing a prospective investment of $2,000,000,000 were scrapped and definite limitations on new construction were imposed. In the friendly atmosphere of this conference Britain and Japan agreed to forego their separate alliance, and to substitute, in its place, a general treaty for the preservation of peace on the Pacific.

Those who decry the Washington Conference as having done no more than substitute cruiser competition for competition in building dreadnoughts ignore several important factors of the 1922 situation. There was at that time a grave danger to peace in the intense naval rivalry of Japan and the United States. This was eliminated by the Washington agreements and it has never recurred. The construction of dreadnoughts had become the largest single charge upon the naval budget of all the leading naval powers. By restricting battleship construction that charge was much reduced. The general fear and suspicion which would have followed the excessive naval expenditures contemplated on the eve of the Washington Conference did not develop. There was

instead a general sigh of relief. The Washington agreement produced what the French call a *détente* in the international atmosphere. During the next five years serious naval rivalry developed again and began to concentrate on cruiser units. This made it necessary to consider calling another conference.

It is unfortunate that President Coolidge summoned the Geneva Conference of 1927 without proper preparation. He first sought to make it a five-power conference. When France and Italy refused to join because acceptable conditions for their participation had not been outlined, the proposed five-power conference was transformed into a meeting of England, Japan and the United States. Where the Washington Conference succeeded, because it was confronted at the outset with a well-developed technically-sound plan, the Geneva Conference failed because there were two contradictory plans which proved irreconcilable. It soon degenerated into a squabble between British and American naval experts, and there was not enough statesmanship or good will in Washington and London to give it a new turn and bring it to success.

Piqued by this failure, the Coolidge Administration presented to Congress a preposterous three-quarter billion dollar plan of naval expansion. Fortunately, the good sense of the American people rebelled at this belligerent proposal. A wave of sentiment against it swept the country, and public opinion won the day.

In the face of this public protest President Coolidge refused even to defend the program which he had approved.

Instead of authorizing the seventy-one ships called for by the General Staff plans which Secretary of the Navy Wilbur had presented, the House of Representatives contented itself and the country with a sixteen-ship program. It was not until a year later that even this comparatively modest proposal could be forced through the Senate.

As it happened the Senate's affirmative vote on the construction of fifteen 10,000-ton cruisers and one aircraft carrier came early in 1929 within a few days after ratification of the Anti-War Pact by the United States Senate. This naturally diminished the immediate moral value of the Anti-War Treaty and gave European cynics a chance to discredit its importance.

But early in his administration, President Hoover made it clear that we are much more interested in developing the efficacy of the Anti-War Treaty than we are in expanding the size of the United States Navy. Through Ambassador Gibson at Geneva, he informed the world in general and Great Britain in particular that the strength in fighting ships which we require is relative to that of other powers and that the United States sincerely desired to achieve actual reduction in naval armament.

At Versailles in 1919, President Wilson sought to

achieve a general reduction in armament. He tried to do it by making the United States a member of the League and by signing a special treaty with Great Britain and France to guarantee the Rhineland frontier. The United States Senate refused to accept membership in the League and failed to approve the tri-partite treaty of guaranty which was to give France that security without which she refused to disarm.

For a decade our country and the League of Nations have worked separately, each seeking to achieve armament reduction in its own way. The United States scored the first great success in the Washington Conference. Several years later the League Assembly created its commission for the preparation of a general disarmament conference. The Coolidge Administration braved the Senate isolationists and sent representatives to the meetings of that Commission, thus linking the United States definitely as well as officially with the League's major undertaking.

For a time it was rather a timid relationship. Our delegates contented themselves with presenting the American point of view at the various meetings of the Commission, and were usually outvoted by their Continental associates. Peace lovers could find little encouragement in these debates. The arguments were theoretical. They dealt with issues on which nations were hopelessly divided. Successive meetings

emphasized differences, rather than the possibility of agreement.

The French continued to insist upon their thesis that security must be guaranteed before there could be any thought or discussion of reducing armaments. France required definite pledges of military assistance against aggression. At Washington in 1922 as well as later in Geneva, French spokesmen insisted that guaranteed treaties must be the first step in any disarmament program. The Locarno Treaties and Germany's formal acceptance of the obligations of the League Covenant partially satisfied the more reasonable elements of French public opinion.

Delegates representing the United States and some of the smaller powers that were neutral during the war have always answered the "security" argument of the French by pointing out that security is best promoted through reduction of armament. That such reduction in itself eliminates ill will and minimizes the danger of aggression. We believe that cooperative action in reducing armaments is a better guaranty of peace than special security treaties.

The most important point of difference in the disarmament debates at Geneva concerned methods of procedure. Arguing with that fine logic for which they are famous, the French pointed out the interdependence of land, sea and air arms. They declared that unless these three armament factors were dealt with simultaneously little could be achieved. In

time of war, land, sea and air forces act jointly and are inter-dependent. Hence, they argued, effective limitation must be applied to all three at once. The American delegates conceded that all defence services are closely related, but pointed out that no practical result could be achieved unless these three arms of defence were dealt with separately. We favor the isolation of concrete questions and the consideration of separate categories as the only possible way of making practical progress.

Under French leadership, most of the Continental Powers have insisted upon some system of international inspection to control and check up whatever agreements might be made. The long and futile arguments on how to make sure that the Powers will keep their word, if they should ever be persuaded to give their word, indicates the theoretical nature of much of the discussion. Both Great Britain and the United States have stood firm in opposing anything like international control of national defence services. The American delegates realized that the United States Senate could hardly be persuaded to permit foreign inspectors to check up on the armed forces of the United States. The time when national egoism can be subordinated sufficiently to permit this has not yet arrived, at least not under the dome of the Capitol in Washington. Naturally, our delegates at Geneva did not say that. They argued that inspection machinery would create ill will and would

for that reason fail in its purpose. They declared that good will and mutual confidence in the maintenance of agreements must be the foundation of any treaty on armament reduction.

It was inevitable that these preliminary discussions should also consider what constitutes armament. The French again pointed out with sound logic that a nation's financial, industrial and economic resources are all important factors in its ability to make war. They asked, therefore, that there be a careful appraisal of all these factors in working out a basis for equivalent contribution towards armament reduction.

As might have been expected both Britain and the United States objected. We argued that such factors as financial and industrial strength are too variable and uncertain to be subject to such definite appraisal as might provide a proper basis for a disarmament agreement. We also emphasized that it is the purpose of a general disarmament conference to obtain immediate practical results and that a nation's visible peace-strength armament is the only basis on which any agreement can be achieved.

Another point of difference concerned the universality of the proposed agreement. Would the same standard system of reduction be applied to all countries, or would there be regional agreements dealing with special armament factors? France, as might have been expected, argued for the universal

system. The United States again insisted on regional agreements dealing with specific categories. We showed that it is impossible to work out any universal system that would be accepted by all powers. Land and air armaments create regional problems which must be solved by regional agreements. The most practical way to deal with naval armaments is also by direct agreement among a limited number of powers.

There were other debates at Geneva on limiting reserves and equipment which showed the greatest diversity of views. Little progress was made on any of these issues until the Hoover Administration struck a new note in the Geneva debate in April, 1929.

The Preparatory Commission had spent a week discussing the impractical Russian and German proposals for immediate general disarmament. Russia's contribution to the Geneva discussion in 1928 had been a proposal for immediate universal disarmament. A withering response by Lord Cushendun, the chief British delegate, put the quietus on this impractical suggestion which was made only for political effect. But the Soviet representatives returned to the fray in 1929 with the more modest proposal to reduce all armaments by one-half. This suggestion could be neither ridiculed nor ignored, particularly since it found powerful support. Germany, disarmed by the Treaty of Versailles, is naturally anxious to see other powers come down to her

level. It is the only way in which she can hope to approach parity for many years to come. Hence, Germany's League delegations always recall that in the text of the Treaty of Versailles Germany's involuntary disarmament was justified as the first step in general disarmament.

Ambassador Gibson's dramatic proposal on behalf of the United States for actual reduction of naval armaments in place of mere limitation came at a moment when it seemed that the Preparatory Commission's meeting was degenerating into another fruitless discussion of theoretical proposals. On April 22nd, the head of the American delegation pointed out that the terms of the Anti-War Pact recently signed and ratified by the leading nations of the world required a new attitude towards the general problem of disarmament. The United States, he said, is prepared to accept "reduction however drastic."

He then proceeded to outline in general terms a new formula by which the United States hopes to achieve practical results. The Hoover Administration, he said, is prepared to abandon the previous American contention that the fighting strength of cruisers must be measured by the single factor of tonnage. President Hoover proposed that the fighting strength of each vessel should be computed not only on the basis of tonnage, but that due weight should be given to gun power, speed, armor and age. Naval bases and merchant fleets were other factors to be considered

in appraising a navy's fighting strength. By thus broadening the basis of comparison and including all the most important factors, it was hoped that "equivalent" fighting strength could be rated and established. Obviously when such a formula has once been accepted, the parity on which Britain and the United States have agreed could be maintained just as readily by naval reduction as by naval expansion. "It only remains for others to say how low they will go," President Hoover declared on November 11, 1929. "It cannot be too low for us."

A few days after making this initial good-will gesture at Geneva the United States delegation offered another contribution towards agreement by withdrawing the American demand that trained reserves should be included in the limitation of land forces. This concession goes very far since it may thwart future efforts to secure any effective limitation on land armaments. France has some five million trained reservists. Her military partners—Poland, Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Yugo-Slavia together have almost an equal number. Without limitation on reserves, this group of powers will continue to dominate the military situation on the Continent no matter what may be done about the active units of land armies. The British have already announced that they will continue their efforts to secure some limitation on trained reserves.

Our yielding to the French point of view was ex-

cused on the ground that France, Italy and other conscription countries would never consent to limit their trained reserves. Progress seemed to depend on the elimination of this point from the Geneva discussions. Ambassador Gibson linked his concession with an appeal for counter-concessions by the Continental Powers. Before the meeting was over, France did go so far as to withdraw her demand for international inspection and control of armaments.

But it was America's forward step with respect to naval armament that injected new life into the disarmament discussions. Here was an offer by the world's strongest power to recede from a position on which it had previously insisted to the point of seeing its own 1927 conference end in failure. It was the spirit of the offer as much as the technical proposals involved that elicited an immediate friendly response. Lord Cushendun, the British delegate, expressed his satisfaction in somewhat measured terms, but the British Press and the British party leaders who were already in the midst of the 1929 political campaign eagerly welcomed the American suggestion.

Labor and Liberal leaders were particularly enthusiastic in commending the American proposal. With renewed vigor they attacked the failure of the Conservative Government to come to an agreement with the United States at Geneva in 1927, and referred bitterly to the futile anti-American Anglo-French agreement which followed the Geneva session.

When Ramsay MacDonald's Labor Government came into power a few weeks later, prompt agreement on naval reduction between Britain and the United States was assured.

On the very day on which British voters placed the Labor Government in power, President Hoover, addressing his countrymen at Arlington on Memorial Day reiterated in even stronger terms the proposals he had made through Ambassador Gibson at Geneva. Once again he cited the pledges which the nations of the world have made to one another in the Anti-War Agreement. He reminded his millions of radio listeners that forty nations have solemnly condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and that they have renounced it utterly as an instrument of national policy. That they have also agreed never to seek the settlement of any dispute or conflict of whatever nature, or whatever origin except by pacific means.

On the basis of this pledge he called for a prompt reduction of armaments. "This declaration," he said, "means an abandonment of the aggressive use of arms by every signatory nation. . . . If we are honest we must reconsider our own naval armaments and the armaments of the world in the light of their defensive and not their aggressive use. . . . Despite the declarations of the Kellogg Pact every important country has since the signing of that agreement been engaged in strengthening its naval arms. We are still

borne on the tide of competitive building. . . . Fear and suspicion will never slacken until we can halt competitive construction of arms. They will never disappear unless we can turn this tide towards actual reduction. . . . We feel that it is useless for us to talk of the limitation of arms if such limitations are to be set so high as virtually to be an incitement to increase armaments. . . . We believe the time has come when we must know whether we are condemned to further and more extensive programs of naval construction. Limitation upward is not now our goal, but actual reduction of existing commitments to a lower level."

In these words President Hoover notified the world that he was anxious to use the power granted to him in the 1929 naval bill to stop the construction of the fifteen cruisers therein proposed. He is authorized to do so provided there is an international agreement on limitation. In the meantime, pending the result of the 1930 London Conference, he has suspended construction on the first new cruiser units.

The world has already responded to his proposal. Britain first suspended and in January, 1930, definitely abandoned construction of two new 10,000-ton cruisers on which work had been begun. The Governments and people of both Britain and Japan are ready for further affirmative steps towards direct reduction. Before long concrete achievement on naval disarmament will be recorded in London. That

accomplished the League of Nations will call the general conference on disarmament which has been so long in preparation. Land forces and air forces will be subject to the same limitations and reductions which have been found practicable for naval forces. The world will vindicate its sincere desire to forego war by voluntarily surrendering the instruments with which war is fought.

The moment instruments of war are limited or even controlled on an agreed basis the hostile psychology of rival armaments diminishes and gradually disappears. One need only recall the immense improvement in American-Japanese relations which followed the Washington Conference.

No sane American proposes war to enforce our will upon the world. Strong as we are we could hardly do that. No one country is ever likely to be strong enough to challenge all the others. Europe is groping towards organization and understanding. Our task is to help her achieve it by ourselves reducing armaments, by accepting the principle of reciprocity in trade and tariffs, and by that tolerance and understanding which our thrice-blessed nation owes peoples to whom the gods have been less kind.

CHAPTER XIII

THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1930

THAT part of President Hoover's first annual message to Congress which dealt with armaments stirred most comment abroad. His concern over the growing expense of our armaments, his frank admission that "our expenditures are in excess of those of the most highly militarized nations of the world" and his warning of what lies ahead if the results of the London Conference prove disappointing were emphasized in the press of the five powers whose delegates gathered in London for the great naval reduction effort of 1930.

There was a warning to other countries as well as ours in President Hoover's statement that if no international agreement to reduce naval armaments is signed we shall be committed during the next six years to an expenditure of one billion two hundred million dollars for the single item of new warships.

What is the real program of the London Conference? And what are its chances for enduring achievement? Within a decade we have had two great naval reduction conferences with an even record of success

and failure. The Washington Conference of 1921 succeeded because it had definite objectives, because it was well led and well prepared. The Geneva Conference of 1927 failed because it was neither well led nor well prepared and because professional navalists and paid propagandists were permitted to dominate the proceedings and the resulting publicity.

Certainly the London Conference has been well prepared. Never before has such a long period of careful preliminary negotiations preceded the actual meeting of delegates. For more than nine months active preparations for this London meeting were under way. Political leaders and naval experts have been working out their plans and programs and they have taken the world into their confidence.

Weeks before the Conference convened we knew what each power would ask. We knew the difficulties that lay ahead. Any one writing before the conference was under way, would have had good reason to predict that it would prove impossible to reconcile the conflicting views of France and Italy, of Japan and the United States, of Britain and France. Italy demands parity with France. France cannot and will not concede parity to Italy. Japan demands a 70 per cent instead of a 60 per cent cruiser ratio. Neither Britain nor the United States is willing to grant it. The United States and Britain would abolish undersea boats. Japan and France cite the submarine as one of the chief elements in national defense. The United

States insists on parity with Britain. British naval needs are far greater than America's because she must safeguard her food supply and maintain communication with an empire scattered over the earth.

Here are problems enough to wreck any conference. Yet the fine spirit displayed during the opening weeks of the conference created general optimism concerning the outcome. The very fact that diverse and conflicting viewpoints received so much preliminary publicity hastened accommodation and compromise. It must not be forgotten that from the time the text of the British invitation was sent out to the United States, Japan, France and Italy on October 8th, preparation and preliminary discussion were under way. Foreign Minister Henderson in that text suggested the informal conversations among the invited powers that prepared the way for the London meeting.

A preliminary agreement between London and Washington was worked out in a series of meetings that began with the arrival of Ambassador Dawes in England and continued until Prime Minister MacDonald concluded final arrangements with President Hoover on his visit to Washington in October, 1929. From then on France and Italy, Japan and the United States, Britain and France, were busily engaged in discussing naval issues. They arrived at some agreements and encountered certain difficulties which were left to be dealt with in the general conference.

This ground-clearing procedure had a dual value.

It made each nation familiar with the other's point of view and enabled the London conferees to cut straight to the heart of such difficulties as were revealed. The various delegations became thoroughly familiar with one another's demands. They had a chance to discuss these demands with their own naval technicians and learned to appraise their relative importance. All this was helpful. It reduced the antagonism that is aroused by the unexpected and prepared members of the five delegations for those compromise suggestions which enable an international conference to make progress.

Let us consider the four principles enunciated in the invitation to the London parley since these served as the foundation for its deliberations. The first emphasizes that the Peace Pact of 1928 is the foundation and starting point of the agreement reached between Britain and the United States. Both powers announce that they regard the renunciation of war as changing the national attitude with regard to security. If nations are no longer going to use war as an instrument of national policy they must draw the logical conclusion by eliminating all preparation for offensive war. They must also bring their defensive equipment down to a point where it cannot possibly be regarded as intended for offensive purposes.

The second of the four principles recognizes Great Britain's formal acceptance of the principle of parity

with the United States in each of the several categories of naval vessels. Actual parity need not be reached until December 31st, 1936, but all construction programs will henceforth take it into account.

The average American accepts this concession by the British as a matter of course, but not so the average Britisher. He has been brought up on the tradition that Britain rules the seas. It is not easy for him to visualize Britannia ruling the waves with Uncle Sam sitting on her right as royal consort.

Many British naval experts are up in arms against the parity idea, and are writing vigorous articles in which they point out that Britain's overseas communications, her imperial population of five hundred million, her proximity to the European continent and her dependence upon sea-borne food place her in a position vastly different from that of the United States. Lord Balfour's acceptance of parity in battleships in 1921 was a different matter, since that left each country free to build any desirable number of those cruisers upon which overseas communications depend. Let us not, therefore, take this important British concession too much as a mere matter of course.

As their third point of agreement Britain and the United States proposed to reduce or postpone the battleship replacement program provided in the Washington Treaty of 1921. No power participating in the conference has shown any disposition

to object to such reduction. Neither France nor Italy is building battleships, and Japan prefers to concentrate her construction on large and speedy cruisers. There is an increasing disposition to consider the battleship as obsolete. American naval experts are not yet ready to accept this view, but even they agree that its relative importance has been greatly diminished. When the London conferees drew up their agenda they placed battleships last because it was their least difficult problem.

As a final point of agreement Britain and the United States announced their desire to abolish the submarine. But they understood that this desire runs counter to the naval policy of Japan, Italy and France. For this reason the naval parley invitation declared that "they recognize that no final settlement on this subject can be reached except in conference with the other naval powers."

That submarines will be abolished independently may well be doubted. The submarine is an efficient naval weapon. It has proved effective as an instrument of defence and offence. It can be used successfully by weaker naval powers against those stronger in surface ships. Weaker naval powers will hardly give up this weapon because those powers which possess the strongest navies desire it. There has been agreement to regulate its use but this will bring up every issue related to the "freedom of the seas," a topic which Britain desired to avoid. Before the London

Conference began Prime Minister MacDonald assured the British people that he had not discussed this issue with President Hoover.

Let us now consider the special position of the different powers as developed in the conference. Each one has particular policies and prejudices. Each has developed a definite point of view on naval needs, and in some respects that point of view has no relation to the policies or purposes of other powers. In each one of the five countries which sent delegates to meet around the ornate council table at the St. James' Palace in London, there is a certain amount of irritation because it was obliged to submit its own program for national security to the critical appraisal of other powers.

Everywhere nationalistically-minded editors, naval experts and political leaders seeking to catch the favor of public opinion are declaring: "Let us build such warships as we need. Why should we submit our defence program to the judgment and criticism of others. We know what we require for our security. Let that suffice." The obvious answer to such arguments is that naval needs are relative, not absolute. Statesmen realize that, even if naval experts do not, and fortunately the London Conference is now dominated by statesmen. The naval technicians had their chance at Geneva in 1927 and failed. Britain and the United States agreed that only civilian delegates should be accredited to London. King George left his

admiral's uniform at home and opened the conference in civilian garb. His gesture was symbolic.

Americans have come to regard the London parley as our affair as much as it is Britain's. President Hoover launched it with his new yardstick proposal made through Ambassador Hugh S. Gibson at Geneva in the spring of 1929. That led to the Dawes-MacDonald conversations during the summer, to the British Premier's visit in October and thus directly to the London parley.

We are more anxious that the meeting should succeed than any other power. The Hoover Administration has launched a policy of active coöperation with Europe. It is seeking to make the Anti-War Pact a positive influence for peace. We even intervened in the remote Manchurian Russo-Chinese quarrel in an endeavor to establish prestige for the pact. Our intervention proved to be ill-timed, and was neither successful nor adroit, but it did show our earnest determination to make the Anti-War Pact something more than a pious gesture. In making this formal renunciation of war the basis of the London parley, we emphasize our belief that it has produced a change in international relations which no power can afford to ignore. We may even agree to implement the Pact.

In justification of the popular American demand for complete parity with the British Navy, it must be remembered that there was a general belief that we had attained it in 1921. At least one of the British

delegates, Lord Lee of Fareham, also believes that it was granted on that occasion. Speaking of parity he said recently: "To question its validity in any way would be to dishonor our signatures at Washington, my own among them."

Yet the new cruiser program which Britain launched shortly after the Washington Conference denied parity and soon led to the cynical declaration that at Washington we got "piety, not parity." The failure of the Geneva Conference of 1927 embittered President Coolidge and led him to say some rather unfortunate things in the closing year of his administration. It caused him to approve a provocative seventy-one warship program, which was later modified into the fifteen-cruiser bill. In view of Britain's cruiser program this was not excessive, and yet it was proposed under conditions which seemed to make it a challenge to the British Navy.

Fundamentally it is a logical consequence of our larger overseas interests. Our post-war trade leans to manufactured goods. Within a few years only one-third of our exports will be in raw materials. The remaining two-thirds will be products of our factories. Raw materials do not require a foreign sales force or a merchant marine. Those who want them need them and are willing to come and get them. Manufactured goods, on the other hand, must be pushed in competitive markets and their delivery must be guaranteed. Our overseas commerce has become more dependent

on our merchant marine and hence we are more sea-minded than we were even a decade ago.

It has been said of us that we do not want to wage war, but that we insist on waging neutrality. This is another way of saying that we believe in freedom of the seas in war as well as in peace. British mercantile opinion is coming around to our point of view on this important issue, but traditional British naval opinion still disagrees. President Hoover's proposal to permit the free passage of food ships in time of war appeals to us as humanitarian, but the British see in it the disappearance of their traditional sea supremacy. With free food ships, they say, Germany would have won the war. Yet there is already developing in Britain the point of view that international guarantees will provide greater assurance of uninterrupted food supplies than the strongest navy which Britain could afford to build.

Continental observers declare that our insistence on ship for ship parity with Britain is merely a matter of prestige. They insist that actual parity cannot be measured, because there are too many imponderables such as economic resources, seamanship and scientific genius. Ships, after all, are only one element. Actual parity must take into account economic resources, naval bases, merchant fleets and air forces.

The really important thing, since definite parity is impossible, is to achieve parity as a state of mind. Attention having been concentrated on warships, it is

in warships that parity must be accepted and recorded. We are informed that Britain and America are in complete agreement on naval parity, the minor difference about some thirty thousand tons of warships having very readily yielded to adjustment in London. It is probable that the Anglo-American agreement will have to be slightly modified in the endeavor to allot acceptable ratios to Japan, France and Italy. Joseph P. Cotton, Acting Secretary of State, announced in November that the United States delegates in London would work out a five-power agreement or come home. This would mean that we will sign no agreement with Britain and Japan in London, if it is found impossible to persuade France and Italy to agree. For the present we maintain that a three-power agreement would have little enduring value. Yet no matter what happens in London the Anglo-American agreement will stand.

Our proposal to postpone battleship replacements for five or ten years found very little opposition, but neither France nor Italy would consider the Anglo-American proposal to abolish the submarine. It may also be doubted that the American delegation was keen on this proposal. We accepted it at the request of the British, but we were ready to drop it when it became apparent that France, Japan and even Italy asked that the submarine be maintained. Efforts will be concentrated on limiting the size and number and the operations of undersea craft.

The average conservative Britisher does not look upon the London Conference with any particular satisfaction. Britain has been a law unto herself for so many generations that her sea dogs cannot help but growl at the idea that Britain's naval needs should even be discussed in an international conference. Occasionally there is frank admission that the world situation has changed. Sir Valentine Chirol, writing in the *Nineteenth Century* for November, 1929, declares that America is stronger than Britain in financial and industrial resources, and asks naval parity as an outward sign of equality. "We surrender sea supremacy," he says, "because we can no longer exercise it."

There was much British resentment at the bland American assumption that continued maintenance of the naval bases at Halifax, Bermuda and Jamaica would be discussed in London. The American expectation that Halifax would be mentioned in an official statement after Prime Minister MacDonald crossed into Canada and talked with Premier Mackenzie King of Canada was not realized. On November 25th, 1929, First Lord of the Admiralty A. V. Alexander announced to the House of Commons that the status of the minor naval bases at Bermuda and Jamaica was not to be discussed during the London meeting. At some later conference questions related to development and equipment of naval bases will certainly come up but for the average Britisher it is

quite enough that the London discussion should be devoted to "Faith, Hope and Parity."

One question frequently asked in Britain is whether the United States, in accepting parity in naval strength, will also accept parity of responsibility for preserving peace. Our action under the Anti-War Pact in the Russo-Chinese quarrel enables us to give an affirmative answer to this question. It suggests that the United States is prepared to accept a larger responsibility for world order than in the past. In this we will be brought into closer coöperation with Britain. In a very real sense the London Conference is a joint Anglo-American enterprise. Its success is bound to give a stimulus to Anglo-American coöperation in world affairs. Neither country desires an alliance, but both will be well pleased if the conference leaves us with a close and more friendly understanding. Britain's action during the first two weeks of the conference in abandoning construction of the 10,000-ton cruisers Northumberland and Surrey, and in deleting an additional large and small cruiser from the 1929-30 naval program did much to convince Americans of British willingness to take what Premier MacDonald called "the risks of peace."

Japan brings to the conference an earnest desire to reduce naval armaments. Democratic currents play a large part in Japan's present policy. She has recently enfranchised millions of new voters whose action in the 1930 election again showed that their

temper is peaceful and democratic. Tokio is now seeking to reconcile rather than to dominate China. Japan's economic and financial difficulties are very real. Any government that could bring about the reduction of Japan's naval expenditures without sacrificing Japan's comparative position would be acclaimed. These facts must not be forgotten in considering Japan's demands for a 70 per cent ratio. At the Washington Conference Japan was content to accept the five-five-three ratio on battleships and at that time she might have accepted the same ratio for auxiliary vessels. But in recent years she has emphasized the construction of large cruisers and submarines to a point where the 60 per cent ratio is no longer satisfactory in those two categories.

The preliminary negotiations between the United States and Japan on this point were conducted in a very friendly spirit. While the Japanese delegation was in Washington en route to London it was suggested that Japan take a lower ratio in light cruisers and destroyers to offset her 70 per cent demand in 10,000-ton cruisers and submarines. Ex-Premier Wakatsuki, the chief Japanese delegate, has already indicated that Japan is willing to make concessions. She will agree to cut down the size of cruisers to less than a maximum of 10,000 tons, will extend the life of cruisers—will defer battleship replacement until 1936 and will accept a lower tonnage and smaller gun calibre for such new battleships as may be

authorized. She insists on submarines but is willing to restrict their size and their employment.

At the first conference for the reduction of naval armaments in Washington in 1921, France was the villain of the piece. Her representatives refused the British-American request to abolish submarines. They refused to consent to any consideration of land armaments. They would not consider the extension of a definite reduction program to any category of vessels outside of battleships. There was a general inclination to blame France for the failure of the conference to achieve larger results.

It almost looks as though France were destined to play a similar rôle at London. Unable to expand her navy during the war because of her preoccupation with the struggle on land, France has only just arrived at a financial position to consider naval development. At the beginning of 1930 the French Naval party has ambitious plans. It proposes a navy totaling in various categories 725,000 tons as against the present total of around 600,000 tons. France has 115,000 tons of cruisers and expects to increase this to 200,000. Her naval program calls for the construction of 90 destroyers by 1942 with a total tonnage of 200,000. Fifty of these new destroyers are to be 3,000 tons each which means that they will be equal to small cruisers and very much faster.

In submarines France has already achieved parity with Britain. Her undersea fleet includes 62 units,

the exact number belonging to the British fleet. But she is building 42 new submarines as against eighteen under construction in Britain. The French naval plans call for a total of 115 undersea craft, and the French marine minister has declared officially that France must have 130,000 tons of submarines.

Late in 1929 France launched the *Surcouf,* the world's largest submarine, with a displacement of 3,256 tons, a cruising radius of 13,000 miles, a speed of nineteen knots, and an armament which includes four five-and-one-half-inch guns. This undersea monster is armored against aircraft—carries thirty torpedo tubes, can remain under water two and one-half days and carries a crew of 150 men. A craft of this type gives to the word submarine a new meaning and importance in connection with naval warfare.

In a recent report Senator Gustave de Kerguezec, Chairman of the Naval Commission of the French Senate, announces a new yardstick with which to measure naval parity. It includes the following factors: Area of territory, length of coasts, length of communications, external trade, sea-borne traffic. On the basis of this yardstick, if Italy is granted a ratio of one, the French Senator finds that the British Empire is entitled to a ratio of ten, the United States to a ratio of 4.2, France to a ratio of three and Japan to a ratio of 1.6. To us this seems fantastic but it does not appear so to the French Nationalists who were the mainstay of most recent French governments.

All this explains why France is definitely opposed to any emphasis on ratios during the London discussions. She declares that national needs and not artificial ratios must determine a nation's naval strength. She is perfectly willing to postpone battleship replacement for five or even ten years from 1931 for the simple reason that she has not begun to build battleships and does not propose to do so. Her interest, as French naval plans indicate, is concentrated on other naval units. Since the close of the war the French have constantly harped upon security. After the American Senate refused to guarantee the Rhine frontier they were apprehensive and dissatisfied until Britain in the Locarno Pact guaranteed to France the permanent possession of Alsace Lorraine.

The French are realists. They declare that armaments merely reflect underlying political and economic differences, and until these are removed armaments are necessary. Many Frenchmen contend that since France is the second colonial power in the world, her navy should be second. When Aristide Briand returned from Washington in 1921 with the 1.75 ratio for battleships he was told that he had humiliated his country and he was forced out of office. France was determined that nothing of that kind should happen again and because preliminary negotiations were unsatisfactory she refused to participate in the Geneva Conference of 1927.

When Prime Minister MacDonald visited the

United States, France became apprehensive about an Anglo-American alliance. It required repeated positive declarations from the heads of both the British and American governments to reassure the French on this point. France realizes that under the Labor Government there has been a decided change in British policy. The Anglo-French Entente, carried forward by Sir Austen Chamberlain as the Conservative Foreign Minister, no longer exists. American opposition to the Anglo-French Naval agreement of 1928 brought it to an end. Chancellor of the Exchequer Snowden's successful bulldozing at the Hague Conference of 1929, which secured a larger share of German reparations for the British, further angered the French and alienated them from the MacDonald Labor Government. France moved to the Right and Britain to the Left with the result of widening the distance across the English Channel.

France also confronts a special situation in the Mediterranean. She is faced there by a Dictator who has frankly declared his purpose of achieving more colonial territory for Italy. He has his eye on Tunis in North Africa, on the island of Corsica and on Nice. He has loudly demanded parity with France despite the fact that France must maintain a navy on the Atlantic as well as in the Mediterranean and despite the special duties which fall to the French fleet because of distant colonial possessions.

Naval strength in the Mediterranean may well be-

come the dominant issue of the conference. British naval strategists maintain that Britain must maintain the two-power standard there. This means that the British Navy must always be as large as the French Navy plus the Italian Navy. At the present time France only has one-third of Britain's cruiser tonnage, and Italy has very much less, so that the two-power standard is more than maintained. But it is obvious that if the French carry their building program into effect, the situation will be changed, and if Italy even begins to build a navy equal to that of France, naval competition in the Mediterranean would soon present a serious problem. Already the French are suggesting that they must also envisage an Italian-Spanish combine, since these two Mediterranean powers might readily agree to join their forces against France.

Among several suggestions for the solution of this difficulty is that of a Mediterranean Locarno, an agreement by Britain that she would protect either France or Italy from aggression by the other. This would make Britain the guarantor of peace in the Mediterranean in the same sense that she has become the guarantor of peace on the Rhine. The Labor Government has not reacted enthusiastically to this suggestion. It has no desire to commit Britain to any more military obligations. Yet it is more than possible that some such agreement would prove the only way to persuade France and Italy to accept

definite naval limitations. Nor can it be forgotten that Britain already stands in the position of arbiter in a Mediterranean war since she controls the two exits and entrances to that ocean at the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

Beginning in November, 1929, France and Italy engaged in conversations to see if they could settle some of these differences. The overthrow of the Briand Ministry and the succession of André Tardieu's more conservative government first delayed negotiations and then made them more difficult.

The Italians declare that they have the same right to parity with France that the United States has to parity with Britain. They point out that with us it is largely a question of prestige and they feel the same way about it. They cite Italy's long coast line, most of it undefended and point to the fact that they are dependent upon foreign supplies of food. Most important of all Italy's right to parity was established at Washington in 1921 when she received the same ratio in battleships as France. Italy's statement at London on her naval needs was not at all belligerent and indicated a very genuine desire for the achievement of actual naval reduction. But it emphasized very definitely Italy's determination to insist upon the grant of naval parity with France.

This Mediterranean issue is the most serious and the most difficult which the conference confronts. It cannot and will not be finally settled in London. The

best we can hope for is a temporary agreement which will postpone the naval rivalry that is now imminent. France insists to-day as she has in the past, that land and naval armaments are linked and what is done at London must be definitely related to the work of the League of Nations on disarmament.

Despite some American objection to any mention of the League, the British Government in its invitation to the London parley declared that the work to be done there will not conflict with or rival the disarmament machinery of the League of Nations. A League observer was invited to London and participated in the Conference sessions.

Foreign Minister Henderson in the note of invitation had the French point of view in mind when he said: "I should like to emphasize that His Majesty's Government has discovered no inclination in any quarter to set up new machinery for dealing with the naval disarmament question. On the contrary, it is hoped that by this means a text can be elaborated which will facilitate the task of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission and of the subsequent general disarmament conference."

It is because this paragraph was included in the invitation that the Council of the League of Nations was more willing to change its meeting date to avoid conflict with the opening of the London parley. For the first time since it established regular meetings in

1923, the Council of the League of Nations gave way to another international conference. It seems that when Prime Minister MacDonald and President Hoover agreed on the date of the London meeting in Washington, they forgot all about the League.

The League Council met January 13th and adjourned four days later, thus clearing the way for the London meeting to begin on January 21st. It is because London cannot provide a final solution for all the problems it confronts that there must be reference to the League. During the first decade of its existence the League of Nations has worked out an admirable technique of postponement when immediate solution becomes impossible. It has sometimes seemed that there should have been more pressure for final solutions, but the technique of postponement has at least served to avoid both failure and bitterness. That technique was found useful at London. Several delegates at the opening of the conference stressed the fact that similar meetings would recur—Ramsay MacDonald suggested five-year intervals to carry the work forward.

Progress will be made at London; certain problems will be solved; there will be definite agreements on some points; but we would be foolish to hope or expect that this meeting will be anything more than a step, presumably a large step, in the direction of organizing world peace.

The essential lesson of the post-war years is, after

all, that it is futile to hope for miracles in developing better relations among men and nations. We can well afford to be content with slow progress, so long as it is real progress. The one thing we must not admit is failure. We must not give way to discouragement. We must renew our enthusiasm at the beginning of each new effort. It is our task to fight the good fight. The happy millennium of peace on earth—good will to men, will not come in our time, but if we can bring it only a little nearer those of us who believe in the new order will have justified our faith.

THE END